Charles 5.th

Engraved for Chapman & Lang's Edition of Robertson's Charles. 5.th 1800.

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THE

HISTORY OF THE REIGN

OF THE

EMPEROR CHARLES V.

WITH A VIEW OF THE

Progress of Society in Europe,

FROM THE

SUBVERSION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE,

TO THE

BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

BY

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EMPEROR CHARLES V.

BOOK I.

CHARLES V. was born at Ghent on the twenty-fourth day of February, in the year one thouſand five hundred. His father, Philip the Handſome, archduke of Auſtria, was the ſon of the emperor Maximilian, and of Mary, the only child of Charles the Bold, the laſt prince of the houſe of Burgundy. His mother, Joanna, was the ſecond daughter of Ferdinand king of Aragon, and of Iſabella queen of Caſtile.

A long train of fortunate events had opened the way for this young prince to the inheritance of more extenſive dominions, than any European monarch, ſince Charlemagne, had poſſeſſed. Each of his anceſtors had acquired kingdoms or provinces, towards which their proſpect of ſucceſſion was extremely remote. The rich poſſeſſions of Mary of Burgundy had been deſtined for another family, ſhe having been contracted by her father to the only ſon of Louis XI. of France; but that capricious monarch, indulging his hatred to her family, choſe rather to ſtrip her of part of her territories by force, than to ſecure the whole by marriage; and by this miſconduct, fatal to his poſterity, he threw all the Netherlands and Franche Comte into the hands of a rival. Iſabella, the daughter of John II. of Caſtile, far from having any proſpect of that noble inheritance

which ſhe tranſmitted to her grandſon, paſſed the early part of her life in obſcurity and indigence. But the Caſtilians, exaſperated againſt her brother Henry IV. an ill-adviſed and vicious prince, publicly charged him with impotence, and his queen with adultery. Upon his demiſe, rejecting Joanna, whom Henry had uniformly, and even on his death-bed, owned to be his lawful daughter, and whom an aſſembly of the ſtates had acknowledged to be the heir of his kingdom, they obliged her to retire into Portugal, and placed Iſabella on the throne of Caſtile. Ferdinand owed the crown of Aragon to the unexpected death of his elder brother, and acquired the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily by violating the faith of treaties, and diſregarding the ties of blood. To all theſe kingdoms, Chriſtopher Columbus, by an effort of genius and of intrepidity, the boldeſt and moſt ſucceſsful that is recorded in the annals of mankind, added a new world, the wealth of which became one conſiderable ſource of the power and grandeur of the Spaniſh monarchs.

Don John, the only ſon of Ferdinand and Iſabella, and their eldeſt daughter, the queen of Portugal, being cut off, without iſſue, in the flower of youth, all their hopes centered in Joanna and her poſterity. But as her huſband, the archduke, was a ſtranger to the Spaniards, it was thought expedient to invite him into Spain, that by reſiding among them, he might accuſtom himſelf to their laws and manners; and it was expected that the Cortes, or aſſembly of ſtates, whoſe authority was then ſo great in Spain, that no title to the crown was reckoned valid unleſs it received their ſanction, would acknowledge his right of ſucceſſion, together with that of the infanta, his wife. Philip and Joanna, paſſing through France in their way to Spain, were entertained in that kingdom with the utmoſt magnificence. The archduke did homage to Louis XII. for the earldom of Flanders, and took his ſeat as a peer of the realm in the parliament of Paris. They were received in Spain with every mark of honour that the parental affection of Ferdinand and

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Iſabella, or the reſpect of their ſubjects, could deviſe; and their title to the crown was ſoon after acknowledged by the Cortes of both kingdoms.

But amidſt theſe outward appearances of ſatisfaction and joy, ſome ſecret uneaſineſs preyed upon the mind of each of theſe princes. The ſtately and reſerved ceremonial of the Spaniſh court was ſo burdenſome to Philip, a prince, young, gay, affable, fond of ſociety and of pleaſure, that he ſoon began to expreſs a deſire of returning to his native country, the manners of which were more ſuited to his temper. Ferdinand, obſerving the declining health of his queen, with whoſe life he knew that his right to the government of Caſtile muſt ceaſe, eaſily foreſaw, that a prince of Philip's diſpoſition, and who already diſcovered an extreme impatience to reign, would never conſent to his retaining any degree of authority in that kingdom; and the proſpect of this diminution of his power awakened the jealouſy of that ambitious monarch.

Iſabella beheld, with the ſentiments natural to a mother, the indifference and neglect with which the archduke treated her daughter, who was deſtitute of thoſe beauties of perſon, as well as thoſe accompliſhments of mind, which fix the affections of a huſband. Her underſtanding, always weak, was often diſordered. She doated on Philip with ſuch an exceſs of childiſh and indiſcreet fondneſs, as excited diſguſt rather than affection. Her jealouſy, for which her huſband's behaviour gave her too much cauſe, was proportioned to her love, and often broke out in the moſt extravagant actions. Iſabella, though ſenſible of her defects, could not help pitying her condition, which was ſoon rendered altogether deplorable, by the archduke's abrupt reſolution of ſetting out in the middle of winter for Flanders, and of leaving her in Spain. Iſabella, intreated him not to abandon his wife to grief and melancholy, which might prove fatal to her, as ſhe was near the time of her delivery. Joanna conjured him to put off his journey for three days only,

that ſhe might have the pleaſure of celebrating the feſtival of Chriſtmas in his company. Ferdinand, after repreſenting the imprudence of his leaving Spain, before he had time to become acquainted with the genius, or to gain the affections of the people, who were one day to be his ſubjects, beſought him, at leaſt, not to paſs through France, with which kingdom he was then at open war. Philip, without regarding either the dictates of humanity, or the maxims of prudence, perſiſted in his purpoſe; and on the twenty-ſecond of December ſet out for the Low Countries, by the way of France*.

From the moment of his departure, Joanna ſunk into a deep and ſullen melancholy†, and while ſhe was in that ſituation bore Ferdinand her ſecond ſon, for whom the power of his brother Charles afterwards procured the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, and to whom he at laſt tranſmitted the imperial ſceptre. Joanna was the only perſon in Spain who diſcovered no joy at the birth of this prince. Inſenſible to that, as well as to every other pleaſure, ſhe was wholly occupied with the thoughts of returning to her huſband; nor did ſhe, in any degree, recover tranquillity of mind, until ſhe arrived at Bruſſels next year§.

Philip, in paſſing through France, had an interview with Louis XII. and ſigned a treaty with him, by which he hoped that all the differences between France and Spain would have been finally terminated. But Ferdinand, whoſe affairs, at that time, were extremely proſperous in Italy, where the ſuperior genius of Gonſalvo de Cordova, the great captain, triumphed on every occaſion over the arms of France, did not pay the leaſt regard to what his ſon-in-law had concluded, and carried on hoſtilities with greater ardour than ever.

From this time Philip ſeems not to have taken any part in

* Petri Martyris Anglerii Epiſtolæ, 250—253.
† Id. Epiſt. 255.
§ Mariana, lib. 27. c. 11. 14. Flechier Vie de Ximen. 1. 191.

the affairs of Spain, waiting in quiet till the death either of Ferdinand or Iſabella ſhould open the way to one of their thrones. The latter of theſe events was not far diſtant. The untimely death of her ſon and eldeſt daughter had made a deep impreſſion on the mind of Iſabella; and as ſhe could derive but little conſolation for the loſſes which ſhe had ſuſtained either from her daughter Joanna, whoſe infirmities daily increaſed, or from her ſon-in-law, who no longer preſerved even the appearance of a decent reſpect towards that unhappy princeſs, her ſpirits and health began gradually to decline, and after languiſhing ſome months, ſhe died at Medina del Campo on the twenty-ſixth of November one thouſand five hundred and four. She was no leſs eminent for virtue than for wiſdom; and whether we conſider her behaviour as a queen, as a wife, or as a mother, ſhe is juſtly entitled to the high encomiums beſtowed on her by the Spaniſh hiſtorians*.

A few weeks before her death, ſhe made her laſt will, and being convinced of Joanna's incapacity to aſſume the reins of government into her own hands, and having no inclination to commit them to Philip, with whoſe conduct ſhe was extremely diſſatisfied, ſhe appointed Ferdinand regent or adminiſtrator of the affairs of Caſtile until her grandſon Charles ſhould attain the age of twenty. She bequeathed to Ferdinand likewiſe one half of the revenues which ſhould ariſe from the Indies, together with the grand maſterſhips of the three military orders; dignities which rendered the perſon who poſſeſſed them almoſt independent, and which Iſabella had, for that reaſon, annexed to the crown†, But before ſhe ſigned a deed ſo favourable to Ferdinand, ſhe obliged him to ſwear that he would not, by a ſecond marriage, or by any other means, endeavour to deprive Joanna or her poſterity of their right of ſucceſſion to any of his kingdoms‡.

* P. Mart. Ep. 279.

† P. Martyr. Ep. 277. Mar. Hiſt. lib. 28. c. 11. Fer. Hiſt. Gener. d'Eſpagne, tom. viii. 263.

‡ Mar. Hiſt. lib 28. c. 14.

Immediately upon the queen's death, Ferdinand reſigned the title of king of Caſtile, and iſſued orders to proclaim Joanna and Philip the ſovereigns of that kingdom. But, at the ſame time, he aſſumed the character of regent, in conſequence of Iſabella's teſtament; and not long after he prevailed on the Cortes of Caſtile to acknowledge his right to that office. This, however, he did not procure without difficulty, nor without diſcovering ſuch ſymptoms of alienation and diſguſt among the Caſtilians as filled him with great uneaſineſs. The union of Caſtile and Aragon, for almoſt thirty years, had not ſo entirely extirpated the ancient and hereditary enmity which ſubſiſted between the natives of theſe kingdoms, that the Caſtilian pride could ſubmit, without murmuring, to the government of a king of Aragon. Ferdinand's own character, with which the Caſtilians were well acquainted, was far from rendering his authority deſirable. Suſpicious, diſcerning, ſevere, and parſimonious, he was accuſtomed to obſerve the minute actions of his ſubjects with a jealous attention, and to reward their higheſt ſervices with little liberality; and they were now deprived of Iſabella, whoſe gentle qualities, and partiality to her Caſtilian ſubjects, often tempered his auſterity, or rendered it tolerable. The maxims of his government were eſpecially odious to the grandees; for that artful prince, ſenſible of the dangerous privileges conferred upon them by the feudal inſtitutions, had endeavoured to curb their exorbitant power*, by extending the royal juriſdiction, by protecting their injured vaſſals, by increaſing the immunities of cities, and by other meaſures equally prudent. From all theſe cauſes, a formidable party among the Caſtilians united againſt Ferdinand, and though the perſons who compoſed it had not hitherto taken any public ſtep in oppoſition to him, he plainly ſaw, that upon the leaſt encouragement from their new king, they would proceed to the moſt violent extremities.

* Marian. lib. 28. c. 12.

There was no leſs agitation in the Netherlands, upon receiving the accounts of Iſabella's death, and of Ferdinand's having aſſumed the government of Caſtile. Philip was not of a temper tamely to ſuffer himſelf to be ſupplanted by the ambition of his father-in-law. If Joanna's infirmities, and the non-age of Charles, rendered them incapable of government, he, as a huſband, was the proper guardián of his wife, and, as a father, the natural tutor of his ſon. Nor was it ſufficient to oppoſe to theſe juſt rights, and to the inclination of the people of Caſtile, the authority of a teſtament, the genuineneſs of which was perhaps doubtful, and its contents to him appeared certainly to be iniquitous. A keener edge was added to Philip's reſentment, and new vigour infuſed into his councils by the arrival of Don John Manuel. He was Ferdinand's ambaſſador at the Imperial court, but upon the firſt notice of Iſabella's death repaired to Bruſſels, flattering himſelf, that under a young and liberal prince, he might attain to power and honours, which he could never have expected in the ſervice of an old and frugal maſter. He had early paid court to Philip during his reſidence in Spain, with ſuch aſſiduity as entirely gained his confidence; and having been trained to buſineſs under Ferdinand, could oppoſe his ſchemes with equal abilities, and with arts not inferior to thoſe for which that monarch was diſtinguiſhed§.

By the advice of Manuel, ambaſſadors were diſpatched to require Ferdinand to retire into Aragon, and to reſign the government of Caſtile to thoſe perſons whom Philip ſhould entruſt with it, until his own arrival in that kingdom. Such of the Caſtilian nobles as had diſcovered any diſſatisfaction with Ferdinand's adminiſtration, were encouraged by every method to oppoſe it. At the ſame time a treaty was concluded with Louis XII. by which Philip flattered himſelf, that he had ſecured the friendſhip and aſſiſtance of that monarch.

§ Zurita Annales de Aragon, tom. vi. p. 12.

Meanwhile, Ferdinand employed all the arts of addreſs and policy, in order to retain the power of which he had got poſſeſſion. By means of Conchillos, an Aragonian gentleman, he entered into a private negotiation with Joanna, and prevailed on that weak princeſs to confirm, by her authority, his right to the regency. But this intrigue did not eſcape the penetrating eye of Don John Manuel; Joanna's letter of conſent was intercepted; Conchillos was thrown into a dungeon; ſhe herſelf confined to an apartment in the palace, and all her Spaniſh domeſtics ſecluded from her preſence*.

The mortification which the diſcovery of this intrigue occaſioned to Ferdinand was much increaſed by his obſerving the progreſs which Philip's emiſſaries made in Caſtile. Some of the nobles retired to their caſtles; others to the towns in which they had influence: they formed themſelves into confederacies, and began to aſſemble their vaſſals. Ferdinand's court was almoſt totally deſerted; not a perſon of diſtinction but Ximenes, archbiſhop of Toledo, the duke of Alva, and the marquis of Denia, remaining there; while the houſes of Philip's ambaſſadors were daily crowded with noblemen of the higheſt rank.

Exaſperated at this univerſal defection, and mortified perhaps with ſeeing all his ſchemes defeated by a younger politician, Ferdinand reſolved, in defiance of the law of nature, and of decency, to deprive his daughter and her poſterity of the crown of Caſtile, rather than renounce the regency of that kingdom. His plan for accompliſhing this was no leſs bold, than the intention itſelf was wicked. He demanded in marriage Joanna, the ſuppoſed daughter of Henry IV. on the belief of whoſe illegitimacy Iſabella's right to the crown of Caſtile was founded: and by reviving the claim of this princeſs, in oppoſition to which he himſelf had formerly led armies and fought battles, he hoped once more to get poſſeſſion of the throne of that kingdom. But

* P. Mart. Ep. 287. Zurita Annales, vi. p. 14.

Emanuel, king of Portugal, in whoſe dominions Joanna reſided, at that time having married one of Ferdinand's daughters by Iſabella, refuſed his conſent to that unnatural match; and the unhappy princeſs herſelf, having loſt all reliſh for the objects of ambition, by being long immured in a convent, diſcovered no leſs averſion to it*.

The reſources, however, of Ferdinand's ambition were not exhauſted. Upon meeting with a repulſe in Portugal, he turned towards France, and ſought in marriage Germain de Foix, a daughter of the viſcount of Narbonne, and of Mary, the ſiſter of Louis XII. The war which that monarch had carried on againſt Ferdinand in Naples, had been ſo unfortunate, that he liſtened with joy to a propoſal, which furniſhed him with an honourable pretence for concluding peace: and though no prince was ever more remarkable than Ferdinand for making all his paſſions bend to the maxims of intereſt, or become ſubſervient to the purpoſes of ambition, yet ſo vehement was his reſentment againſt his ſon-in-law, that the deſire of gratifying it rendered him regardleſs of every other conſideration. In order to be revenged of Philip, by detaching Louis from his intereſt, and in order to gain a chance of excluding him from his hereditary throne of Aragon, and the dominions annexed to it, he was ready once more to divide Spain into ſeparate kingdoms, though the union of theſe was the great glory of his reign, and had been the chief object of his ambition; he conſented to reſtore the Neapolitan nobles of the French faction to their poſſeſſions and honours; and ſubmitted to the ridicule of marrying, in an advanced age, a princeſs of eighteen†.

The concluſion of this match, which deprived Philip of his only ally, and threatened him with the loſs of ſo many kingdoms, gave him a dreadful alarm, and convinced Don

* Sandov. Hiſt. of Civil Wars in Caſtile. Lon. 1655. p. 5. Zurita Annales de Aragon, tom. vi. p. 213.

† P. Mart. Ep. 290, 292. Mariana, lib. 28. c. 16, 17.

John Manuel that there was now a neceſſity of taking other meaſures with regard to the affairs of Spain‡. He accordingly inſtructed the Flemiſh ambaſſadors, in the court of Spain, to teſtify the ſtrong deſire which their maſter had of terminating all differences between him and Ferdinand in an amicable manner, and his willingneſs to conſent to any conditions that would re-eſtabliſh the friendſhip which ought to ſubſiſt between a father and a ſon-in-law. Ferdinand, though he had made and broken more treaties than any prince of any age, was apt to confide ſo far in the ſincerity of other men, or to depend ſo much upon his own addreſs and their weakneſs, as to be always extremely fond of a negotiation. He liſtened with eagerneſs to theſe declarations, and ſoon concluded a treaty at Salamanca [Nov. 24]; in which it was ſtipulated, that the government of Caſtile ſhould be carried on in the joint names of Joanna, of Ferdinand, and of Philip; and that the revenues of the crown, as well as the right of conferring offices, ſhould be ſhared between Ferdinand and Philip, by an equal diviſion*.

Nothing, however, was farther from Philip's thoughts than to obſerve this treaty. His ſole intention in propoſing it was to amuſe Ferdinand, and to prevent him from taking any meaſures for obſtructing his voyage into Spain. It had that effect. Ferdinand, ſagacious as he was, did not for ſome time ſuſpect his deſign; and though when he perceived it, he prevailed on the king of France not only to remonſtrate againſt the archduke's journey, but to threaten hoſtilities if he ſhould undertake it; though he ſolicited the duke of Gueldres to attack his ſon-in-law's dominions in the Low-Countries, Philip and his conſort nevertheleſs ſet ſail with a numerous fleet, and a good body of land forces. They were obliged, by a violent tempeſt, to take ſhelter in England, where Henry VII. in compliance with Ferdi-

‡ P. Mart. Ep. 293.
* Zurita Annales de Aragon, vi. 19. P. Mart. Ep. 293, 294.

nand's ſolicitations, detained them upwards of three months*; at laſt they were permitted to depart, and after a more proſperous voyage, they arrived in ſafety at Corunna in Galicia [April 28], nor durſt Ferdinand attempt, as he had once intended, to oppoſe their landing by force of arms.

The Caſtilian nobles, who had been obliged hitherto to conceal or to diſſemble their ſentiments, now declared openly in favour of Philip. From every corner of the kingdom, perſons of the higheſt rank, with numerous retinues of their vaſſals, repaired to their new ſovereign. The treaty of Salamanca was univerſally condemned, and all agreed to exclude from the government of Caſtile a prince, who, by conſenting to disjoin Aragon and Naples from that crown, diſcovered ſo little concern for its true intereſts. Ferdinand, meanwhile, abandoned by almoſt all the Caſtilians, diſconcerted by their revolt, and uncertain whether he ſhould peaceably relinquiſh his power, or take arms in order to maintain it, earneſtly ſolicited an interview with his ſon-in-law, who, by the advice of Manuel, ſtudiouſly avoided it. Convinced, at laſt, by ſeeing the number and zeal of Philip's adherents daily increaſe, that it was vain to think of reſiſting ſuch a torrent, Ferdinand conſented, by treaty, to reſign the regency of Caſtile into the hands of Philip [June 27], to retire into his hereditary dominions of Aragon, and to reſt ſatisfied with the maſterſhips of the military orders, and that ſhare of the revenue of the Indies, which Iſabella had bequeathed to him. Though an interview between the princes was no longer neceſſary, it was agreed to on both ſides from motives of decency. Philip repaired to the place appointed, with a ſplendid retinue of Caſtilian nobles, and a conſiderable body of armed men. Ferdinand appeared without any pomp, attended by a few followers mounted on mules, and unarmed. On that occaſion Don John Manuel had the pleaſure of diſplaying before the monarch, whom he had deſerted, the extenſive influence which he had

* Ferrer. Hiſt. viii. 285.

acquired over his new maſter: while Ferdinand ſuffered, in preſence of his former ſubjects, the two moſt cruel mortifications which an artful and ambitious prince can feel; being at once over-reached in conduct, and ſtripped of power†.

Not long after [July], he retired into Aragon; and hoping that ſome favourable accident would ſoon open the way for his return into Caſtile, he took care to proteſt, though with great ſecrecy, that the treaty concluded with his ſon-in-law, being extorted by force, ought to be deemed void of all obligation*.

Philip took poſſeſſion of his new authority with a youthful joy. The unhappy Joanna, from whom he derived it, remained, during all theſe conteſts, under the dominion of a deep melancholy; ſhe was ſeldom allowed to appear in public; her father, though he had often deſired it, was refuſed acceſs to her; and Philip's chief object was to prevail on the Cortes to declare her incapable of government, that an undivided power might be lodged in his hands, until his ſon ſhould attain to full age. But ſuch was the partial attachment of the Caſtilians to their native princeſs, that though Manuel had the addreſs to gain ſome members of the Cortes aſſembled at Valladolid, and others were willing to gratify their new ſovereign in his firſt requeſt, the great body of the repreſentatives refuſed their conſent to a declaration which they thought ſo injurious to the blood of their monarchs‡. They were unanimous, however, in acknowledging Joanna and Philip, queen and king of Caſtile, and their ſon Charles prince of Aſturias.

This was almoſt the only memorable event during Philip's adminiſtration. A fever put an end to his life in the twenty-eighth year of his age [Sept 25,] when he had not en-

† Zurita Annales de Arag. vi 64. Mar. lib. 28. c. 19, 20. P. Mart. Ep. 304, 305. &c.

* Zurita Annales de Arag. vi. p. 68. Ferrer. Hiſt. viii. 290.

‡ Zurita Annales de Arag. vi. p. 75.

joyed the regal dignity, which he had been ſo eager to obtain, full three months*.

The whole royal authority in Caſtile ought of courſe to have devolved upon Joanna. But the ſhock occaſioned by a diſaſter ſo unexpected as the death of her huſband, completed the diſorder of her underſtanding, and her incapacity for government. During all the time of Philip's ſickneſs no intreaty could prevail on her, though in the ſixth month of her pregnancy, to leave him for a moment. When he expired, however, ſhe did not ſhed one tear, or utter a ſingle groan. Her grief was ſilent and ſettled. She continued to watch the dead body with the ſame tenderneſs and attention as if it had been alive‡; and though at laſt ſhe permitted it to buried, ſhe ſoon removed it from the tomb to her own apartment. There it was laid upon a bed of ſtate, in a ſplendid dreſs: and having heard from ſome monk a legendary tale of a king who revived after he had been dead fourteen years ſhe kept her eyes almoſt conſtantly fixed on the body, waiting for the happy moment of its return to life. Nor was this capricious affection for her dead huſband leſs tinctured with jealouſy, than that which ſhe had born to him while alive. She did not permit any of her female attendants to approach the bed on which his corpſe was laid; ſhe would not ſuffer any woman who did not belong to her family to enter the apartment; and rather than grant that privilege to a midwife, though a very aged one had been choſen on purpoſe, ſhe bore the princeſs Catharine without any other aſſiſtance than that of her own domeſtics†.

A woman in ſuch a ſtate of mind was little capable of governing a great kingdom; and Joanna, who made it her ſole employment to bewail the loſs, and to pray for the ſoul of her huſband, would have thought her attention to public

* Marian. lib. 28. c. 23.

‡ P. Mart. Ep. 316.

† Mar. Hiſt. lib. 29. c. 3 & 5. P. Mart. Ep. 318, 324, 328, 332.

affairs an impious neglect of thoſe duties which ſhe owed to him. But though ſhe declined aſſuming the adminiſtration herſelf, yet by a ſtrange caprice of jealouſy, ſhe refuſed to commit it to any other perſon; and no intreaty of her ſubjects could perſuade her to name a regent, or even to ſign ſuch papers as were neceſſary for the execution of juſtice, and the ſecurity of the kingdom.

The death of Philip threw the Caſtilians into the greateſt perplexity. It was neceſſary to appoint a regent, both on account of Joanna's frenzy, and the infancy of her ſon; and as there was not among the nobles any perſon ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed, either by ſuperiority in rank or abilities, as to be called by the public voice to that high office, all naturally turned their eyes either towards Ferdinand, or towards the emperor Maximilian. The former claimed that dignity as adminiſtrator for his daughter, and by virtue of the teſtament of Iſabella; the latter thought himſelf the legal guardian of his grandſon, whom, on account of his mother's infirmity, he already conſidered as king of Caſtile. Such of the nobility as had lately been moſt active in compelling Ferdinand to reſign the government of the kingdom, trembled at the thoughts of his being reſtored ſo ſoon to his former dignity. They dreaded the return of a monarch, not apt to forgive, and who to thoſe defects with which they were already acquainted, added that reſentment which the remembrance of their behaviour, and reflection upon his own diſgrace, muſt naturally have excited. Though none of theſe objections lay againſt Maximilian, he was a ſtranger to the laws and manners of Caſtile; he had not either troops or money to ſupport his pretenſions; nor could his claim be admitted without a public declaration of Joanna's incapacity for government, an indignity to which, notwithſtanding the notoriety of her diſtemper, the delicacy of the Caſtilians could not bear the thoughts of ſubjecting her.

Don John Manuel, however and a few of the nobles, who conſidered themſelves as moſt obnoxious to Ferdinand's diſ-

pleaſure, declared for Maximilian, and offered to ſupport his claim with all their intereſt. Maximilian always enterpriſing and deciſive in council, though feeble and dilatory in execution, eagerly embraced the offer. But a ſeries of ineffectual negotiations was the only conſequence of this tranſaction. The emperor, as uſual, aſſerted his rights in a high ſtrain, promiſed a great deal, and performed nothing*.

A few days before the death of Philip, Ferdinand had ſet out for Naples, that, by his own preſence, he might put an end, with greater decency, to the viceroyalty of the great captain, whoſe important ſervices, and cautious conduct, did not ſcreen him from the ſuſpicions of his jealous maſter. Though an account of his ſon-in-law's death reached him at Porto-fino, in the territories of Genoa, he was ſo ſolicitous to diſcover the ſecret intrigues which he ſuppoſed the great captain to have been carrying on, and to eſtabliſh his own authority on a firm foundation in the Neapolitan dominions, by removing him from the ſupreme command there, that rather than diſcontinue his voyage he choſe to leave Caſtile in a ſtate of anarchy, and even to riſque, by this delay, his obtaining poſſeſſion of the government of that kingdom†.

Nothing but the great abilities and prudent conduct of his adherents could have prevented the bad effects of this abſence. At the head of theſe was Ximenes, archbiſhop of Toledo, who though he had been raiſed to that dignity by Iſabella, contrary to the inclination of Ferdinand, and tho' he could have no expectation of enjoying much power under the adminiſtration of a maſter little diſpoſed to diſtinguiſh him by extraordinary marks of attention, was nevertheleſs ſo diſintereſted as to prefer the welfare of his country before his own grandeur, and to declare, that Caſtile could never be ſo happily governed as by a prince, whom long experience had renderd thoroughly acquainted with its true intereſt. The zeal of Ximenes to bring over his country-

* Mariana, lib. 29. c. 7. Zurita Annales de Arag. vi. 93.
† Zurita Annales de Arag. vi. p. 85.

men to this opinion, induced him to lay aſide ſomewhat of his uſual auſterity and haughtineſs. He condeſcended, on this occaſion, to court the diſaffected nobles, and employed addreſs, as well as arguments, to perſuade them. Ferdinand ſeconded his endeavours with great art; and by conceſſions to ſome of the grandees, by promiſes to others, and by letters full of complaiſance to all, he gained many of his moſt violent opponents†. Though many cabals were formed, and ſome commotions were excited, yet when Ferdinand, after having ſettled the affairs of Naples, arrived in Caſtile [Aug. 21, 1507], he entered upon the adminiſtration without oppoſition. The prudence with which he exerciſed his authority in that kingdom, equalled the good fortune by which he had recovered it. By a moderate, but ſteady adminiſtration, free from partiality and from reſentment, he reconciled the Caſtilians to his perſon, and ſecured to them, entirely during the remainder of his life, as much domeſtic tranquillity as was conſiſtent with the genius of the feudal government, which ſtill ſubſiſted among them in full vigour*.

Nor was the preſervation of tranquillity in his hereditary kingdoms, the only obligation which the archduke Charles owed to the wiſe regency of his grandfather; it was his good fortune, during that period, to have very important additions made to the dominions over which he was to reign. On the coaſt of Barbary, Oran, and other conqueſts of no ſmall value, were annexed to the crown of Caſtile by Cardinal Ximenes, who, with a ſpirit very uncommon in a monk, led in perſon a numerous army againſt the Moors of that country; and with a generoſity and magnificence ſtill more ſingular, defrayed the whole expence of the expedition out of his own revenues‡. In Europe, Ferdinand, under pretences no leſs frivolous than unjuſt; as well as by artifices the moſt ſhameful and treacherous, expelled John d'Albret, the lawful ſovereign, from the throne of Navarre; and, ſeiz-

† Zurita Annales de Arag. vi p. 87, 94, 109.
* Mariana, lib. 29. c. 10. ‡ Id. lib. 29. c. 18.

ing on that kingdom extended the limits of the Spaniſh monarchy from the Pyrenees on the one hand, to the frontiers of Portugal on the other†.

It was not, however, the deſire of aggrandizing the archduke, which influenced Ferdinand in this, or in any other of his actions. He was more apt to conſider that young prince as a rival, who might one day wreſt out of his hands the government of Caſtile, than as a grandſon, for whoſe intereſt he was entruſted with the adminiſtration. This jealouſy ſoon begot averſion, and even hatred, the ſymptoms of which he was at no pains to conceal. Hence proceeded his immoderate joy when his young queen was delivered of a ſon, whoſe life would have deprived Charles of the crowns of Aragon, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia; and upon the untimely death of that prince, he diſcovered, for the ſame reaſon, an exceſſive ſolicitude to have other children. This impatience haſtened, in all probability, the acceſſion of Charles to the crown of Spain. Ferdinand, in order to procure a bleſſing, of which, from his advanced age, and the intemperance of his youth, he could have little proſpect, had recourſe to his phyſicians, and by their preſcription took one of thoſe potions, which are ſuppoſed to add vigour to the conſtitution, though they more frequently prove fatal to it. This was its effect on a frame ſo feeble and exhauſted as that of Ferdinand; for though he ſurvived a violent diſorder which it at firſt occaſioned, it brought on ſuch an habitual languor and dejection of mind, as rendered him averſe from any ſerious attention to public affairs, and fond of frivolous amuſements, on which he had not hitherto beſtowed much time§. Though he now deſpaired of having any ſon of his own, his jealouſy of the archduke did not abate, nor could he help viewing him with that averſion which princes often bear to their ſucceſſors. In order to gratify this unnatural paſſion,

† Mar. lib. 30. c. 11, 12, 19, 24.

§ Zurita Annales de Arag. vi. p. 347. P. Mart. Ep. 531. Argenſola Annal. de Aragon, lib. i. p. 4.

he made a will, appointing prince Ferdinand, who, having been born and educated in Spain, was much beloved by the Spaniards, to be regent of all his kingdoms, until the arrival of the archduke his brother; and by the ſame deed he ſettled upon him the grand-maſterſhip of the three military orders. The former of theſe grants might have put it in the power of the young prince to have diſputed the throne with his brother; the latter would, in any event, have rendered him almoſt independent of him.

Ferdinand retained to the laſt that jealous love of power, which was ſo remarkable through his whole life. Unwilling even at the approach of death to admit a thought of relinquiſhing any portion of his authority, he removed continually from place to place, in order to fly from his diſtemper, or to forget it. Though his ſtrength declined every day, none of his attendants durſt mention his condition; nor would he admit his father confeſſor, who thought ſuch ſilence criminal and unchriſtian, into his preſence. At laſt the danger became ſo imminent, that it could be no longer concealed. Ferdinand received the intimation with a decent fortitude, and touched, perhaps, with compunction at the injuſtice which he had done his grandſon, or influenced by the honeſt remonſtrances of Carvajal, Zapata, and Vargas, his moſt ancient and faithful counſellors, who repreſented to him, that by inveſting prince Ferdinand with the regency, he would infallibly entail a civil war on the two brothers, and by beſtowing on him the grand-maſterſhip of the military orders, would ſtrip the crown of its nobleſt ornament and chief ſtrength, he conſented to alter his will with reſpect to both theſe particulars. By a new deed he left Charles the ſole heir of all his dominions, and allotted to prince Ferdinand, inſtead of that throne of which he thought himſelf almoſt ſecure, an inconſiderable eſtabliſhment of fifty thouſand ducats a year*. He died a few

* Mar. Hiſt. lib. 30. c. ult. Zurita. Annales de Arag. vi 401. P. Mart. Ep. 565, 566. Argenſola Annales de Arag. lib. i. p. 11.

hours after ſigning this will, on the twenty-third day of January, one thouſand five hundred and ſixteen.

Charles, to whom ſuch a noble inheritance deſcended by his death, was near the full age of ſixteen. He had hitherto reſided in the Low Countries, his paternal dominions. Margaret of Auſtria, his aunt, and Margaret of York, the ſiſter of Edward IV. of England, and widow of Charles the Bold, two princeſſes of great virtue and abilities, had the care of forming his early youth. Upon the death of his father, the Flemings committed the government of the Low Countries to his grandfather, the emperor Maximilian, with the name rather than the authority of regent†. Maximilian made choice of William de Croy lord of Chievres to ſuperintend the education of the young prince his grandſon*. That nobleman poſſeſſed, in an eminent degree, the

† Pontius Heuterus Rerum Auſtriacarum, lib. xv. Lov. 1649. lib. vii. c. 2. p. 155.

* The French hiſtorians, upon the authority of M. de Bellay, Mem. p. 11. have unanimouſly aſſerted, that Philip, by his laſt will, having appointed the king of France to have the direction of his ſon's education, Louis XII. with a diſintereſtedneſs ſuitable to the confidence repoſed in him, named Chievres for that office. Even the preſident Henaut has adopted this opinion. Abregé Chron. A. D. 1507. Varillas, in his uſual manner, pretends to have ſeen Philip's teſtament. Prac. de l'Education des Princes, p. 16. But the Spaniſh, German, and Flemiſh hiſtorians concur in contradicting this aſſertion of the French authors. It appears from Heuterus, a contemporary Flemiſh hiſtorian of great authority, that Louis XII. by conſenting to the marriage of Germaine de Foix with Ferdinand, had loſt much of that confidence which Philip once placed in him; that this diſguſt was increaſed by the French king's giving in marriage to the count of Angouleme his eldeſt daughter, whom he had formerly betrothed to Charles, Heuter. Rer. Auſtr. lib. v. 151: That the French, a ſhort time before Philip's death, had violated the peace which ſubſiſted between them and the Flemings, and Philip had complained of this injury, and was ready to reſent it. Heuter. ibid. All theſe circumſtances render it improbable that Philip, who made his will a few days before he died, Heuter. p. 152. ſhould commit the education of his ſon to Louis XII. In confirmation of theſe plauſible conjectures, poſitive teſtimony can be produced. It appears from Heuterus, that Philip, when he ſet out for Spain, had intruſted Chievres both with the care of his ſon's education, and with the government of his dominions in the Low Countries. Heuter. lib. vii.

talents which fitted him for ſuch an important office, and diſcharged the duties of it with great fidelity. Under Chievres, Adrian of Utrecht acted as preceptor. This preferment, which opened his way to the higheſt dignities an eccleſiaſtic can attain, he owed not to his birth, for that was extremely mean; nor to his intereſt, for he was a ſtranger to the arts of a court: but to the opinion which his countrymen entertained of his learning. He was indeed no inconſiderable proficient in thoſe frivolous ſciences, which, during ſeveral centuries, aſſumed the name of philoſophy, and had publiſhed a commentary, which was highly eſteemed, upon *The Book of Sentences*, a famous treatiſe of Petrus Lombardus, conſidered at that time as the ſtandard ſyſtem of metaphyſical theology. But whatever admiration theſe procured him in an illiterate age, it was ſoon found that a man accuſtomed to the retirement of a college, unacquainted with the world, and without any tincture of taſte or elegance, was by no means qualified for rendering ſcience agreeable to a young prince. Charles, accordingly, diſcovered an early averſion to learning, and an exceſſive fondneſs for thoſe violent and martial exerciſes, to excel in which was the chief pride, and almoſt the only ſtudy of perſons of rank in that age. Chievres encouraged this taſte, either from a deſire of gaining his pupil by indulgence, or from

p. 153. That an attempt was made, ſoon after Philip's death, to have the emperor Maximilian appointed regent, during the minority of his grandſon; but this being oppoſed, Chievres ſeems to have continued to diſcharge both the offices which Philip had committed to him. Heut. ibid. 153—155. That in the beginning of the year 1508, the Flemings invited Maximilian to accept of the regency; to which he conſented, and appointed his daughter, Margaret, together with a council of Flemings, to exerciſe the ſupreme authority, when he himſelf ſhould, at any time be abſent. He likewiſe named Chievres as governor, and Adrian Utrecht as preceptor to his ſon. Heut. ibid 155—157. What Heuterus relates with reſpect to this matter is confirmed by Moringus in Vita Adriani apud Analecta Caſp. Burmanni de Adriano, cap. 10; by Barlandus Chronic. Brabant. ibid. p. 25; and by Haræus Annal. Brab. vol. ii. 520, &c.

too ſlight an opinion of the advantages of literary accompliſhments*. He inſtructed him, however, with great care in the arts of government; he made him ſtudy the hiſtory not only of his own kingdoms, but of thoſe with which they were connected; he accuſtomed him, from the time of his aſſuming the government of Flanders in the year one thouſand five hundred and fifteen, to attend to buſineſs; he perſuaded him to peruſe all papers relating to public affairs; to be preſent at the deliberations of his privy-counſellors, and to propoſe to them himſelf thoſe matters, concerning which he required their opinion†. From ſuch an education, Charles contracted habits of gravity and recollection which ſcarcely ſuited his time of life. The firſt openings of his genius did not indicate that ſuperiority which its maturer age diſplayed‡. He did not diſcover in his youth the impetuoſity of ſpirit which commonly uſhers in an active and enterpriſing manhood. Nor did his early obſequiouſneſs to Chievres, and his other favourites, promiſe that capacious and deciſive judgment, which afterwards directed the affairs of one half of Europe. But his ſubjects, dazzled with the external accompliſhments of a graceful figure and manly addreſs, and viewing his character with that partiality which is always ſhewn to princes during their youth, entertained ſanguine hopes of his adding luſtre to thoſe crowns which deſcended to him by the death of Ferdinand.

The kingdoms of Spain, as is evident from the view which I have given of their political conſtitution, were at that time in a ſituation which required an adminiſtration no leſs vigorous than prudent. The feudal inſtitutions, which had been introduced into all its different provinces by the Goths, the Suevi, and the Vandals, ſubſiſted in great force.

* Jovii Vita Adriani, p. 91. Struvii Corpus Hiſt. Germ. ii. 967. P. Heuter. Rer. Auſtr. lib. vii. c. 3. p. 157.

† Memoires de Bellay, 8vo. Par. 1573. p. 11. P. Heuter. lib. viii. c. i. p. 184.

‡ P. Martyr, Ep. 569—655.

The nobles, who were powerful and warlike, had long poſſeſſed all the exorbitant privileges which theſe inſtitutions veſted in their order. The cities in Spain were more numerous and more conſiderable, than the genius of feudal government, naturally unfavourable to commerce and to regular police, ſeemed to admit. The perſonal rights, and political influence, which the inhabitants of theſe cities had acquired, were extenſive. The royal prerogative, circumſcribed by the privileges of the nobility, and by the pretenſions of the people, was confined within very narrow limits. Under ſuch a form of government, the principles of diſcord were many; the bond of union was extremely feeble; and Spain felt not only all the inconveniencies occaſioned by the defects in the feudal ſyſtem, but was expoſed to diſorders ariſing from the peculiarities in its own conſtitution.

During the long adminiſtration of Ferdinand, no internal commotion, it is true, had ariſen in Spain. His ſuperior abilities had enabled him to reſtrain the turbulence of the nobles, and to moderate the jealouſy of the commons. By the wiſdom of his domeſtic government, by the ſagacity with which he conducted his foreign operations, and by the high opinion that his ſubjects entertained of both, he had preſerved among them a degree of tranquillity, greater than was natural to a conſtitution, in which the ſeeds of diſcord and diſorder were ſo copiouſly mingled. But, by the death of Ferdinand, theſe reſtraints were at once withdrawn; and faction and diſcontent, from being long repreſſed, were ready to break out with fiercer animoſity.

In order to prevent theſe evils, Ferdinand had in his laſt will taken a moſt prudent precaution, by appointing cardinal Ximenes, archbiſhop of Toledo, to be ſole regent of Caſtile, until the arrival of his grandſon in Spain. The ſingular character of this man, and the extraordinary qualities which marked him out for that office at ſuch a juncture, merit a particular deſcription. He was deſcended of an honourable, not of a wealthy family; and the circumſtances of

his parents, as well as his own inclinations, having determined him to enter into the church, he early obtained benefices of great value, and which placed him in the way of the higheſt preferment. All theſe, however, he renounced at once; and after undergoing a very ſevere noviciate, aſſumed the habit of St. Francis in a monaſtery of Obſervantine friars, one of the moſt rigid orders in the Romiſh church. There he ſoon became eminent for his uncommon auſterity of manners, and for thoſe exceſſes of ſuperſtitious devotion, which are the proper characteriſtics of the monaſtic life. But notwithſtanding theſe extravagances, to which weak and enthuſiaſtic minds alone are uſually prone, his underſtanding, naturally penetrating and deciſive, retained its full vigour, and acquired him ſuch great authority in his own order, as raiſed him to be their provincial. His reputation for ſanctity ſoon procured him the office of father-confeſſor to queen Iſabella, which he accepted with the utmoſt reluctance. He preſerved in a court the ſame auſterity of manners which had diſtinguiſhed him in the cloiſter. He continued to make all his journies on foot; he ſubſiſted only upon alms; his acts of mortification were as ſevere as ever, and his penances as rigorous. Iſabella, pleaſed with her choice, conferred on him, not long after, the archbiſhopric of Toledo, which, next to the papacy, is the richeſt dignity in the church of Rome. This honour he declined with a firmneſs, which nothing but the authoritative injunction of the pope was able to overcome. Nor did this height of promotion change his manners. Though obliged to diſplay in public that magnificence which became his ſtation, he himſelf retained his monaſtic ſeverity. Under his pontifical robes he conſtantly wore the coarſe frock of St. Francis, the rents in which he uſed to patch with his own hands. He at no time uſed linen; but was commonly clad in hair-cloth. He ſlept always in his habit, moſt frequently on the ground, or on boards, rarely in a bed. He did not taſte any of the delicacies which appeared at his table, but ſatisfied himſelf with

that ſimple diet which the rule of his order preſcribed*. Notwithſtanding theſe peculiarities, ſo oppoſite to the manners of the world, he poſſeſſed a thorough knowledge of its affairs; and no ſooner was he called by his ſtation, and by the high opinion which Ferdinand and Iſabella entertained of him, to take a principal ſhare in the adminiſtration, than he diſplayed talents for buſineſs, which rendered the fame of his wiſdom equal to that of his ſanctity. His political conduct, remarkable for the boldneſs and originality of all his plans, flowed from his real character, and partook both of its virtues and its defects. His extenſive genius ſuggeſted to him ſchemes vaſt and magnificent. Conſcious of the integrity of his intentions, he purſued theſe with unremitting and undaunted firmneſs. Accuſtomed from his early youth to mortify his own paſſions, he ſhewed little indulgence towards thoſe of other men. Taught by his ſyſtem of religion to check even his moſt innocent deſires, he was the enemy of every thing to which he could affix the name of elegance or pleaſure. Though free from any ſuſpicion of cruelty, he diſcovered, in all his commerce with the world, a ſevere inflexibility of mind, and auſterity of character, peculiar to the monaſtic profeſſion, and which can hardly be conceived in a country where that is unknown.

Such was the man to whom Ferdinand committed the regency of Caſtile; and though Ximenes was then near fourſcore, and perfectly acquainted with the labour and difficulty of the office, his natural intrepidity of mind, and zeal for the public good, prompted him to accept of it without heſitation. Adrian of Utrecht, who had been ſent into Spain a few months before the death of Ferdinand, produced full powers from the archduke to aſſume the name and authority of regent, upon the demiſe of his grandfather; but ſuch was the averſion of the Spaniards to the government of a ſtranger, and ſo unequal the abilities of the two competi-

* Hiſtoire de l'adminiſtration du Card. Ximen. par Mich. Baudier, 4to. 1635, p. 13.

tors, that Adrian's claim would at once have been rejected, if Ximenes himſelf, from complaiſance to his new maſter, had not conſented to acknowledge him as regent, and to carry on the government in conjunction with him. By this, however, Adrian acquired a dignity merely nominal. Ximenes, though he treated him with great decency, and even reſpect, retained the whole power in his own hands†.

The cardinal's firſt care was to obſerve the motions of the infant Don Ferdinand, who, having been flattered with ſo near a proſpect of ſupreme power, bore the diſappointment of his hopes with greater impatience than a prince at a period of life ſo early could have been ſuppoſed to feel. Ximenes, under pretence of providing more effectually for his ſafety, removed him from Guadaloupe, the place in which he had been educated, to Madrid, where he fixed the reſidence of the court. There he was under the cardinal's own eye, and his conduct, with that of his domeſtics, was watched with the utmoſt attention§.

The firſt intelligence he received from the Low-Countries, gave greater diſquiet to the cardinal, and convinced him how difficult a taſk it would be to conduct the affairs of an unexperienced prince, under the influence of counſellors unacquainted with the laws and manners of Spain. No ſooner did the account of Ferdinand's death reach Bruſſels, than Charles, by the advice of his Flemiſh miniſters, reſolved to aſſume the title of king. By the laws of Spain, the ſole right to the crowns, both of Caſtile and of Aragon, belonged to Joanna; and though her infirmities diſqualified her from governing, this incapacity had not been declared by any public act of the Cortes in either kingdom: ſo that the Spaniards conſidered this reſolution, not only as a direct violation of their privileges, but as an unnatural uſurpation in a ſon on the prerogatives of a mother, towards whom, in her

† Gometius de reb. geſt. Ximenii, p. 150. fol. Compl. 1569.
§ Miniana Contin. Marianæ, lib. i. c. 2. Baudier Hiſt. de Ximenes, p. 118.

preſent unhappy ſituation, he manifeſted a leſs delicate regard than her ſubjects had always expreſſed*. The Flemiſh court, however, having prevailed both on the pope and on the emperor to addreſs letters to Charles as king of Caſtile; the former of whom, it was pretended, had a right, as head of the church, and the latter, as head of the empire, to confer this title; inſtructions were ſent to Ximenes, to prevail on the Spaniards to acknowledge it. Ximenes, though he had earneſtly remonſtrated againſt the meaſure, as no leſs unpopular than unneceſſary, reſolved to exert all his authority and credit in carrying it into execution, and immediately aſſembled ſuch of the nobles as were then at court. What Charles required was laid before them; and when, inſtead of complying with his demands, they began to murmur againſt ſuch an unprecedented encroachment on their privileges, and to talk high of the rights of Joanna, and their oath of allegiance to her, Ximenes haſtily interpoſed, and, with that firm and deciſive tone which was natural to him, told them that they were not called now to deliberate, but to obey; that their ſovereign did not apply to them for advice, but expected ſubmiſſion; and "this day," added he, "Charles ſhall be proclaimed king of Caſtile in Madrid; and the reſt of the cities, I doubt not, will follow its example." On the ſpot he gave orders for that purpoſe† [April 13]; and notwithſtanding the novelty of the practice, and the ſecret diſcontents of many perſons of diſtinction, Charles's title was univerſally recognized. In Aragon, where the privileges of the ſubject were more extenſive, and the abilities as well as authority of the archbiſhop of Saragoſſa, whom Ferdinand had appointed regent, were far inferior to thoſe of Ximenes, the ſame obſequiouſneſs to the will of Charles did not appear, nor was he acknowledged there under any other character but that of prince, until his arrival in Spain§.

* P. Mart. Ep. 568.
† Gometius, p. 152, &c. Baudier Hiſt. de Ximen. p. 121.
§ P. Mart. Ep. 572.

Ximenes, though poſſeſſed only of delegated power, which from his advanced age, he could not expect to enjoy long, aſſumed, together with the character of regent, all the ideas natural to a monarch, and adopted ſchemes for extending the regal authority, which he purſued with as much intrepidity and ardour, as if he himſelf had been to reap the advantages reſulting from their ſucceſs. The exorbitant privileges of the Caſtilian nobles circumſcribed the prerogative of the prince within very narrow limits. Theſe privileges the cardinal conſidered as ſo many unjuſt extortions from the crown, and determined to abridge them. Dangerous as the attempt was, there were circumſtances in his ſituation which promiſed him greater ſucceſs than any king of Caſtile could have expected. His ſtrict and prudent economy of his archiepiſcopal revenues furniſhed him with more ready money than the crown could at any time command; the ſanctity of his manners, his charity and munificence, rendered him the idol of the people; and the nobles themſelves, not ſuſpecting any danger from him, did not obſerve his motions with the ſame jealous attention, as they would have watched thoſe of one of their monarchs.

Immediately upon his acceſſion to the regency, ſeveral of the nobles, fancying that the reins of government would of conſequence be ſomewhat relaxed, began to aſſemble their vaſſals, and to proſecute, by force of arms, private quarrels and pretenſions, which the authority of Ferdinand had obliged them to diſſemble, or to relinquiſh. But Ximenes, who had taken into pay a good body of troops, oppoſed and defeated all their deſigns with unexpected vigour and facility; and though he did not treat the authors of theſe diſorders with any cruelty, he forced them to acts of ſubmiſſion, extremely mortifying to the haughty ſpirit of Caſtilian grandees.

But while the cardinal's attacks were confined to individuals, and every act of rigour was juſtified by the appearance of neceſſity, founded on the forms of juſtice, and tempered

with a mixture of lenity, there was ſcarcely room for jealouſy or complaint. It was not ſo with his next meaſure, which, by ſtriking at a privilege eſſential to the nobility, gave a general alarm to the whole order. By the feudal conſtitution, the military power was lodged in the hands of the nobles, and men of an inferior condition were called into the field only as their vaſſals, and to follow their banners. A king, with ſcanty revenues, and a limited prerogative, depended on theſe potent barons, in all his operations. It was with their forces he attacked his enemies, and with them he defended his kingdom. While at the head of troops attached warmly to their own immediate lords, and accuſtomed to obey no other commands, his authority was precarious, and his efforts feeble. From this ſtate Ximenes reſolved to deliver the crown; and as mercenary ſtanding armies were unknown under the feudal government, and would have been odious to a martial and generous people, he iſſued a proclamation, commanding every city in Caſtile to enroll a certain number of its burgeſſes, in order that they might be trained to the uſe of arms on Sundays and holidays; he engaged to provide officers to command them at the public expence; and as an encouragement to the private men, promiſed them an exemption from all taxes and impoſitions. The frequent incurſions of the Moors from Africa, and the neceſſity of having ſome force always ready to oppoſe them, furniſhed a plauſible pretence for this innovation. The object really in view was to ſecure the king a body of troops independent of his barons, and which might ſerve to counterbalance their power§. The nobles were not ſlow in perceiving what was his intention, and ſaw how effectually the ſcheme which he had adopted would accompliſh his end; but as a meaſure which had the pious appearance of reſiſting the progreſs of the infidels was extremely popular, and as any oppoſition to it, ariſing from their order alone, would have been imputed wholly to intereſted motives, they en-

§ Minianæ Continuatio Marianæ, fol. Hag. 1733. p. 3.

deavoured to excite the cities themſelves to refuſe obedience, and to inveigh againſt the proclamation as inconſiſtent with their charters and privileges. In conſequence of their inſtigations, Burgos, Valladolid, and ſeveral other cities, roſe in open mutiny. Some of the grandees declared themſelves their protectors. Violent remonſtrances were preſented to the king. His Flemiſh counſellors were alarmed. Ximenes alone continued firm and undaunted; and partly by terror, partly by entreaty; by force in ſome inſtances, and by forbearance in others; he prevailed on all the refractory cities to comply §. During his adminiſtration, he continued to execute his plan with vigour; but ſoon after his death it was entirely dropped.

His ſucceſs in this ſcheme for reducing the exorbitant power of the nobility, encouraged him to attempt a diminution of their poſſeſſions, which were no leſs exorbitant. During the conteſts and diſorders inſeparable from the feudal government, the nobles, ever attentive to their own intereſt, and taking advantage of the weakneſs or diſtreſs of their monarchs, had ſeized ſome parts of the royal demeſnes, obtained grants of others, and having gradually wreſted almoſt the whole out of the hands of the prince, had annexed them to their own eſtates. The titles, by which moſt of the grandees held theſe lands, were extremely defective; it was from ſome ſucceſsful uſurpation, which the crown had been too feeble to diſpute, that many derived their only claim to poſſeſſion. An inquiry carried back to the origin of theſe encroachments, which were almoſt coëval with the feudal ſyſtem, was impracticable; and as it would have ſtripped every nobleman in Spain of great part of his lands, it muſt have excited a general revolt. Such a ſtep was too bold, even for the enterpriſing genius of Ximenes. He confined himſelf to the reign of Ferdinand; and beginning with the penſions granted during that time, refuſed to make any farther payment, becauſe all right to them expired with

§ P. Mart. Ep. 556, &c. Gometius, p. 160, &c.

his life. He then called to account ſuch as had acquired crown lands under the adminiſtration of that monarch, and at once reſumed whatever he had alienated. The effects of theſe revocations extended to many perſons of high rank; for tho' Ferdinand was a prince of little generoſity, yet he and Iſabella having been raiſed to the throne of Caſtile by a powerful faction of the nobles, they were obliged to reward the zeal of their adherents with great liberality, and the royal demeſnes were their only fund for that purpoſe. The addition made to the revenue of the crown by theſe revocations, together with his own frugal economy, enabled Ximenes not only to diſcharge all the debts which Ferdinand had left, and to remit conſiderable ſums to Flanders, but to pay the officers of his new militia, and to eſtabliſh magazines not only more numerous, but better furniſhed with artillery, arms, and warlike ſtores, than Spain had ever poſſeſſed in any former age*. The prudent and diſintereſted application of theſe ſums, was a full apology to the people for the rigour with which they were exacted.

The nobles, alarmed at theſe repeated attacks, began to think of precautions for the ſafety of their order. Many cabals were formed, loud complaints were uttered, and deſperate reſolutions taken; but before they proceeded to extremities, they appointed ſome of their number to examine the powers in conſequence of which the cardinal exerciſed acts of ſuch high authority. The admiral of Caſtile, the duke de Infantado, and the Conde de Benevento, grandees of the firſt rank, were entruſted with this commiſſion. Ximenes received them with cold civility, and in anſwer to their demand, produced the teſtament of Ferdinand by which he was appointed regent, together with the ratification of that deed by Charles. To both theſe they objected; and he endeavoured to eſtabliſh their validity. As the converſation grew warm, he led them inſenſibly towards a balcony, from which they had a view of a large body of troops

* Flechier Vie de Ximen. ii. 600.

under arms, and of a formidable train of artillery. "Behold," ſays he, pointing to theſe and raiſing his voice, "the powers which I have received from his Catholic majeſty. With theſe I govern Caſtile; and with theſe I will govern it, until the king your maſter and mine takes poſſeſſion of his kingdom§." A declaration ſo bold and haughty ſilenced them, and aſtoniſhed their aſſociates. To take arms againſt a man aware of his danger, and prepared for his defence, was what deſpair alone would dictate. All thoughts of a general confederacy againſt the Cardinal's adminiſtration were laid aſide; and except from ſome ſlight commotions, excited by the private reſentment of particular noblemen, the tranquillity of Caſtile ſuffered no interruption.

It was not only from the oppoſition of the Spaniſh nobility that obſtacles aroſe to the execution of the cardinal's ſchemes; he had a conſtant ſtruggle to maintain with the Flemiſh miniſters, who preſuming upon their favour with the young king, aimed at directing the affairs of Spain, as well as thoſe of their own country. Jealous of the great abilities and independent ſpirit of Ximenes, they conſidered him rather as a rival who might circumſcribe their power, than as a miniſter, who by his prudence and vigour was adding to the grandeur and authority of their maſter. Every complaint againſt his adminiſtration was liſtened to with pleaſure by the courtiers in the Low-Countries. Unneceſſary obſtructions were thrown by their means in the way of all his meaſures; and though they could not, either with decency or ſafety, deprive him of the office of regent, they endeavoured to leſſen his authority by dividing it. They ſoon diſcovered that Adrian of Utrecht, already joined with him in office, had neither genius nor ſpirit ſufficient to give the leaſt check to his proceedings; and therefore Charles, by their advice, added to the commiſſion of regency La Chau, a Flemiſh gentleman, and afterwards Amerſtorf, a nobleman of Holland; the former diſtinguiſhed for his addreſs, the

§ Flech. ii. 551. Ferreras, Hiſt. viii. 433.

latter for his firmneſs. Ximenes, though no ſtranger to the malevolent intention of the Flemiſh courtiers, received theſe new aſſociates with all the external marks of diſtinction due to the office with which they were inveſted; but when they came to enter upon buſineſs, he abated nothing of that air of ſuperiority with which he had treated Adrian, and ſtill retained the ſole direction of affairs. The Spaniards, more averſe, perhaps, than any other people, to the government of ſtrangers, approved of all his efforts to preſerve his own authority. Even the nobles, influenced by this national paſſion, and forgetting their jealouſies and diſcontents, choſe rather to ſee the ſupreme power in the hands of one of their countrymen, whom they feared, than in thoſe of foreigners, whom they hated.

Ximenes, though engaged in ſuch great ſchemes of domeſtic policy, and embarraſſed by the artifices and intrigues of the Flemiſh miniſters, had the burden of two foreign wars to ſupport. The one was in Navarre, which was invaded by its unfortunate monarch John d'Albret. The death of Ferdinand, the abſence of Charles, the diſcord and diſaffection which reigned among the Spaniſh nobles, ſeemed to preſent him with a favourable opportunity of recovering his dominions. The cardinal's vigilance, however, defeated a meaſure ſo well concerted. As he foreſaw the danger to which that kingdom might be expoſed, one of his firſt acts of adminiſtration was to order thither a conſiderable body of troops. While the king was employed with one part of his army in the ſiege of St. Jean Pied en Port, Villalva, an officer of great experience and courage, attacked the other by ſurpriſe, and cut it to pieces. The king inſtantly retreated with precipitation, and an end was put to the war*. But as Navarre was filled at that time with towns and caſtles ſlightly fortified, and weakly garriſoned, which being unable to reſiſt an enemy, ſerved only to furniſh him with places of retreat; Ximenes, always bold and deciſive in his mea-

* P. Mart. Ep. 570.

ſures, ordered every one of theſe to be diſmantled, except Pampeluna, the fortifications of which he propoſed to render very ſtrong. To this uncommon precaution, Spain owes the poſſeſſion of Navarre. The French, ſince that period, have often entered, and have as often over-run the open country; while they were expoſed to all the inconveniencies attending an invading army, the Spaniards have eaſily drawn troops from the neighbouring provinces to oppoſe them; and the French having no place of any ſtrength to which they could retire, have been obliged repeatedly to abandon their conqueſt with as much rapidity as they gained it.

The other war which he carried on in Africa, againſt the famous adventurer Horuc Barbaroſſa, who, from a private corſair, raiſed himſelf, by his ſingular valour and addreſs, to be king of Algiers and Tunis, was far from being equally ſucceſsful. The ill conduct of the Spaniſh general, and the raſh valour of his troops, preſented Barbaroſſa with an eaſy victory. Many periſhed in the battle, more in the retreat, and the remainder returned into Spain covered with infamy. The magnanimity, however, with which the cardinal bore this diſgrace, the only one he experienced during his adminiſtration, added new luſtre to his character†. Great compoſure of temper under a diſappointment, was not expected from a man ſo remarkable for the eagerneſs and impatience with which he urged on the execution of all his ſchemes.

This diſaſter was ſoon forgotten; while the conduct of the Flemiſh court proved the cauſe of conſtant uneaſineſs, not only to the cardinal, but to the whole Spaniſh nation. All the great qualities of Chievres, the prime miniſter and favourite of the young king, were ſullied with an ignoble and ſordid avarice. The acceſſion of his maſter to the crown of Spain, opened a new and copious ſource for the gratification of this paſſion. During the time of Charles's reſidence in Flanders, the whole tribe of pretenders to offices or to favour reſorted thither. They ſoon diſcovered that, without

† Gometius, lib. vi. p. 179.

the patronage of Chievres, it was vain to hope for preferment; nor did they want ſagacity to find out the proper method of ſecuring his protection. Great ſums of money were drawn out of Spain. Every thing was venal, and diſpoſed of to the higheſt bidder. After the example of Chievres, the inferior Flemiſh miniſters engaged in this traffic, which became as general and avowed, as it was infamous *. The Spaniards were filled with rage when they beheld offices of great importance to the welfare of their country, ſet to ſale by ſtrangers, unconcerned for its honour or its happineſs. Ximenes, diſintereſted in his whole adminiſtration, and a ſtranger, from his native grandeur of mind, to the paſſion of avarice, inveighed with the utmoſt boldneſs againſt the venality of the Flemings. He repreſented to the king, in ſtrong terms, the murmurs and indignation which their behaviour excited among a free and high-ſpirited people, and beſought him to ſet out without loſs of time for Spain, that, by his preſence, he might diſſipate the clouds which were gathering all over the kingdom †.

Charles was fully ſenſible that he had delayed too long to take poſſeſſion of his dominions in Spain. Powerful obſtacles, however, ſtood in his way, and detained him in the Low-Countries. The war which the league of Cambray had kindled in Italy, ſtill ſubſiſted; though during its courſe, the armies of all the parties engaged in it had changed their deſtination and their objects. France was now in alliance with Venice, which it had at firſt combined to deſtroy. Maximilian and Ferdinand had for ſome years carried on hoſtilities againſt France, their original ally, to the valour of whoſe troops the confederacy had been indebted in a great meaſure for its ſucceſs. Together with his kingdoms, Ferdinand tranſmitted this war to his grandſon; and there was reaſon to expect that Maximilian, always fond of new enterpriſes, would perſuade the young monarch to enter into it with ardour. But the Flemings, who had long poſ-

* Miniana, Contin. l. i. c. 2. † P. Mart. Ep. 576.

ſeſſed an extenſive commerce, which, during the league of Cambray, had grown to a great height upon the ruins of the Venetian trade, dreaded a rupture with France; and Chievres, ſagacious to diſcern the true intereſt of his country, and not warped on this occaſion by his love of wealth, warmly declared for maintaining peace with the French nation. Francis I. deſtitute of allies, and ſolicitous to ſecure his late conqueſts in Italy by a treaty, liſtened with joy to the firſt overtures of accommodation. Chievres himſelf conducted the negotiation in the name of Charles. Gouffier appeared as plenipotentiary for Francis. Each of them had preſided over the education of the prince whom he repreſented. They had both adopted the ſame pacific ſyſtem; and were equally perſuaded that the union of the two monarchs was the happieſt event for themſelves, as well as for their kingdoms. In ſuch hands the negotiation did not languiſh. A few days after opening their conferences at Noyon, they concluded a treaty of confederacy and mutual defence between the two monarchs [Aug. 13], the chief articles in which were, that Francis ſhould give in marriage to Charles his eldeſt daughter, the princeſs Louiſe, an infant of a year old, and as her dowry, ſhould make over to him all his claims and pretenſions upon the kingdom of Naples; that, in conſideration of Charles's being already in poſſeſſion of Naples, he ſhould, until the accompliſhment of the marriage, pay an hundred thouſand crowns a-year to the French king; and the half of that ſum annually as long as the princeſs had no children; that when Charles ſhall arrive in Spain, the heirs of the king of Navarre may repreſent to him their right to that kingdom; and if, after examining their claim, he does not give them ſatisfaction, Francis ſhall be at liberty to aſſiſt them with all his forces*. This alliance not only united Charles and Francis, but obliged Maximilian, who was unable alone to cope with the French and Venetians, to enter into a treaty with thoſe

* Leonard Recueil des Traitez, tom. ii. 69.

powers, which put a final period to the bloody and tedious war that the league of Cambray had occaſioned. Europe enjoyed a few years of univerſal tranquillity, and was indebted for that bleſſing to two princes, whoſe rivalſhip and ambition kept it in perpetual diſcord and agitation during the remainder of their reigns.

By the treaty of Noyon, Charles ſecured a ſafe paſſage into Spain. It was not, however, the intereſt of his Flemiſh miniſters, that he ſhould viſit that kingdom ſoon. While he reſided in Flanders, the revenues of the Spaniſh crown were ſpent there, and they engroſſed, without any competitors, all the effects of their monarch's generoſity; their country became the ſeat of government, and all favours were diſpenſed by them. Of all theſe advantages they run the riſk of ſeeing themſelves deprived, from the moment that their ſovereign entered Spain. The Spaniards would naturally aſſume the direction of their own affairs; the Low-Countries would be conſidered only as a province of that mighty monarchy; and they who now diſtributed the favours of the prince to others, muſt then be content to receive them from the hands of ſtrangers. But what Chievres chiefly wiſhed to avoid was, an interview between the king and Ximenes. On the one hand, the wiſdom, the integrity, and the magnanimity of that prelate, gave him a wonderful aſcendant over the minds of men; and it was extremely probable, that theſe great qualities, added to the reverence due to his age and office, would command the reſpect of a young prince, who, capable of noble and generous ſentiments himſelf, would, in proportion to his admiration of the cardinal's virtues, leſſen his deference towards perſons of another character. Or, on the other hand, if Charles ſhould allow his Flemiſh favourites to retain all the influence over his councils which they at preſent poſſeſſed, it was eaſy to foreſee that the cardinal would remonſtrate loudly againſt ſuch an indignity to the Spaniſh nation, and vindicate the rights of his country with the ſame intrepidity

and ſucceſs, with which he had aſſerted the prerogatives of the crown. For theſe reaſons, all his Flemiſh counſellors combined to retard his departure; and Charles, unſuſpicious, from want of experience, and fond of his native country, ſuffered himſelf to be unneceſſarily detained in the Netherlands a whole year after ſigning the treaty of Noyon.

The repeated entreaties of Ximenes, the advice of his grandfather Maximilian, and the impatient murmurs of his Spaniſh ſubjects, prevailed on him at laſt to embark. He was attended not only by Chievres, his prime miniſter, but by a numerous and ſplendid train of the Flemiſh nobles, fond of beholding the grandeur, or of ſharing in the bounty of their prince. After a dangerous voyage, he landed at Villa Vicioſa, in the province of Aſturias [Sept. 13], and was received with ſuch loud acclamations of joy, as a new monarch, whoſe arrival was ſo ardently deſired, had reaſon to expect. The Spaniſh nobility reſorted to their ſovereign from all parts of the kingdom, and diſplayed a magnificence which the Flemings were unable to emulate*.

Ximenes, who conſidered the preſence of the king as the greateſt bleſſing to his dominions, was advancing towards the coaſt, as faſt as the infirm ſtate of his health would permit, in order to receive him. During his regency, and notwithſtanding his extreme old age, he had abated, in no degree, the rigour or frequency of his mortifications; and to theſe he added ſuch laborious aſſiduity in buſineſs, as would have worn out the moſt youthful and vigorous conſtitution. Every day he employed ſeveral hours in devotion; he celebrated maſs in perſon; he even allotted ſome ſpace for ſtudy. Notwithſtanding theſe occupations, he regularly attended the council; he received and read all papers preſented to him; he dictated letters and inſtructions; and took under his inſpection all buſineſs, civil, eccleſiaſtical, or military. Every moment of his time was filled up with ſome ſerious employment. The only amuſement in which he in-

* P. Mart. Ep. 599, 601.

dulged himſelf, by way of relaxation after buſineſs, was to canvaſs, with a few friars, and other divines, ſome intricate article in ſcholaſtic theology. Waſted by ſuch a courſe of life, the infirmities of age daily grew upon him. On his journey, a violent diſorder ſeized him at Bos Equillos, attended with uncommon ſymptoms, which his followers conſidered as the effect of poiſon*, but could not agree whether the crime ought to be imputed to the hatred of the Spaniſh nobles, or to the malice of the Flemiſh courtiers. This accident obliged him to ſtop ſhort, he wrote to Charles, and with his uſual boldneſs adviſed him, to diſmiſs all the ſtrangers in his train, whoſe numbers and credit gave offence already to the Spaniards, and would ere long alienate the affections of the whole people. At the ſame time he earneſtly deſired to have an interview with the king, that he might inform him of the ſtate of the nation, and the temper of his ſubjects. To prevent this, not only the Flemings, but the Spaniſh grandees, employed all their addreſs, and induſtriouſly kept Charles at a diſtance from Aranda, the place to which the cardinal had removed. Through their ſuggeſtions, every meaſure that he recommended was rejected; the utmoſt care was taken to make him feel, and to point out to the whole nation, that his power was on the decline; even in things purely trivial, ſuch a choice was always made, as was deemed moſt diſagreeable to him. Ximenes did not bear this treatment with his uſual fortitude of ſpirit. Conſcious of his own integrity and merit, he expected a more greatful return from a prince, to whom he delivered a kingdom more flouriſhing than it had been in any former age, together with authority more extenſive and better eſtabliſhed than the moſt illuſtrious of his anceſtors had ever poſſeſſed. He could not, therefore, on many occaſions, refrain from giving vent to his indignation and complaints. He lamented the fate of his country, and foretold the calamities which it would ſuffer from the inſolence, the rapaci-

* Miniana, Contin. lib. i. c. 3.

ouſneſs, and ignorance of ſtrangers. While his mind was agitated by theſe paſſions, he received a letter from the king, in which, after a few cold and formal expreſſions of regard, he was allowed to retire to his dioceſe; that after a life of ſuch continued labour, he might end his days in tranquillity. This meſſage proved fatal to Ximenes. His haughty mind, it is probable, could not ſurvive diſgrace; perhaps his generous heart could not bear the proſpect of the misfortunes ready to fall on his country. Whichſoever of theſe opinions we embrace, certain it is that he expired a few hours after reading the letter * [Nov. 8.] The variety, the grandeur, and the ſucceſs of his ſchemes, during a regency of only twenty months, leave it doubtful, whether his ſagacity in council, his prudence in conduct, or his boldneſs in execution, deſerve the greateſt praiſe. His reputation is ſtill high in Spain, not only for wiſdom, but for ſanctity; and he is the only prime miniſter mentioned in hiſtory, whom his contemporaries reverenced as a ſaint †, and to whom the people under his government aſcribed the power of working miracles.

Soon after the death of Ximenes, Charles made his public entry, with great pomp, into Valladolid, whither he had ſummoned the Cortes of Caſtile. Though he aſſumed on all occaſions the name of king, that title had never been acknowledged in the Cortes. The Spaniards conſidered Joanna as poſſeſſed of the ſole right to the crown, and no example of a ſon's having enjoyed the title of king during the life of his parents occurring in their hiſtory, the Cortes diſcovered all that ſcrupulous reſpect for ancient forms, and that averſion to innovation, which are conſpicuous in popular aſſemblies. The preſence, however, of their prince, the addreſs, the artifices, and the threats of his miniſters, prevailed on them at laſt to proclaim him king, in conjunc-

* Marſollier, Vie de Ximenes, p. 447. Gomerius, lib. vii. 206, &c. Baudier, Hiſt. de Ximen. p. 208.

† Flechier, Vie de Ximem. ii. p. 746.

tion with his mother, whoſe name they appointed to be placed before that of her ſon, in all public acts. But when they made this conceſſion, they declared, that if, at any future period, Joanna ſhould recover the exerciſe of reaſon, the whole royal authority ſhould return into her hands. At the ſame time, they voted a free gift of ſix hundred thouſand ducats, to be paid in three years, a ſum more conſiderable than had ever been granted to any former monarch*.

Notwithſtanding this obſequiouſneſs of the Cortes to the will of the king, the moſt violent ſymptoms of diſſatisfaction with his government began to break out in the kingdom. Chievres had acquired over the mind of the young monarch the aſcendant, not only of a tutor, but of a parent. Charles ſeemed to have no ſentiments but thoſe which his miniſter inſpired, and ſcarcely uttered a word but what he put into his mouth. He was conſtantly ſurrounded by Flemings; no perſon got acceſs to him without their permiſſion; nor was any admitted to audience but in their preſence. As he ſpoke the Spaniſh language very imperfectly, his anſwers were always extremely ſhort, and often delivered with heſitation. From all theſe circumſtances, many of the Spaniards were led to believe, that he was a prince of a ſlow and narrow genius. Some pretended to diſcover a ſtrong reſemblance between him and his mother, and began to whiſper that his capacity for government would never be far ſuperior to hers; and though they who had the beſt opportunity of judging concerning his character, maintained, that notwithſtanding ſuch unpromiſing appearances, he poſſeſſed a large fund of knowledge, as well as of ſagacity†; yet all agreed in condemning his partiality towards the Flemings, and his attachment to his favourites, as unreaſonable and immoderate. Unfortunately for Charles, theſe favourites were unworthy of his confidence. To amaſs wealth

* Miniana, Contin. lib. i. c. 3. P. Mart. Ep. 608. Sandov. p. 22.

† Sandoval, p. 31. P. Mart. Ep. 655.

ſeems to have been their only aim: and as they had reaſon to fear, that either their maſter's good ſenſe, or the indignation of the Spaniards, might ſoon abridge their power, they haſtened to improve the preſent opportunity, and their avarice was the more rapacious, becauſe they expected their authority to be of no long duration. All honours, offices, and benefices, were either engroſſed by the Flemings, or publicly ſold by them. Chievres, his wife, and Sauvage, whom Charles, on the death of Ximenes, had imprudently raiſed to be chancellor of Caſtile, vied with each other in all the refinements of extortion and venality. Not only the Spaniſh hiſtorians, who, from reſentment, may be ſuſpected of exaggeration, but Peter Martyr Angleria, an Italian, who reſided at that time in the court of Spain, and who was under no temptation to deceive the perſons to whom his letters are addreſſed, give a deſcription which is almoſt incredible, of the inſatiable and ſhameleſs covetouſneſs of the Flemings. According to Angleria's calculation, which he aſſerts to be extremely moderate, they remitted into the Low-Countries, in the ſpace of ten months, no leſs a ſum than a million and one hundred thouſand ducats. The nomination of William de Croy, Chievres' nephew, a young man not of canonical age, to the archbiſhopric of Toledo, exaſperated the Spaniards more than all theſe exactions. They conſidered the elevation of a ſtranger to the head of their church, and to the richeſt benefice in the kingdom, not only as an injury, but as an inſult to the whole nation; both clergy and laity, the former from intereſt, the latter from indignation, joined in exclaiming againſt it†.

Charles leaving Caſtile thus diſguſted with his adminiſtration, ſet out for Saragoſſa, the capital of Aragon, that he might be preſent in the Cortes of that kingdom. On his way thither, he took leave of his brother Ferdinand, whom he ſent into Germany on the pretence of viſiting

† Sandoval, 28—31. P. Mart. Ep. 608, 611, 613, 614, 622, 623, 639. Miniana, Contin. lib. i. c. 3. p. 8.

their grandfather, Maximilian, in his old age. To this prudent precaution, Charles owed the preſervation of the Spaniſh dominions. During the violent commotions which aroſe there ſoon after this period, the Spaniards would infallibly have offered the crown to a prince, who was the darling of the whole nation; nor did Ferdinand want ambition, or counſellors, that might have prompted him to accept of the offer†.

The Aragoneſe had not hitherto acknowledged Charles as king, nor would they allow the Cortes to be aſſembled in his name, but in that of the Juſtiza, to whom during an interregnum, this privilege belonged *. The oppoſition Charles had to ſtruggle with in the Cortes of Aragon, was more violent and obſtinate than that which he had overcome in Caſtile; after long delays, however, and with much difficulty, he perſuaded the members to confer on him the title of king, in conjunction with his mother. At the ſame time he bound himſelf by that ſolemn oath, which the Aragoneſe exacted of their kings, never to violate any of their rights or liberties. When a donative was demanded, the members were ſtill more intractable; many months elapſed before they would agree to grant Charles two hundred thouſand ducats, and that ſum they appropriated ſo ſtrictly for paying the debts of the crown, which had long been forgotten, that a very ſmall part of it came into the king's hands. What had happened in Caſtile taught them caution, and determined them rather to ſatisfy the claims of their fellow-citizens, how obſolete ſoever, than to furniſh ſtrangers the means of enriching themſelves with the ſpoils of their country ‡.

During theſe proceedings of the Cortes, ambaſſadors arrived at Saragoſſa from Francis I. and the young king of Navarre, demanding the reſtitution of that kingdom in terms of the treaty of Noyon. But neither Charles, nor

† P. Mart. Ep. 619. Ferreras, viii. 460.
* P. Mart. Ep. 605. ‡ P. Mart. Ep. 615—634.

the Caſtilian nobles whom he conſulted on this occaſion, diſcovered any inclination to part with this acquiſition. A conference held ſoon after at Montpelier, in order to bring this matter to an amicable iſſue, was altogether fruitleſs; while the French urged the injuſtice of the uſurpation, the Spaniards were attentive only to its importance §.

From Aragon Charles proceeded to Catalonia, where he waſted as much time, encountered more difficulties, and gained leſs money. The Flemings were now become ſo odious in every province of Spain by their exactions, that the deſire of mortifying them, and of diſappointing their avarice, augmented the jealouſy with which a free people uſually conducted their deliberations.

The Caſtilians, who had felt moſt ſenſibly the weight and rigour of the oppreſſive ſchemes carried on by the Flemings, reſolved no longer to ſubmit with a tameneſs fatal to themſelves, and which rendered them the objects of ſcorn to their fellow ſubjects in the other kingdoms, of which the Spaniſh monarchy was compoſed. Segovia, Toledo, Seville, and ſeveral other cities of the firſt rank, entered into a confederacy for the defence of their rights and privileges; and notwithſtanding the ſilence of the nobility, who, on this occaſion, diſcovered neither the public ſpirit, nor the reſolution, which became their order, the confederates laid before the king a full view of the ſtate of the kingdom, and of the mal-adminiſtration of his favourites. The preferment of ſtrangers, the exportation of the current coin, the increaſe of taxes, were the grievances of which they chiefly complained; and of theſe they demanded redreſs with that boldneſs which is natural to a free people. Theſe remonſtrances, preſented at firſt at Saragoſſa, and renewed afterwards at Barcelona, Charles treated with great neglect. The confederacy, however, of theſe cities, at this juncture, was the beginning of that famous union among the commons of Caſtile, which not long after threw the kingdom

§ P. Martyr, Ep. 605, 633, 640.

into ſuch violent convulſions as ſhook the throne, and almoſt overturned the conſtitution*.

Soon after Charles's arrival at Barcelona, he received the account of an event which intereſted him much more than the murmurs of the Caſtilians, or the ſcruples of the Cortes of Catalonia. This was the death of the emperor Maximilian [Jan. 12]; an occurrence of ſmall importance in itſelf, for he was a prince conſpicuous neither for his virtues, nor his power, nor his abilities; but rendered by its conſequences more memorable than any that had happened during ſeveral ages. It broke that profound and univerſal peace which then reigned in the Chriſtian world; it excited a rivalſhip between two princes, which threw all Europe into agitation, and kindled wars more general, and of longer duration, than had hitherto been known in modern times.

The revolutions occaſioned by the expedition of the French king, Charles VIII. into Italy, had inſpired the European princes with new ideas concerning the importance of the Imperial dignity. The claims of the empire upon ſome of the Italian ſtates were numerous; its juriſdiction over others was extenſive; and though the former had been almoſt abandoned, and the latter ſeldom exerciſed, under princes of ſlender abilities and of little influence, it was obvious, that in the hands of an emperor poſſeſſed of power or of genius, they might be employed as engines for ſtretching his dominion over the greater part of that country. Even Maximilian, feeble and unſteady as his conduct always was, had availed himſelf of the infinite pretenſions of the empire, and had reaped advantage from every war and every negotiation in Italy during his reign. Theſe conſiderations, added to the dignity of the ſtation, confeſſedly the firſt among Chriſtian princes, and to the rights inherent in the office, which, if exerted with vigour, were far from being inconſiderable, rendered the Imperial crown more than ever an object of ambition.

* P. Martyr, Ep. 630. Ferreras, viii. 464.

Not long before his death, Maximilian had diſcovered great ſolicitude to preſerve this dignity in the Auſtrian family, and to procure the king of Spain to be choſen his ſucceſſor. But he himſelf having never been crowned by the pope, a ceremony deemed eſſential in that age, was conſidered only as emperor *elect*. Though hiſtorians have not attended to that diſtinction, neither the Italian nor German chancery beſtowed any other title upon him than that of king of the Romans; and no example occurring in hiſtory of any perſon's being choſen a ſucceſſor to a king of the Romans, the Germans, always tenacious of their forms, and unwilling to confer upon Charles an office for which their conſtitution knew no name, obſtinately refuſed to gratify Maximilian in that point §.

By his death, this difficulty was at once removed, and Charles openly aſpired to that dignity which his grandfather had attempted, without ſucceſs, to ſecure for him. At the ſame time, Francis I. a powerful rival, entered the liſts againſt him; and the attention of all Europe was fixed upon this competition, no leſs illuſtrious from the high rank of the candidates, than from the importance of the prize for which they contended. Each of them urged his pretenſions with ſanguine expectations, and with no unpromiſing proſpect of ſucceſs. Charles conſidered the Imperial crown as belonging to him of right, from its long continuance in the Auſtrian line; he knew that none of the German princes poſſeſſed power or influence enough to appear as his antagoniſt; he flattered himſelf, that no conſideration would induce the natives of Germany to exalt any foreign prince to a dignity, which during ſo many ages had been deemed peculiar to their own nation; and leaſt of all, that they would confer this honour upon Francis I. the ſovereign of a people whoſe genius, and laws, and manners, differed ſo widely from

§ Guicciardini, lib. xiii. p. 15. Hiſt. Gener. d'Allemagne, par P. Barre, tom. viii. part. 1. p. 1087. P. Heuter. Rer. Auſtr. lib. vii. c. 17. p. 179. lib. viii. c. 2. p. 183.

thoſe of the Germans, that it was hardly poſſible to eſtabliſh any cordial union between them; he truſted not a little to the effect of Maximilian's negotiations, which, though they did not attain their end, had prepared the minds of the Germans for his elevation to the Imperial throne; but what he relied on as a chief recommendation, was the fortunate ſituation of his hereditary dominions in Germany, which ſerved as a natural barrier to the empire againſt the encroachments of the Turkiſh power. The conqueſts, the abilities, and the ambition of Sultan Selim II. had ſpread over Europe, at that time, a general and well-founded alarm. By his victories over the Mamalukes, and the extirpation of that gallant body of men, he had not only added Egypt and Syria to his empire, but had ſecured to it ſuch a degree of internal tranquillity, that he was ready to turn againſt Chriſtendom the whole force of his arms, which nothing hitherto had been able to reſiſt. The moſt effectual expedient for ſtopping the progreſs of this torrent, ſeemed to be the election of an emperor, poſſeſſed of extenſive territories in that country, where its firſt impreſſion would be felt, and who, beſides, could combat this formidable enemy with all the forces of a powerful monarchy, and with all the wealth furniſhed by the mines of the new world, or the commerce of the Low-Countries. Theſe were the arguments by which Charles publicly ſupported his claim; and to men of integrity and reflection, they appeared to be not only plauſible but convincing. He did not, however, truſt the ſucceſs of his cauſe to theſe alone. Great ſums of money were remitted from Spain; all the refinements and artifice of negotiation were employed; and a conſiderable body of troops, kept on foot, at that time, by the ſtates of the circle of Suabia, was ſecretly taken into his pay. The venal were gained by preſents; the objections of the more ſcrupulous were anſwered or eluded; ſome feeble princes were threatened and overawed §.

§ Guicc. lib. 13. 159. Sleidan, Hiſt. of the Reformat. 14. Struvii Corp. Hiſt. German. ii. 971. Not. 20.

On the other hand, Francis ſupported his claim with equal eagerneſs, and no leſs confidence of its being well founded. His emiſſaries contended that it was now high time to convince the princes of the houſe of Auſtria that the Imperial crown was elective, and not hereditary; that other perſons might aſpire to an honour which their arrogance had accuſtomed them to regard as the property of their family; that it required a ſovereign of mature judgment, and of approved abilities, to hold the reins of government in a country where ſuch unknown opinions concerning religion had been publiſhed, as had thrown the minds of men into an uncommon agitation, which threatened the moſt violent effects; that a young prince, without experience, and who had hitherto given no ſpecimens of his genius for command, was no fit match for Selim, a monarch grown old in the art of war, and in the courſe of victory; whereas a king who in his early youth had triumphed over the valour and diſcipline of the Swiſs, till then reckoned invincible, would be an antagoniſt not unworthy the conqueror of the Eaſt; that the fire and impetuoſity of the French cavalry, added to the diſcipline and ſtability of the German infantry, would form an army ſo irreſiſtible, that, inſtead of waiting the approach of the Ottoman forces, it might carry hoſtilities into the heart of their dominions; that the election of Charles would be inconſiſtent with a fundamental conſtitution, by which the perſon who holds the crown of Naples is excluded from aſpiring to the Imperial dignity; that his elevation to that honour would ſoon kindle a war in Italy, on account of his pretenſions to the dutchy of Milan, the effects of which could not fail of reaching the empire, and might prove fatal to it§. But while the French ambaſſadors enlarged upon theſe and other topics of the ſame kind, in all the courts of Germany, Francis, ſenſible of the prejudices entertained againſt him as a foreigner, unacquainted with the

§ Guicc. lib. 13. 160. Sleid. p. 16. Geor. Sabini de Elect. Car. V. Hiſtoria apud Scardii Script. Rer. German. vol. ii. p. 4.

German language or manners, endeavoured to overcome theſe, and to gain the favour of the princes by immenſe gifts, and by infinite promiſes. As the expeditious method of tranſmitting money, and the decent mode of conveying a bribe, by bills of exchange, were then little known, the French ambaſſadors travelled with a train of horſes loaded with treaſure, an equipage not very honourable for that prince by whom they were employed, and infamous for thoſe to whom they were ſent‡.

The other European princes could not remain indifferent ſpectators of a conteſt, the deciſion of which ſo nearly affected every one of them. Their common intereſt ought naturally to have formed a general combination, in order to diſappoint both competitors, and to prevent either of them from obtaining ſuch a pre-eminence in power and dignity, as might prove dangerous to the liberties of Europe. But the ideas with reſpect to a proper diſtribution and balance of power were ſo lately introduced into the ſyſtem of European policy, that they were not hitherto objects of ſufficient attention. The paſſions of ſome princes, the want of foreſight in others, and the fear of giving offence to the candidates, hindered ſuch a ſalutary union of the powers of Europe, and rendered them either totally negligent of the public ſafety, or kept them from exerting themſelves with vigour in its behalf.

The Swiſs Cantons, though they dreaded the elevation of either of the contending monarchs, and though they wiſhed to have ſeen ſome prince whoſe dominions were leſs extenſive, and whoſe power was more moderate, ſeated on the Imperial throne, were prompted, however, by their hatred of the French nation, to give an open preference to the pretenſions of Charles, while they uſed their utmoſt influence to fruſtrate thoſe of Francis†.

The Venetians eaſily diſcerned, that it was the intereſt of their republic to have both the rivals ſet aſide; but their

‡ Memoires de Marech. de Fleuranges, p. 296. † Sabinus, p. 6.

jealouſy of the houſe of Auſtria, whoſe ambition and neighbourhood had been fatal to their grandeur, would not permit them to act up to their own ideas, and led them haſtily to give the ſanction of their approbation to the claim of the French king.

It was equally the intereſt, and more in the power of Henry VIII. of England, to prevent either Francis or Charles from acquiring a dignity which would raiſe them ſo far above other monarchs. But though Henry often boaſted that he held the balance of Europe in his hand, he had neither the ſteady attention, the accurate diſcernment, nor the diſpaſſionate temper which that delicate function required. On this occaſion, it mortified his vanity ſo much, to think that he had not entered early into that noble competition which reflected ſuch honour upon the two antagoniſts, that he took a reſolution of ſending an ambaſſador into Germany, and of declaring himſelf a candidate for the Imperial throne. The ambaſſador, though loaded with careſſes by the German princes and the pope's nuncio, informed his maſter, that he could hope for no ſucceſs in a claim which he had been ſo late in preferring. Henry, imputing his diſappointment to that circumſtance alone, and ſoothed with this oſtentatious diſplay of his own importance, ſeems to have taken no farther part in the matter, either by contributing to thwart both his rivals, or to promote one of them†.

Leo X. a pontiff no leſs renowned for his political abilities, than for his love of the arts, was the only prince of the age who obſerved the motions of the two contending monarchs with a prudent attention, or who diſcovered a proper ſolicitude for the public ſafety. The Imperial and papal juriſdiction interfered in ſo many inſtances, the complaints of uſurpation were ſo numerous on both ſides, and the territories of the church owed their ſecurity ſo little to their own force, and ſo much to the weakneſs of the powers around them, that nothing was ſo formidable to the court of Rome

† Memoires de Fleuranges, 314. Herbert, Hiſt. of Henry VIII.

as an emperor with extenſive dominions, or of enterpriſing genius. Leo trembled at the proſpect of beholding the Imperial crown placed on the head of the king of Spain and of Naples, and the maſter of the new world; nor was he leſs afraid of ſeeing a king of France, who was duke of Milan and lord of Genoa, exalted to that dignity. He foretold that the election of either of them would be fatal to the independence of the holy ſee, to the peace of Italy, and perhaps to the liberties of Europe. But to oppoſe them with any proſpect of ſucceſs, required addreſs and caution in proportion to the greatneſs of their power, and their opportunities of taking revenge. Leo was defective in neither. He ſecretly exhorted the German princes to place one of their own number on the Imperial throne, which many of them were capable of filling with honour. He put them in mind of the conſtitution by which the kings of Naples were for ever excluded from that dignity§. He warmly exhorted the French king to perſiſt in his claim, not from any deſire that he ſhould gain his end, but as he foreſaw that the Germans would be more diſpoſed to favour the king of Spain, he hoped that Francis himſelf, when he diſcovered his own chance of ſucceſs to be deſperate, would be ſtimulated by reſentment and the ſpirit of rivalſhip, to concur with all his intereſt in raiſing ſome third perſon to the head of the empire; or, on the other hand, if Francis ſhould make an unexpected progreſs, he did not doubt but that Charles would be induced by ſimilar motives to act the ſame part; and thus, by a prudent attention, the mutual jealouſy of the two rivals might be ſo dexterouſly managed, as to diſappoint both. But this ſcheme, the only one which a prince in Leo's ſituation could adopt, though concerted with great wiſdom, was executed with little diſcretion. The French ambaſſadors in Germany fed their maſter with vain hopes; the pope's nuncio, being gained by them, altogether forgot the inſtructions which he had received; and Francis perſevered ſo long and with

§ Goldaſti Conſtitutiones Imperiales. Francof. 1673. vol. i. 439.

ſuch obſtinacy in urging his own pretenſions, as rendered all Leo's meaſures abortive*.

Such were the hopes of the candidates, and the views of the different princes, when the diet was opened according to form at Frankfort [June 17]. The right of chuſing an emperor had long been veſted in ſeven great princes, diſtinguiſhed by the name of electors, the origin of whoſe office, as well as the nature and extent of their powers, have already been explained. Theſe were at that time, Albert of Brandenburgh, archbiſhop of Mentz; Herman count de Wied, archbiſhop of Cologne; Richard de Greiffenklau, archbiſhop of Triers; Lewis, king of Bohemia; Lewis, count palatine of the Rhine; Frederic, duke of Saxony; and Joachim I. marquis of Brandenburgh. Notwithſtanding the artful arguments produced by the ambaſſadors of the two kings in favour of their reſpective maſters, and in ſpite of all their ſolicitations, intrigues, and preſents, the electors did not forget that maxim on which the liberty of the German conſtitution was thought to be founded. Among the members of the Germanic body, which is a great republic compoſed of ſtates almoſt independent, the firſt principle of patriotiſm is to depreſs and limit the power of the emperor; and of this idea, ſo natural under ſuch a form of government, a German politician ſeldom loſes ſight. No prince of conſiderable power, or extenſive dominions, had for ſome ages been raiſed to the Imperial throne. To this prudent precaution many of the great families in Germany owed the ſplendour and independence which they had acquired during that period. To elect either of the contending monarchs, would have been a groſs violation of that ſalutary maxim; would have given to the empire a maſter inſtead of an head; and would have reduced themſelves from the rank of being almoſt his equals, to the condition of his ſubjects.

Full of theſe ideas, all the electors turned their eyes towards Frederic, duke of Saxony, a prince of ſuch eminent

* Guicciar. lib. 13. 161.

virtue and abilities, as to be diſtinguiſhed by the name of the *Sage*, and with one voice they offered him the Imperial crown. He was not dazzled with that object, which monarchs, ſo far ſuperior to him in power, courted with ſuch eagerneſs; and after deliberating upon the matter a ſhort time, he rejected it with a magnanimity and diſintereſtedneſs no leſs ſingular than admirable. "Nothing," he obſerved, "could be more impolitic, than an obſtinate adherence to a maxim which, though ſound and juſt in many caſes, was not applicable to all. In times of tranquillity (ſaid he) we wiſh for an emperor who has not power to invade our liberties; times of danger demand one who is able to ſecure our ſafety. The Turkiſh armies, led by a gallant and victorious monarch, are now aſſembling. They are ready to pour in upon Germany with a violence unknown in former ages. New conjunctures call for new expedients. The Imperial ſceptre muſt be committed to ſome hand more powerful than mine, or that of any other German prince. We poſſeſs neither dominions, nor revenues, nor authority, which enable us to encounter ſuch a formidable enemy. Recourſe muſt be had, in this exigency, to one of the rival monarchs. Each of them can bring into the field forces ſufficient for our defence. But as the king of Spain is of German extraction; as he is a member and prince of the empire by the territories which deſcend to him from his grandfather; as his dominions ſtretch along that frontier which lies moſt expoſed to the enemy; his claim is preferable, in my opinion, to that of a ſtranger to our language, to our blood, and to our country; and therefore I give my vote to confer on him the Imperial crown."

This opinion, dictated by ſuch uncommon generoſity, and ſupported by arguments ſo plauſible, made a deep impreſſion on the electors. The king of Spain's ambaſſadors, ſenſible of the important ſervice which Frederic had done their maſter, ſent him a conſiderable ſum of money, as the firſt token of that prince's gratitude. But he who had greatneſs of

mind to refuſe a crown, diſdained to receive a bribe; and, upon their entreating that at leaſt he would permit them to diſtribute part of that ſum among his attendants, he replied, That he could not prevent them from accepting what ſhould be offered, but whoever took a ſingle florin ſhould be diſmiſſed next morning from his ſervice*.

No prince in Germany could now aſpire to a dignity, which Frederic had declined, for reaſons applicable to them all. It remained to make a choice between the two great competitors. But beſides the prejudice in Charles's favour ariſing from his birth, as well as the ſituation of his German dominions, he owed not a little to the abilities of the cardinal de Gurk, and the zeal of Erard de la Mark, biſhop of Liege, two of his ambaſſadors, who had conducted their negotiations with more prudence and addreſs than thoſe entruſted by the French king. The former, who had long been the miniſter and favourite of Maximilian, was well acquainted with the art of managing the Germans; and the latter, having been diſappointed of a cardinal's hat by Francis, employed all the malicious ingenuity with which the deſire of revenge inſpires an ambitious mind, in thwarting the meaſures of that monarch. The Spaniſh party among the electors daily gained ground; and even the pope's nuncio,

* P. Daniel, an hiſtorian of conſiderable name, ſeems to call in queſtion the truth of this account of Frederic's behaviour in refuſing the Imperial crown, becauſe it is not mentioned by Georgius Sabinus in his Hiſtory of the Election and Coronation of Charles V. tom. iii. p. 63. But no great ſtreſs ought to be laid on an omiſſion in a ſuperficial author, whoſe treatiſe, though dignified with the name of Hiſtory, contains only ſuch an account of the ceremonial of Charles's election, as is uſually publiſhed in Germany on like occaſions. Scard. Rer. Germ. Script. v. ii. p. 1. The teſtimony of Eraſmus, lib. 13. epiſt. 4. and that of Sleidan, p. 18. are expreſs. Seckendorf, in his Commentarius Hiſtoricus & Apologeticus de Lutheraniſmo, p. 121. has examined this fact with his uſual induſtry, and has eſtabliſhed its truth by the moſt undoubted evidence. To theſe teſtimonies which he has collected, I may add the deciſive one of cardinal Cajetan, the pope's legate at Frankfort, in his letter, July 5th, 1519. Epiſtres au Princes, &c. recueillies par Ruſcelli, traduicts par Belforeſt. Par. 1572. p. 60.

being convinced that it was vain to make any farther oppoſition, endeavoured to acquire ſome merit with the future emperor, by offering voluntarily, in the name of his maſter, a diſpenſation to hold the Imperial crown in conjunction with that of Naples*.

On the twenty-eighth day of June, five months and ten days after the death of Maximilian, this important conteſt, which had held all Europe in ſuſpence, was decided. Six of the electors had already declared for the king of Spain; and the archbiſhop of Triers, the only firm adherent to the French intereſt, having at laſt joined his brethren, Charles was, by the unanimous voice of the electoral college, raiſed to the Imperial throne†.

But though the electors conſented, from various motives, to promote Charles to that high ſtation, they diſcovered, at the ſame time, great jealouſy of his extraordinary power, and endeavoured, with the utmoſt ſolicitude, to provide againſt his encroaching on the privileges of the Germanic body. It had long been the cuſtom to demand of every new emperor a confirmation of theſe privileges, and to require a promiſe that he would never violate them in any inſtance. While princes, who were formidable neither from extent of territory, nor of genius, poſſeſſed the Imperial throne, a general and verbal engagement to this purpoſe was deemed ſufficient. But under an emperor ſo powerful as Charles, other precautions ſeemed neceſſary. A *Capitulation* or claim of right was formed, in which the privileges and immunities of the electors, of the princes of the empire, of the cities, and of every other member of the Germanic body, are enumerated. This capitulation was immediately ſigned by Charles's ambaſſadors in the name of their maſter, and he himſelf, at his coronation, confirmed it in the moſt ſolemn manner. Since that period, the electors have continued to preſcribe the ſame conditions to all his ſucceſſors; and the

* Freheri Rer. German. Scriptores, vol. iii. 172. cur. Struvii Argent. 1717. Gianone Hiſt. of Naples, 2. 498.

† Jac. Aug. Thuan. Hiſt. ſui Temporis, edit. Bulkley, lib. 1. c. 9.

capitulation or mutual contract between the emperor and his ſubjects, is conſidered in Germany as a ſtrong barrier againſt the progreſs of the Imperial power, and as the great charter of their liberties, to which they often appeal†.

The important intelligence of this election was conveyed in nine days from Frankfort to Barcelona, where Charles was ſtill detained by the obſtinacy of the Catalonian Cortes, which had not hitherto brought to an iſſue any of the affairs which came before it. He received the account with the joy natural to a young and aſpiring mind, on an acceſſion of power and dignity which raiſed him ſo far above the other princes of Europe. Then it was that thoſe vaſt proſpects, which allured him during his whole adminiſtration, began to open, and from this æra we may date the formation, and are able to trace the gradual progreſs, of a grand ſyſtem of enterpriſing ambition, which renders the hiſtory of his reign ſo worthy of attention.

A trivial circumſtance firſt diſcovered the effects of this great elevation upon the mind of Charles. In all the public writs which he now iſſued as king of Spain, he aſſumed the title of *Majeſty*, and required it from his ſubjects as a mark of their reſpect. Before that time, all the monarchs of Europe were ſatisfied with the appellation of *Highneſs* or *Grace;* but the vanity of other courts ſoon led them to imitate the example of the Spaniſh. The epithet of Majeſty is no longer a mark of pre-eminence. The moſt inconſiderable monarchs in Europe enjoy it, and the arrogance of the greater potentates has invented no higher denomination‡.

The Spaniards were far from viewing the promotion of their king to the imperial throne with the ſame ſatisfaction which he himſelf felt. To be deprived of the preſence of their ſovereign, and to be ſubjected to the government of a viceroy and his council, a ſpecies of adminiſtration often op-

† Pfeffel Abregé de l'Hiſt. de Droit Publique d'Allemagne, 590. Limnei Capitulat. Imper. Epiſtres des Princes par Ruſcelli, p. 60.

‡ Miniana, Contin. Mar. p. 13. Ferreras, viii. 475. Memoires Hiſt. de la Houſſaie, tom. i. p. 53, &c.

preſſive, and always diſagreeable, were the immediate and neceſſary conſequences of this new dignity. To ſee the blood of their countrymen ſhed in quarrels wherein the nation had no concern; to behold its treaſures waſted in ſupporting the ſplendour of a foreign title; to be plunged in the chaos of Italian and German politics, were effects of this event almoſt as unavoidable. From all theſe conſiderations, they concluded, that nothing could have happened more pernicious to the Spaniſh nation; and the fortitude and public ſpirit of their anceſtors, who, in the Cortes of Caſtile, prohibited Alphonſo the Wiſe from leaving the kingdom, in order to receive the Imperial crown, were often mentioned with the higheſt praiſe, and pronounced to be extremely worthy of imitation at this juncture *.

But Charles, without regarding the ſentiments or murmurs of the Spaniſh ſubjects, accepted of the Imperial dignity, which the count palatine, at the head of a ſolemn embaſſy, offered him in the name of the electors [November]; and declared his intention of ſetting out ſoon for Germany in order to take poſſeſſion of it. This was the more neceſſary, becauſe, according to the forms of the German conſtitution, he could not, before the ceremony of a public coronation, exerciſe any act of juriſdiction or authority §.

Their certain knowledge of this reſolution augmented ſo much the diſguſt of the Spaniards, that a ſullen and refractory ſpirit prevailed among perſons of all ranks. The pope having granted the king the tenths of all eccleſiaſtical benefices in Caſtile, to aſſiſt him in carrying on war with greater vigour againſt the Turks, a convocation of the clergy unanimouſly refuſed to levy that ſum, upon pretence that it ought never to be exacted but at thoſe times when Chriſtendom was actually invaded by the Infidels; and though Leo, in order to ſupport his authority, laid the kingdom under an interdict, ſo little regard was paid to a cenſure

* Sandoval, i. p. 32. Miniana, Contin. p. 14.
§ Sabinus, P. Barre, viii. 1085.

which was univerſally deemed unjuſt, that Charles himſelf applied to have it taken off. Thus the Spaniſh clergy, beſides their merit in oppoſing the uſurpations of the pope, and diſregarding the influence of the crown, gained the exemption which they had claimed §.

The commotions which aroſe in the kingdom of Valencia, annexed to the crown of Aragon, were more formidable, and produced more dangerous and laſting effects. A ſeditious monk having, by his ſermons, excited the citizens of Valencia, the capital city, to take arms, and to puniſh certain criminals in a tumultuary manner, the people, pleaſed with this exerciſe of power, and with ſuch a diſcovery of their own importance, not only refuſed to lay down their arms, but formed themſelves into troops and companies, that they might be regularly trained to martial exerciſes. To obtain ſome ſecurity againſt the oppreſſion of the grandees was the motive of this aſſociation, and proved a powerful bond of union; for as the ariſtocratical privileges and independence were more complete in Valencia than in any other of the Spaniſh kingdoms, the nobles, being ſcarcely accountable for their conduct to any ſuperior, treated the people not only as vaſſals, but as ſlaves. They were alarmed, however, at the progreſs of this unexpected inſurrection, as it might encourage the people to attempt ſhaking off the yoke altogether; but as they could not repreſs them without taking arms, it became neceſſary to have recourſe to the emperor, and to deſire his permiſſion to attack them. At the ſame time the people made choice of deputies to repreſent their grievances, and to implore the protection of their ſovereign. Happily for the latter, they arrived at court when Charles was exaſperated to a high degree againſt the nobility. As he was eager to viſit Germany, where his preſence became every day more neceſſary, and as his Flemiſh courtiers were ſtill more impatient to return into their native country, that they might carry thither the ſpoils

§ P. Martyr, Ep. 462. Ferreras, viii. 473.

which they had amaſſed in Caſtile, it was impoſſible for him to hold the Cortes of Valencia in perſon. He had for that reaſon empowered the cardinal Adrian to repreſent him in that aſſembly, and in his name to receive their oath of allegiance, to confirm their privileges with the uſual ſolemnities, and to demand of them a free gift. But the Valencian nobles, who conſidered this meaſure as an indignity to their country, which was no leſs entitled, than his other kingdoms, to the honour of their ſovereign's preſence, declared, that by the fundamental laws of the conſtitution they could neither acknowledge as king a perſon who was abſent, nor grant him any ſubſidy; and to this declaration they adhered with an haughty and inflexible obſtinacy. Charles, piqued by their behaviour, decided in favour of the people, and raſhly authorized them to continue in arms. The deputies returned in triumph, and were received by their fellow-citizens as the deliverers of their country. The inſolence of the multitude increaſing with their ſucceſs, they expelled all the nobles out of the city, committed the government to magiſtrates of their own election, and entered into an aſſociation diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Germanada* or *Brotherhood*, which proved the ſource not only of the wildeſt diſorders, but of the moſt fatal calamities in that kingdom*.

Meanwhile, the kingdom of Caſtile was agitated with no leſs violence. No ſooner was the emperor's intention to leave Spain made known, than ſeveral cities of the firſt rank reſolved to remonſtrate againſt it, and to crave redreſs once more of thoſe grievances which they had formerly laid before him. Charles artfully avoided admitting their deputies to audience; and as he ſaw from this circumſtance how difficult it would be, at this juncture, to reſtrain the mutinous ſpirit of the greater cities, he ſummoned the Cortes of Caſtile to meet at Compoſtella, a town in Galicia. His only reaſon for calling that aſſembly, was the hope of obtaining another donative; for as his treaſury had been exhauſt-

* P. Martyr, Ep. 651. Ferreras, viii. 476, 485.

ed in the ſame proportion that the riches of his miniſters increaſed, he could not, without ſome additional aid, appear in Germany with ſplendour ſuited to the imperial dignity. To appoint a meeting of the Cortes in ſo remote a province, and to demand a new ſubſidy before the time for paying the former was expired, were innovations of a moſt dangerous tendency; and among a people not only jealous of their liberties, but accuſtomed to ſupply the wants of their ſovereigns with a very frugal hand, excited an univerſal alarm. The magiſtrates of Toledo remonſtrated againſt both theſe meaſures in a very high tone; the inhabitants of Valladolid, who expected that the Cortes ſhould have been held in that city, were ſo enraged, that they took arms in a tumultuary manner; and if Charles, with his foreign counſellors, had not fortunately made their eſcape during a violent tempeſt, they would have maſſacred all the Flemings, and have prevented him from continuing his journey towards Compoſtella.

Every city through which he paſſed, petitioned againſt holding a Cortes in Galicia, a point with regard to which Charles was inflexible. But though the utmoſt influence had been exerted by the miniſters, in order to procure a choice of repreſentatives favourable to their deſigns, ſuch was the temper of the nation, that, at the opening of the aſſembly [April 1,] there appeared among many of the members unuſual ſymptoms of ill-humour, which threatened a fierce oppoſition to all the meaſures of the court. No repreſentatives were ſent by Toledo; for the lot, according to which, by ancient cuſtom, the election was determined in that city, having fallen upon two perſons devoted to the Flemiſh miniſters, their fellow-citizens refuſed to grant them a commiſſion in the uſual form, and in their ſtead made choice of two deputies, whom they empowered to repair to Compoſtella, and to proteſt againſt the lawfulneſs of the Cortes aſſembled there. The repreſentatives of Salamanca refuſed to take the uſual oath of fidelity, unleſs Charles con-

ſented to change the place of meeting. Thoſe of Toro, Madrid, Cordova, and ſeveral other places, declared the demand of another donative to be unprecedented, unconſtitutional, and unneceſſary. All the arts, however, which influence popular aſſemblies, bribes, promiſes, threats, and even force, were employed, in order to gain members. The nobles, ſoothed by the reſpectful aſſiduity with which Chievres and the other Flemings paid court to them, or inſtigated by a mean jealouſy of that ſpirit of independence which they ſaw riſing among the commons, openly favoured the pretenſions of the court, or at the utmoſt did not oppoſe them, and at laſt, in contempt not only of the ſentiments of the nation, but of the ancient forms of the conſtitution, a majority voted to grant the donative for which the emperor had applied*. Together with this grant, the Cortes laid before Charles a repreſentation of thoſe grievances whereof his people complained, and in their name craved redreſs; but he, having obtained from them all he could expect, paid no attention to this ill-timed petition, which it was no longer dangerous to diſregard†.

As nothing now retarded his embarkation, he diſcloſed his intention with regard to the regency of Caſtile during his abſence, which he had hitherto kept ſecret, and nominated cardinal Adrian to that office. The viceroyalty of Aragon he conferred on Don John de Lanuza; that of Valencia on Don Diego de Mendoza Condé de Melito. The choice of the two latter was univerſally acceptable; but the advancement of Adrian, though the only Fleming who had preſerved any reputation among the Spaniards, animated the Caſtilians with new hatred againſt foreigners; and even the nobles, who had ſo tamely ſuffered other inroads upon the conſtitution, felt the indignity offered to their own order by his promotion, and remonſtrated againſt it as illegal. But Charles's deſire of viſiting Germany, as well as the im-

* P. Martyr, Ep. 663. Sandoval, p. 32, &c.
† Sandoval, 84.

patience of his miniſters to leave Spain, were now ſo much increaſed, that without attending to the murmurs of the Caſtilians, or even taking time to provide any remedy againſt an inſurrection in Toledo, which at that time threatened, and afterwards produced, moſt formidable effects, he ſailed from Corunna on the 22d of May; and by ſetting out ſo abruptly in queſt of a new crown, he endangered a more important one of which he was already in poſſeſſion†.

BOOK II.

MANY concurring circumſtances not only called Charles's thoughts towards the affairs of Germany, but rendered his preſence in that country neceſſary. The electors grew impatient of ſo long an interregnum; his hereditary dominions were diſturbed by inteſtine commotions; and the new opinions concerning religion made ſuch rapid progreſs as required the moſt ſerious conſideration. But above all, the motions of the French king drew his attention, and convinced him, that it was neceſſary to take meaſures for his own defence with no leſs ſpeed than vigour.

When Charles and Francis entered the liſts as candidates for the Imperial dignity, they conducted their rivalſhip with many profeſſions of regard for each other, and with repeated declarations that they would not ſuffer any tincture of enmity to mingle itſelf with this honourable emulation. "We both court the ſame miſtreſs," ſaid Francis, with his uſual vivacity; "each ought to urge his ſuit with all the addreſs of which he is maſter; the moſt fortunate will prevail, and the other muſt reſt contented*." But though two young and high-ſpirited princes, and each of them animated with the hope of ſucceſs, might be capable of forming ſuch a ge-

† P. Martyr, Ep. 670. Sandoval, 86.
* Guicc. lib. 13. p. 159.

nerous reſolution, it was ſoon found that they promiſed upon a moderation too refined and diſintereſted for human nature. The preference given to Charles in the ſight of all Europe mortified Francis extremely, and inſpired him with all the paſſions natural to diſappointed ambition. To this was owing the perſonal jealouſy and rivalſhip which ſubſiſted between the two monarchs during their whole reign; and the rancour of theſe, augmented by a real oppoſition of intereſt, which gave riſe to many unavoidable cauſes of diſcord, involved them in almoſt perpetual hoſtilities. Charles had paid no regard to the principal article in the treaty of Noyon, by refuſing oftener than once to do juſtice to John d'Albret, the excluded monarch of Navarre, whom Francis was bound in honour, and prompted by intereſt, to reſtore to his throne. The French king had pretenſions to the crown of Naples, of which Ferdinand had deprived his predeceſſors by a moſt unjuſtifiable breach of faith. The emperor might reclaim the dutchy of Milan as a fief of the empire, which Francis had ſeized, and ſtill kept in poſſeſſion, without having received inveſtiture of it from the emperor. Charles conſidered the dutchy of Burgundy as the patrimonial domain of his anceſtors, wreſted from them by the unjuſt policy of Louis XI. and obſerved with the greateſt jealouſy the ſtrict connections which Francis had formed with the duke of Gueldres, the hereditary enemy of his family.

When the ſources of diſcord were ſo many and various, peace could be of no long continuance, even between princes the moſt exempt from ambition or emulation. But as the ſhock between two ſuch mighty antagoniſts could not fail of being extremely violent, they both diſcovered no ſmall ſolicitude about its conſequences, and took time not only to collect and to ponder their own ſtrength, and to compare it with that of their adverſary, but to ſecure the friendſhip or aſſiſtance of the other European powers.

The pope had equal reaſon to dread the two rivals, and that he who prevailed, would become abſolute maſter.

If it had been in his power to engage them in hoſtilities, without rendering Lombardy the theatre of war, nothing would have been more agreeable to him, than to ſee them waſte each other's ſtrength in endleſs quarrels. But this was impoſſible. Leo foreſaw, that on the firſt rupture between the two monarchs, the armies of France and Spain would take the field in the Milaneſe; and while the ſcene of their operations was ſo near, and the ſubject for which they contended ſo intereſting to him, he could not long remain neuter. He was obliged, therefore, to adapt his plan of conduct to his political ſituation. He courted and ſoothed the emperor and king of France with equal induſtry and addreſs. Though warmly ſolicited by each of them to eſpouſe his cauſe, he aſſumed all the appearances of entire impartiality, and attempted to conceal his real ſentiments under that profound diſſimulation which ſeems to have been affected by moſt of the Italian politicians in that age.

The views and intereſts of the Venetians were not different from thoſe of the pope; nor were they leſs ſolicitous to prevent Italy from becoming the ſeat of war, and their own republic from being involved in the quarrel. But thro' all Leo's artifices, and notwithſtanding his high pretenſions to a perfect neutrality, it was viſible that he leaned towards the emperor, from whom he had both more to fear and more to hope than from Francis; and it was equally manifeſt, that if it became neceſſary to take a ſide, the Venetians would from motives of the ſame nature, declare for the king of France. No conſiderable aſſiſtance, however, was to be expected from the Italian ſtates, who were jealous to an extreme degree of the Tranſalpine powers, and careful to preſerve the balance even between them, unleſs when they were ſeduced to violate this favourite maxim of their policy, by the certain proſpect of ſome great advantage to themſelves.

But the chief attention both of Charles and of Francis was employed in order to gain the king of England, from whom each of them expected aſſiſtance more effectual, and

afforded with leſs political caution. Henry VIII. had aſcended the throne of that kingdom in the year 1509, with ſuch circumſtances of advantage as promiſed a reign of diſtinguiſhed felicity and ſplendour. The union in his perſon of the two contending titles of York and Lancaſter; the alacrity and emulation with which both factions obeyed his commands, not only enabled him to exert a degree of vigour and authority in his domeſtic government which none of his predeceſſors could have ſafely aſſumed; but permitted him to take a ſhare in the affairs of the continent, from which the attention of the Engliſh had long been diverted by their unhappy inteſtine diviſions. The great ſums of money which his father had amaſſed, rendered him the moſt wealthy prince in Europe. The peace which had ſubſiſted under the cautious adminiſtration of that monarch, had been of ſufficient length to recruit the population of the kingdom after the deſolation of the civil wars, but not ſo long as to enervate its ſpirit; and the Engliſh, aſhamed of having rendered their own country ſo long a ſcene of diſcord and bloodſhed, were eager to diſplay their valour in ſome foreign war, and to revive the memory of the victories gained on the continent by their anceſtors. Henry's own temper perfectly ſuited the ſtate of his kingdom, and the diſpoſition of his ſubjects. Ambitious, active, enterpriſing, and accompliſhed in all the martial exerciſes which in that age formed a chief part in the education of perſons of noble birth, and inſpired them with an early love of war, he longed to engage in action, and to ſignalize the beginning of his reign by ſome remarkable exploit. An opportunity ſoon preſented itſelf; and the victory at Guinegate [1513], together with the ſucceſsful ſieges of Teroüenne and Tournay, though of little utility to England, reflected great luſtre on its monarch, and confirmed the idea which foreign princes entertained of his power and conſequence. So many concurring cauſes, added to the happy ſituation of his own dominions, which ſecured them from foreign invaſion; and to the for-

tunate circumſtance of his being in poſſeſſion of Calais, which ſerved not only as a key to France, but opened an eaſy paſſage into the Netherlands, rendered the king of England the natural guardian of the liberties of Europe, and the arbiter between the emperor and French monarch. Henry himſelf was ſenſible of this ſingular advantage, and convinced, that, in order to preſerve the balance even, it was his office to prevent either of the rivals from acquiring ſuch ſuperiority of power as might be fatal to the other, or formidable to the reſt of Chriſtendom. But he was deſtitute of the penetration, and ſtill more of the temper, which ſuch a delicate function required. Influenced by caprice, by vanity, by reſentment, by affection, he was incapable of forming any regular and extenſive ſyſtem of policy, or of adhering to it with ſteadineſs. His meaſures ſeldom reſulted from attention to the general welfare, or from a deliberate regard to his own intereſt, but were dictated by paſſions which rendered him blind to both, and prevented his gaining that aſcendant in the affairs of Europe, or from reaping ſuch advantages to himſelf, as a prince of greater art, though with inferior talents, might have eaſily ſecured.

All the impolitic ſteps in Henry's adminiſtration muſt not, however, be imputed to defects in his own character; many of them were owing to the violent paſſions and inſatiable ambition of his prime miniſter and favourite, cardinal Wolſey. This man, from one of the loweſt ranks in life, had riſen to an height of power and dignity, to which no Engliſh ſubject ever arrived; and governed the haughty, preſumptuous, and untractable ſpirit of Henry with abſolute authority. Great talents, and of very different kinds, fitted him for the two oppoſite ſtations of miniſter, and of favourite. His profound judgment, his unwearied induſtry, his thorough acquaintance with the ſtate of the kingdom, his extenſive knowledge of the views and intereſts of foreign courts, qualified him for that uncontrolled direction of affairs with which he was entruſted. The elegance of his

manners, the gaiety of his converſation, his inſinuating addreſs, his love of magnificence, and his proficiency in thoſe parts of literature of which Henry was fond, gained him the affection and confidence of the young monarch. Wolſey was far from employing this vaſt and almoſt royal power, to promote either the true intereſt of the nation, or the real grandeur of his maſter. Rapacious at the ſame time, and profuſe, he was inſatiable in deſiring wealth. Of boundleſs ambition, he aſpired after new honours with an eagerneſs unabated by his former ſucceſs; and being rendered preſumptuous by his uncommon elevation, as well as by the aſcendant which he had gained over a prince, who ſcarcely brooked advice from any other perſon, he diſcovered in his whole demeanour the moſt overbearing haughtineſs and pride. To theſe paſſions he himſelf ſacrificed every conſideration; and whoever endeavoured to obtain his favour, or that of his maſter, found it neceſſary to ſoothe and to gratify them.

As all the ſtates of Europe ſought Henry's friendſhip at that time, all courted his miniſter, with incredible attention and obſequiouſneſs, and ſtrove by preſents, by promiſes, or by flattery, to work upon his avarice, his ambition, or his pride*. Francis had, in the year 1518, employed Bonnivet, admiral of France, one of his moſt accompliſhed and artful courtiers, to gain this haughty prelate. He himſelf beſtowed on him every mark of reſpect and confidence. He conſulted him with regard to his moſt important affairs, and received his reſponſes with implicit deference. By theſe arts, together with the grant of a large penſion, Francis attached the cardinal to his intereſt, who perſuaded his maſter to ſurrender Tournay to France, to conclude a treaty of marriage between his daughter the princeſs Mary and the dauphin, and to conſent to a perſonal interview with the French king†. From that time, the moſt familiar inter-

* Fiddes's Life of Wolſey, 166. Rymer's Fœdera, xiii. 718.
† Herbert's Hiſt. of Henry VIII. 30. Rymer, xiii. 624.

courſe ſubſiſted between the two courts; Francis, ſenſible of the great value of Wolſey's friendſhip, laboured to ſecure the continuance of it by every poſſible expreſſion of regard, beſtowing on him, in all his letters, the honourable appellations of Father, Tutor, and Governor.

Charles obſerved the progreſs of this union with the utmoſt jealouſy and concern. His near affinity to the king of England gave him ſome title to his friendſhip; and ſoon after his acceſſion to the throne of Caſtile, he attempted to ingratiate himſelf with Wolſey, by ſettling on him a penſion of three thouſand livres. His chief ſolicitude at preſent was to prevent the intended interview with Francis, the effects of which upon two young princes, whoſe hearts were no leſs ſuſceptible of friendſhip, than their manners were capable of inſpiring it, he extremely dreaded. But after many delays, occaſioned by difficulties with reſpect to the ceremonial, and by the anxious precautions of both courts for the ſafety of their reſpective ſovereigns, the time and place of meeting were at laſt fixed. Meſſengers had been ſent to different courts, inviting all comers, who were gentlemen, to enter the liſts at tilt and tournament, againſt the two monarchs and their knights. Both Francis and Henry loved the ſplendour of theſe ſpectacles too well, and were too much delighted with the graceful figure which they made on ſuch occaſions, to forego the pleaſure or glory which they expected from ſuch a ſingular and brilliant aſſembly. Nor was the cardinal leſs fond of diſplaying his own magnificence in the preſence of two courts, and of diſcovering to the two nations the extent of his influence over both their monarchs. Charles, finding it impoſſible to prevent the interview, endeavoured to diſappoint its effects, and to pre-occupy the favour of the Engliſh monarch and his miniſter by an act of complaiſance ſtill more flattering and more uncommon. Having ſailed from Corunna, as has already been related, he ſteered his courſe directly towards England, and relying wholly on Henry's generoſity for his

own ſafety, landed at Dover [May 26th]. This unexpected viſit ſurpriſed the nation. Wolſey, however, was well acquainted with the emperor's intention. A negotiation, unknown to the hiſtorians of that age, had been carried on between him and the court of Spain; this viſit had been concerted; and Charles granted the cardinal, whom he calls his *moſt dear friend*, an additional penſion of ſeven thouſand ducats*. Henry, who was then at Canterbury, in his way to France, immediately diſpatched Wolſey to Dover, in order to welcome the emperor; and being highly pleaſed with an event ſo ſoothing to his vanity, haſtened to receive, with ſuitable reſpect, a gueſt who had placed in him ſuch unbounded confidence. Charles, to whom time was precious, ſtaid only four days in England; but during that ſhort ſpace he had the addreſs, not only to give Henry favourable impreſſions of his character and intentions, but to detach Wolſey entirely from the intereſt of the French king. All the grandeur, the wealth, and the power, which the cardinal poſſeſſed, did not ſatisfy his ambitious mind, while there was one ſtep higher to which an eccleſiaſtic could aſcend. The papal dignity had for ſome time been the object of his wiſhes, and Francis, as the moſt effectual method of ſecuring his friendſhip, had promiſed to favour his pretenſions, on the firſt vacancy, with all his intereſt. But as the emperor's influence in the college of cardinals was greatly ſuperior to that of the French king, Wolſey graſped eagerly at the offer which that artful prince had made him, of exerting it vigorouſly in his behalf; and allured by this proſpect, which, under the pontificate of Leo, ſtill in the prime of his life, was a very diſtant one, he entered with warmth into all the emperor's ſchemes. No treaty, however, was concluded at that time between the two monarchs; but Henry, in return for the honour which Charles had done him, promiſed to viſit him in ſome place

* Rymer, xiii. 714.

of the Low-Countries, immediately after taking leave of the French king.

His interview with that prince was in an open plain between Guiſnes and Andres [June 7th,] where the two kings and their attendants diſplayed their magnificence with ſuch emulatiou, and profuſe expence, as procured it the name of the *Field of the Cloth of Gold.* Feats of chivalry, parties of gallantry, together with ſuch exerciſes and paſtimes as were in that age reckoned manly or elegant rather than ſerious buſineſs, occupied both courts during eighteen days that they continued together†. Whatever impreſſion the engaging manners of Francis, or the liberal and unſuſpicious confidence with which he treated Henry, made on the mind of that monarch, was ſoon effaced by Wolſey's artifices, or by an interview he had with the emperor at Gravelines [July 10;] which was conducted with leſs pomp than that near Guiſnes, but with greater attention to what might be of political utility.

This aſſiduity, with which the two greateſt monarchs in Europe paid court to Henry, appeared to him a plain acknowledgment that he held the balance in his hands, and convinced him of the juſtneſs of the motto which he had

† The French and Engliſh hiſtorians deſcribe the pomp of this interview, and the various ſpectacles, with great minuteneſs. One circumſtance mentioned by the marechal de Fleuranges, who was preſent, and which muſt appear ſingular in the preſent age, is commonly omitted. "After the tournament," ſays he, "the French and Engliſh wreſtlers made their appearance, and wreſtled in preſence of the kings, and the ladies; and as there were many ſtout wreſtlers there, it afforded excellent paſtime; but as the king of France had neglected to bring any wreſtlers out of Bretagne, the Engliſh gained the prize.—After this, the kings of France and England retired to a tent, where they drank together, and the king of England, ſeizing the king of France by the collar, ſaid, "*My brother, I muſt wreſtle with you,*" and endeavoured once or twice to trip up his heels; but the king of France, who is a dextrous wreſtler, twiſted him round, and threw him on the earth with a prodigious violence. The king of England wanted to renew the combat, but was prevented." Memoires de Fleuranges, 12°. Paris, 1753, p. 329.

choſen, "That whoever he favoured would prevail." In this opinion he was confirmed by an offer which Charles made, of ſubmitting any difference that might ariſe between him and Francis to his ſole arbitration. Nothing could have the appearance of greater candour and moderation, than the choice of a judge who was reckoned the common friend of both. But as the emperor had now attached Wolſey entirely to his intereſt, no propoſal could be more inſidious, nor, as appeared by the ſequel, more fatal to the French king †.

Charles, notwithſtanding his partial fondneſs for the Netherlands, the place of his nativity, made no long ſtay there; and after receiving the homage and congratulations of his countrymen, haſtened to Aix-la-Chapelle, the place appointed by the golden bull for the coronation of the emperor. There, in preſence of an aſſembly more numerous and ſplendid than had appeared on any former occaſion, the crown of Charlemagne was placed on his head [Oct. 23], with all the pompous ſolemnity which the Germans affect in their public ceremonies, and which they deem eſſential to the dignity of their empire *.

Almoſt at the ſame time, Solyman the Magnificent, one of the moſt accompliſhed, enterpriſing, and victorious of the Turkiſh ſultans, a conſtant and formidable rival to the emperor, aſcended the Ottoman throne. It was the peculiar glory of that period to produce the moſt illuſtrious monarchs, who have at any one time appeared in Europe. Leo, Charles, Francis, Henry, and Solyman, were each of them poſſeſſed of talents which might have rendered any age, wherein they happened to flouriſh, conſpicuous. But ſuch a conſtellation of great princes ſhed uncommon luſtre on the ſixteenth century. In every conteſt, great power as well as great abilities were ſet in oppoſition; the efforts of valour

† Herbert, 37.

* Hartman. Mauri Relatio Coronat. Car. V. ap. Goldaſt. Folit. Imperial. Franc. 1614, fol. p. 264.

and conduct on one ſide, counterbalanced by an equal exertion of the ſame qualities on the other, not only occaſioned ſuch a variety of events as renders the hiſtory of that period intereſting, but ſerved to check the exorbitant progreſs of any of thoſe princes, and to prevent their attaining ſuch pre-eminence in power as would have been fatal to the liberty and happineſs of mankind.

The firſt act of the emperor's adminiſtration was to appoint a diet of the empire to be held at Worms on the ſixteenth of January, one thouſand five hundred and twenty-one. In his circular letters to the different princes he informed them, that he had called this aſſembly in order to concert with them the moſt proper meaſures for checking the progreſs of thoſe new and dangerous opinions, which threatened to diſturb the peace of Germany, and to overturn the religion of their anceſtors.

Charles had in view the opinions which had been propagated by Luther and his diſciples ſince the year one thouſand five hundred and ſeventeen. As theſe led to that happy reformation in religion which reſcued one part of Europe from the papal yoke, mitigated its rigour in the other, and produced a revolution in the ſentiments of mankind, the greateſt, as well as the moſt beneficial, that has happened ſince the publication of Chriſtianity, not only the events which at firſt gave birth to ſuch opinions, but the cauſes which rendered their progreſs ſo rapid and ſucceſsful, deſerve to be conſidered with minute attention.

To overturn a ſyſtem of religious belief, founded on ancient and deep-rooted prejudices, ſupported by power, and defended with no leſs art than induſtry; to eſtabliſh in its room doctrines of the moſt contrary genius and tendency; and to accompliſh all this, not by external violence or the force of arms; are operations which hiſtorians, the leaſt prone to credulity and ſuperſtition, aſcribe to that Divine Providence which, with infinite eaſe, can bring about events which to human ſagacity appear impoſſible. The interpo-

ſition of Heaven, in favour of the Chriſtian religion at its firſt publication, was manifeſted by miracles and prophecies wrought and uttered in confirmation of it. Though none of the reformers poſſeſſed, or pretended to poſſeſs, theſe ſupernatural gifts, yet that wonderful preparation of circumſtances which diſpoſed the minds of men for receiving their doctrines, that ſingular combination of cauſes which ſecured their ſucceſs, and enabled men, deſtitute of power and of policy, to triumph over thoſe who employed againſt them extraordinary efforts of both, may be conſidered as no ſlight proof, that the ſame hand which planted the Chriſtian religion, protected the reformed faith, and reared it, from beginnings extremely feeble, to an amazing degree of vigour and maturity.

It was from cauſes, ſeemingly fortuitous, and from a ſource very inconſiderable, that all the mighty effects of the reformation flowed. Leo X. when raiſed to the papal throne, found the revenues of the church exhauſted by the vaſt projects of his two ambitious predeceſſors, Alexander VI. and Julius II. His own temper, naturally liberal and enterpriſing, rendered him incapable of that ſevere and patient economy which the ſituation of his finances required. On the contrary, his ſchemes for aggrandizing the family of Medici, his love of ſplendour, his taſte for pleaſure, and his magnificence in rewarding men of genius, involved him daily in new expences; in order to provide a fund for which, he tried every device that the fertile invention of prieſts had fallen upon, to drain the credulous multitude of their wealth. Among others he had recourſe to a ſale of *Indulgences*. According to the doctrine of the Romiſh church, all the good works of the ſaints, over and above thoſe which were neceſſary towards their own juſtification, are depoſited, together with the infinite merits of Jeſus Chriſt, in one inexhauſtible treaſury. The keys of this were committed to St. Peter, and to his ſucceſſors the popes, who may open it at pleaſure, and by transferring a portion of this ſupera-

bundant merit to any particular perſon, for a ſum of money, may convey to him either the pardon of his own ſins, or a releaſe for any one, in whoſe happineſs he is intereſted, from the pains of purgatory. Such indulgences were firſt invented in the eleventh century by Urban II. as a recompence for thoſe who went in perſon upon the meritorious enterpriſe of conquering the Holy Land. They were afterwards granted to thoſe who hired a ſoldier for that purpoſe; and in proceſs of time were beſtowed on ſuch as gave money for accompliſhing any pious work enjoined by the pope*. Julius II. had beſtowed indulgences on all who contributed towards building the church of St. Peter at Rome; and as Leo was carrying on that magnificent and extenſive fabric, his grant was founded on the ſame pretence†.

The right of promulgating theſe indulgences in Germany, together with a ſhare in the profits ariſing from the ſale of them, was granted to Albert, elector of Metz and archbiſhop of Magdeburg, who, as his chief agent for retailing them in Saxony, employed Tetzel, a Dominican friar of licentious morals, but of an active ſpirit, and remarkable for his noiſy and popular eloquence. He, aſſiſted by the monks of his order, executed the commiſſion with great zeal and ſucceſs, but with little diſcretion or decency; and though by magnifying exceſſively the benefit of their indulgences§,

* Hiſtory of the Council of Trent, by F. Paul, p. 4.

† Palavic. Hiſt. Conc. Trident. p. 4.

§ As the form of theſe indulgences, and the benefits which they were ſuppoſed to convey, are unknown in proteſtant countries, and little underſtood, at preſent, in ſeveral places where the Roman catholic religion is eſtabliſhed, I have, for the information of my readers, tranſlated the form of abſolution uſed by Tetzel: "May our Lord Jeſus Chriſt have mercy upon thee, and abſolve thee by the merits of his moſt holy paſſion. And I by his authority, that of his bleſſed apoſtles Peter and Paul, and of the moſt holy pope, granted and committed to me in theſe parts, do abſolve thee, firſt from all eccleſiaſtical cenſures, in whatever manner they have been incurred, and then from all thy ſins, tranſgreſſions and exceſſes, how enormous ſoever they may be, even from ſuch

and by diſpoſing of them at a very low price, they carried on for ſome time an extenſive and lucrative traffic among the credulous and the ignorant; the extravagance of their aſſertions, as well as the irregularities in their conduct, came at laſt to give general offence. The princes and nobles were irritated at ſeeing their vaſſals drained of ſo much wealth, in order to repleniſh the treaſury of a profuſe pontiff. Men of piety regretted the deluſion of the people, who being taught to rely, for the pardon of their ſins, on the indulgences which they purchaſed, did not think it incumbent on them either to ſtudy the doctrines taught by

as are reſerved for the cognizance of the holy ſee, and as far as the keys of the holy church extend, I remit to you all puniſhment which you deſerve in purgatory on their account, and I reſtore you to the holy ſacraments of the church, to the unity of the faithful, and to that innocence and purity which you poſſeſſed at baptiſm, ſo that when you die, the gates of puniſhment ſhall be ſhut, and the gates of the paradiſe of delight ſhall be opened, and if you ſhall not die at preſent, this grace ſhall remain in full force when you are at the point of death. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt." Seckend. Comment. lib. i. p. 14.

The terms in which Tetzel and his aſſociates deſcribed the benefits of indulgences, and the neceſſity of purchaſing them, are ſo extravagant, that they appear to be almoſt incredible. If any man (ſaid they) purchaſes letters of indulgence, his ſoul may reſt ſecure with reſpect to its ſalvation. The ſouls confined in purgatory, for whoſe redemption indulgences are purchaſed, as ſoon as the money tinkles in the cheſt, inſtantly eſcape from that place of torment, and aſcend into heaven. That the efficacy of indulgences was ſo great, that the moſt heinous ſins, even if one ſhould violate (which was impoſſible) the Mother of God, would be remitted and expiated by them, and the perſon be freed both from puniſhment and guilt. That this was the unſpeakable gift of God, in order to reconcile men to himſelf. That the croſs erected by the preachers of indulgences, was as efficacious as the croſs of Chriſt itſelf. Lo! the heavens are open; if you enter not now, when will you enter? For twelve pence you may redeem the ſoul of your father out of purgatory; and are you ſo ungrateful, that you will not reſcue your parent from torment? If you had but one coat, you ought to ſtrip yourſelf inſtantly, and ſell it, in order to purchaſe ſuch benefits, &c. Theſe, and many ſuch extravagant expreſſions, are ſelected out of Luther's works by Chemnitius in his Examen Concilii Tridentini, apud Herm. Vonder Hardt. Hiſt. Liter. Reform. pars iv. p. 6. The ſame author has publiſhed ſeveral of Tetzel's diſcourſes, which prove that theſe expreſſions were neither ſingular nor exaggerated. Ibid. p. 14.

genuine Chriſtianity, or to practiſe the duties which it enjoins. Even the moſt unthinking were ſhocked at the ſcandalous behaviour of Tetzel and his aſſociates, who often ſquandered in drunkenneſs, gaming, and low debauchery, thoſe ſums which were piouſly beſtowed, in hopes of obtaining eternal happineſs; and all began to wiſh that ſome check were given to this commerce, no leſs detrimental to ſociety than deſtructive to religion.

Such was the favourable juncture, and ſo diſpoſed were the minds of his countrymen to liſten to his diſcourſes, when Martin Luther firſt began to call in queſtion the efficacy of indulgences, and to declaim againſt the vicious lives and falſe doctrines of the perſons employed in promulgating them. Luther was a native of Eiſleben in Saxony, and though born of poor parents, had received a learned education, during the progreſs of which he gave many indications of uncommon vigour and acuteneſs of genius. His mind was naturally ſuſceptible of ſerious ſentiments, and tinctured with ſomewhat of that religious melancholy which delights in the ſolitude and devotion of a monaſtic life. The death of a companion killed by lightning at his ſide, in a violent thunder-ſtorm, made ſuch an impreſſion on his mind, as co-operated with his natural temper, in inducing him to retire into a convent of Auguſtinian friars, where, without ſuffering the intreaties of his parents to divert him from what he thought his duty to God, he aſſumed the habit of that order. He ſoon acquired great reputation, not only for piety, but for his love of knowledge, and his unwearied application to ſtudy. He had been taught the ſcholaſtic philoſophy and theology which were then in vogue, by very able maſters, and wanted not penetration to comprehend all the niceties and diſtinctions with which they abound; but his underſtanding, naturally ſound, and ſuperior to every thing frivolous, ſoon became diſguſted with thoſe ſubtile and uninſtructive ſciences, and ſought for ſome more ſolid foundation of knowledge and of piety in the holy ſcriptures.

Having found a copy of the Bible, which lay neglected in the library of his monaſtery, he abandoned all other purſuits, and devoted himſelf to the ſtudy of it, with ſuch eagerneſs and aſſiduity, as aſtoniſhed the monks, who were little accuſtomed to derive their theological notions from that ſource. The great progreſs which he made in this uncommon courſe of ſtudy, augmented ſo much the fame both of his ſanctity and of his learning, that Frederic, elector of Saxony, having founded an univerſity at Wittemberg on the Elbe, the place of his reſidence, Luther was choſen firſt to teach philoſophy, and afterwards theology there; and diſcharged both offices in ſuch a manner, that he was deemed the chief ornament of that ſociety.

While Luther was at the height of his reputation and authority, Tetzel began to publiſh indulgences in the neighbourhood of Wittemberg, and to aſcribe to them the ſame imaginary virtues which had, in other places, impoſed on the credulity of the people. As Saxony was not more enlightened than the other provinces of Germany, Tetzel met with prodigious ſucceſs there. It was with the utmoſt concern that Luther beheld the artifices of thoſe who ſold, and the ſimplicity of thoſe who bought indulgences. The opinions of Thomas Aquinas and the other ſchoolmen, on which the doctrine of indulgences was founded, had already loſt much of their authority with him; and the Scriptures, which he began to conſider as the great ſtandard of theological truth, afforded no countenance to a practice, equally ſubverſive of faith and of morals. His warm and impetuous temper did not ſuffer him long to conceal ſuch important diſcoveries, or to continue a ſilent ſpectator of the deluſion of his countrymen. From the pulpit, in the great church at Wittemberg, he inveighed bitterly againſt the irregularities and vices of the monks who publiſhed indulgences; he ventured to examine the doctrines which they taught, and pointed out to the people the danger of relying for ſalvation upon any other means than thoſe appointed by

God in his word. The boldneſs and novelty of theſe opinions drew great attention, and being recommended by the authority of Luther's perſonal character, and delivered with a popular and perſuaſive eloquence, they made a deep impreſſion on his hearers. Encouraged by the favourable reception of his doctrines among the people, he wrote to Albert, elector of Mentz and archbiſhop of Magdeburg, to whoſe juriſdiction that part of Saxony was ſubject, and remonſtrated warmly againſt the falſe opinions, as well as wicked lives, of the preachers of indulgences; but he found that prelate too deeply intereſted in their ſucceſs to correct their abuſes. His next attempt was to gain the ſuffrage of men of learning. For this purpoſe he publiſhed ninety-five theſes, containing his ſentiments with regard to indulgences. Theſe he propoſed, not as points fully eſtabliſhed, or of undoubted certainty, but as ſubjects of inquiry and diſputation; he appointed a day, on which the learned were invited to impugn them, either in perſon or by writing; to the whole he ſubjoined ſolemn proteſtations of his high reſpect for the apoſtolic ſee, and of his implicit ſubmiſſion to its authority. No opponent appeared at the time prefixed; the theſes ſpread over Germany with aſtoniſhing rapidity; they were read with the greateſt eagerneſs; and all admired the boldneſs of the man, who had ventured not only to call in queſtion the plenitude of papal power, but to attack the Dominicans, armed with all the terrors of inquiſitorial authority †.

The friars of St. Auguſtine, Luther's own order, though addicted with no leſs obſequiouſneſs than the other monaſtic fraternities to the papal ſee, gave no check to the publication of theſe uncommon opinions. Luther had, by his piety and learning, acquired extraordinary authority among his brethren; he profeſſed the higheſt regard for the authority of the pope; his profeſſions were at that time ſincere; and

† Lutheri Opera, Jenæ, 1612, vol. i. præfat. 3. p. 2. 66. Hiſt. of Council of Trent by F. Paul, p. 4. Seckend. Com. Apol. p. 16.

as a ſecret enmity, excited by intereſt or emulation, ſubſiſts among all the monaſtic orders in the Romiſh church, the Auguſtinians were highly pleaſed with his invectives againſt the Dominicans, and hoped to ſee them expoſed to the hatred and ſcorn of the people. Nor was his ſovereign, the elector of Saxony, the wiſeſt prince at that time in Germany, diſſatisfied with this obſtruction which Luther threw in the way of the publication of indulgences. He ſecretly encouraged the attempt, and flattered himſelf that this diſpute among the eccleſiaſtics themſelves, might give ſome check to the exactions of the court of Rome, which the ſecular princes had long, though without ſucceſs, been endeavouring to oppoſe.

Many zealous champions immediately aroſe to defend opinions on which the wealth and power of the church were founded, againſt Luther's attacks. In oppoſition to his theſes, Tetzel publiſhed counter-theſes at Francfort on the Oder; Eccius, a celebrated divine of Augſburg, endeavoured to refute Luther's notions; and Prierias, a Dominican friar, maſter of the ſacred palace and Inquiſitor-general, wrote againſt him with all the virulence of a ſcholaſtic diſputant. But the manner in which they conducted the controverſy did little ſervice to their cauſe. Luther attempted to combat indulgences by arguments founded in reaſon, or derived from ſcripture; they produced nothing in ſupport of them, but the ſentiments of ſchoolmen, the concluſions of the canon law, and the decrees of popes†. The deciſion of judges ſo partial and intereſted, did not ſatisfy the people, who began to call in queſtion the authority even of theſe venerable guides, when they found them ſtanding in direct oppoſition to the dictates of reaſon, and the determinations of the divine laws§. *

† F. Paul, p. 6. Seckend. p. 40. Palavic. p. 8.

§ Seckend. p. 30.

* Guicciardini has aſſerted two things with regard to the firſt promulgation of indulgences: 1. That Leo beſtowed a gift of the profits ariſing from the ſale of indulgences in Saxony, and the ad-

Meanwhile, theſe novelties in Luther's doctrines which intereſted all Germany, excited little attention and no alarm in the court of Rome. Leo, fond of elegant and refined pleaſures, intent upon great ſchemes of policy, a ſtranger to theological controverſies, and apt to deſpiſe them, regarded with the utmoſt indifference the operations of an obſcure friar, who, in the heart of Germany, carried on a ſcholaſtic diſputation in a barbarous ſtyle. Little did he apprehend, or Luther himſelf dream, that the effects of this quarrel would be ſo fatal to the papal ſee. Leo imputed the whole to monaſtic enmity and emulation, and ſeemed inclined not to interpoſe in the conteſt, but to allow the Auguſtinians and Dominicans to wrangle about the matter with their uſual animoſity.

jacent provinces of Germany, upon his ſiſter Magdalen, the wife of Franceſcetto Cibo, Guic. lib. 13, 168.—2. That Arcemboldo, a Genoeſe eccleſiaſtic, who had been bred a merchant, and ſtill retained all the activity and addreſs of that profeſſion, was appointed by her to collect the money which ſhould be raiſed. F. Paul has followed him in both theſe particulars, and adds, that the Auguſtinians in Saxony had been immemorially employed in preaching indulgences; but that Arcemboldo and his deputies, hoping to gain more by committing this truſt to the Dominicans, had made their bargain with Tetzel, and that Luther was prompted at firſt to oppoſe Tetzel and his aſſociates, by a deſire of taking revenge for this injury offered to his order. F. Paul, p. 5. Almoſt all hiſtorians ſince their time, popiſh as well as proteſtant, have, without examination, admitted theſe aſſertions to be true upon their authority. But notwithſtanding the concurring teſtimony of two authors, ſo eminent both for exactneſs and veracity we may obſerve,

1. That Felix Contolori, who ſearched the pontifical archives of purpoſe, could not find this pretended grant to Leo's ſiſter in any of thoſe regiſters where it muſt neceſſarily have been recorded. Palav. p. 5.—2. That the profits ariſing from indulgences in Saxony and the adjacent countries, had been granted not to Magdalen, but to Albert, archbiſhop of Mentz, who had the right of nominating thoſe who publiſhed them. Seck. p. 12. Luth. Oper. 1. præf. p. 1. Palav. p. 6.—3. That Arcemboldo never had concern in the publication of indulgences in Saxony; his diſtrict was Flanders and the Upper and Lower Rhine. Seck. p. 14. Palav. p. 6.—4. That Luther and his adherents never mention this grant of Leo's to his ſiſter; though a circumſtance of which they could hardly have been ignorant, and which they would have been car-

The ſolicitations, however, of Luther's adverſaries, who were exaſperated to an high degree by the boldneſs and ſeverity with which he animadverted on their writings, together with the ſurpriſing progreſs which his opinions made in different parts of Germany, rouſed at laſt the attention of the court of Rome, and obliged Leo to take meaſures for the ſecurity of the church againſt an attack that now appeared too ſerious to be deſpiſed. For this end, he ſummoned Luther to appear at Rome [July 1518], within ſixty days, before the auditor of the chamber, and the Inquiſitor-general Prierias, who had written againſt him, whom he empowered jointly to examine his doctrines, and to decide concerning them. He wrote, at the ſame time, to the elector of Saxony, beſeeching him not to protect a man whoſe heretical and profane tenets were ſo ſhocking to pious ears; and enjoined the provincial of the Auguſtinians to check, by his authority, the raſhneſs of an arrogant monk, which brought diſgrace upon the order of St. Auguſtine, and gave offence and diſturbance to the whole church.

From the ſtrain of theſe letters, as well as from the nomi-

ful not to ſuppreſs.—5. The publication of indulgences in Germany was not uſually committed to the Auguſtinians. The promulgation of them, at three different periods under Julius II. was granted to the Franciſcans; the Dominicans had been employed in the ſame office a ſhort time before the preſent period. Palav. p. 46. —6. The promulgation of thoſe indulgences, which firſt excited Luther's indignation, was entruſted to the archbiſhop of Mentz, in conjunction with the guardian of the Franciſcans; but the latter having declined accepting of that truſt, the ſole right became veſted in the archbiſhop. Palav. 6. Seck. 16, 17.—7. Luther was not inſtigated by his ſuperiors among the Auguſtinians to attack the Dominicans their rivals, or to depreciate indulgences becauſe they were promulgated by them; his oppoſition to their opinions and vices proceeded from more laudable motives. Seck. p. 15, 32. Lutheri Opera, 1. p. 64, 6, 8. A diploma of indulgences is publiſhed by Herm. Vonder Hardt, from which it appears, that the name of the guardian of the Franciſcans is retained, together with that of the archbiſhop, although the former did not act. The limits of the country to which their commiſſions extended, viz. the dioceſe of Mentz, Magdeburg, Halberſtadt, and the territories of the marquis of Brandenburg, are mentioned in that diploma. Hiſt. Literaria Reformat. pars. iv. p. 14.

nation of a judge ſo prejudiced and partial as Prierias, Luther eaſily ſaw what ſentence he might expect at Rome. He diſcovered, for that reaſon, the utmoſt ſolicitude to have his cauſe tried in Germany, and before a leſs ſuſpected tribunal. The profeſſors in the univerſity of Wittemberg, anxious for the ſafety of a man who did ſo much honour to their ſociety, wrote to the pope, and after employing ſeveral pretexts to excuſe Luther from appearing at Rome, intreated Leo to commit the examination of his doctrines to ſome perſons of learning and authority in Germany. The elector requeſted the ſame thing of the pope's legate at the diet of Augſburg; and as Luther himſelf, who, at that time, was ſo far from having any intention to diſclaim the papal authority, that he did not even entertain the ſmalleſt ſuſpicion concerning its divine original, had written to Leo a moſt ſubmiſſive letter, promiſing an unreſerved compliance with his will, the pope gratified them ſo far as to empower his legate in Germany, cardinal Cajetan, a Dominican, eminent for ſcholaſtic learning, and paſſionately devoted to the Roman ſee, to hear and determine the cauſe.

Luther, though he had good reaſon to decline a judge choſen among his avowed adverſaries, did not heſitate about appearing before Cajetan; and having obtained the emperor's ſafe-conduct, immediately repaired to Augſburg. The cardinal received him with decent reſpect, and endeavoured at firſt to gain upon him by gentle treatment. The cardinal, relying on the ſuperiority of his own talents as a theologian, entered into a formal diſpute with Luther concerning the doctrines contained in his theſes†. But the weapons which they employed were ſo different, Cajetan appealing to papal decrees, and the opinions of ſchoolmen, and Luther reſting

† In the former editions I aſſerted, upon the authority of Father Paul, that Cajetan thought it beneath his dignity to enter into any diſpute with Luther; but M. Beauſobre, in his Hiſtoire de la Reformation, vol. i. p. 121, &c. has ſatisfied me that I was miſtaken. See alſo Seckend. lib. i. p. 46, &c.

entirely on the authority of ſcripture, that the conteſt was altogether fruitleſs. The cardinal relinquiſhed the character of a diſputant, and aſſuming that of judge, enjoined Luther, by virtue of the apoſtolic powers with which he was clothed, to retract the errors which he had uttered with regard to indulgences, and the nature of faith; and to abſtain, for the future, from the publication of new and dangerous opinions. Luther, fully perſuaded of the truth of his own tenets, and confirmed in the belief of them by the approbation which they had met with among perſons conſpicuous both for learning and piety, was ſurpriſed at this abrupt mention of a recantation, before any endeavours were uſed to convince him that he was miſtaken. He had flattered himſelf, that in a conference concerning the points in diſpute with a prelate of ſuch diſtinguiſhed abilities, he ſhould be able to remove many of thoſe imputations with which the ignorance or malice of his antagoniſts had loaded him; but the high tone of authority that the cardinal aſſumed, extinguiſhed at once all hopes of this kind, and cut off every proſpect of advantage from the interview. His native intrepidity of mind, however, did not deſert him. He declared with the utmoſt firmneſs, that he could not, with a ſafe conſcience, renounce opinions which he believed to be true; nor ſhould any conſideration ever induce him to do what would be ſo baſe in itſelf, and ſo offenſive to God. At the ſame time he continued to expreſs no leſs reverence than formerly for the authority of the apoſtolic ſee†; he ſignified his willingneſs to ſubmit the whole controverſy to certain univerſities which he named, and promiſed neither to write nor to preach concerning indulgences for the future, provided his adverſaries were likewiſe enjoined to be ſilent with reſpect to them*. All theſe offers Cajetan diſregarded or rejected, and ſtill inſiſted peremptorily on a ſimple recantation, threatening him with eccleſiaſtical cenſures, and forbidding him to appear again in his preſence, unleſs he reſolved in-

† Luth. Oper. vol. i. p. 164. * Id. ibid. p. 169.

ſtantly to comply with what he had required. This haughty and violent manner of proceeding, as well as other circumſtances, gave Luther's friends ſuch ſtrong reaſons to ſuſpect, that even the Imperial ſafe-conduct would not be able to protect him from the legate's power and reſentment, that they prevailed on him to withdraw ſecretly from Augſburg, and to return to his own country. But before his departure, according to a form of which there had been ſome examples, he prepared [October 18] a ſolemn appeal from the pope, ill-informed at that time concerning his cauſe, to the pope, when he ſhould receive more full information with reſpect to it‡.

Cajetan, enraged at Luther's abrupt retreat, and at the publication of his appeal, wrote to the elector of Saxony, complaining of both; and requiring him, as he regarded the peace of the church, or the authority of its head, either to ſend that ſeditious monk a priſoner to Rome, or to baniſh him out of his territories. It was not from theological conſiderations that Frederic had hitherto countenanced Luther; he ſeems to have been much a ſtranger to controverſies of that kind, and to have been little intereſted in them. His protection flowed almoſt entirely, as hath been already obſerved, from political motives, and was afforded with great ſecrecy and caution. He had neither heard any of Luther's diſcourſes, nor read any of his books; and though all Germany reſounded with his fame, he had never once admitted him into his preſence§. But upon this demand which the cardinal made, it became neceſſary to throw off ſomewhat of his former reſerve. He had been at great expence, and had beſtowed much attention on founding a new univerſity, an object of conſiderable importance to every German prince; and foreſeeing how fatal a blow the removal of Luther would be to its reputation*, he, under various pretexts, and with

‡ Sleid. Hiſt. of Reform. p. 7. Seckend. p. 45. Luth. Oper. i. 163.

§ Seckend. p. 27. Sleid. Hiſt. p. 12. * Seckend. p. 59.

many profeſſions of eſteem for the cardinal, as well as of reverence for the pope, not only declined complying with either of his requeſts, but openly diſcovered great concern for Luther's ſafety*.

The inflexible rigour with which Cajetan inſiſted on a ſimple recantation, gave great offence to Luther's followers in that age, and hath ſince been cenſured as imprudent, by ſeveral Popiſh writers. But it was impoſſible for the legate to act another part. The judges before whom Luther had been required to appear at Rome, were ſo eager to diſplay their zeal againſt his errors, that, without waiting for the expiration of the ſixty days allowed him in the citation, they had already condemned him as an heretic†. Leo had, in ſeveral of his briefs and letters, ſtigmatized him as a child of iniquity, and a man given up to a reprobate ſenſe. Nothing leſs, therefore, than a recantation could ſave the honour of the church, whoſe maxim it is, never to abandon the ſmalleſt point that it has eſtabliſhed, and which is even precluded, by its pretenſions to infallibility, from having it in its power to do ſo.

Luther's ſituation at this time was ſuch as would have filled any other perſon with the moſt diſquieting apprehenſions. He could not expect that a prince, ſo prudent and cautious as Frederic, would, on his account, ſet at defiance the thunders of the church, and brave the papal power, which had cruſhed ſome of the moſt powerful of the German emperors. He knew what veneration was paid, in that age, to eccleſiaſtical deciſions; what terrors eccleſiaſtical cenſures carried along with them, and how eaſily theſe might intimidate and ſhake a prince, who was rather his protector from policy, than his diſciple from conviction. If he ſhould be obliged to quit Saxony, he had no proſpect of any other aſylum, and muſt ſtand expoſed to whatever puniſhment the rage or bigotry of his enemies could inflict. Though ſenſible of his danger, he diſcovered no ſymptoms of timidity or remiſſneſs,

* Sleid. Hiſt. p. 10. Luth. Oper. i. 172. † Luth. Oper. i. 161.

but continued to vindicate his own conduct and opinions, and to inveigh againſt thoſe of his adverſaries with more vehemence than ever*.

But as every ſtep taken by the court of Rome, particularly the irregular ſentence by which he had been ſo precipitately declared a heretic, convinced Luther that Leo would ſoon proceed to the moſt violent meaſures againſt him, he had recourſe to the only expedient in his power, in order to prevent the effect of the papal cenſures. He appealed to a general council, which he affirmed to be the repreſentative of the catholic church, and ſuperior in power to the pope, who, being a fallible man, might err, as St. Peter, the moſt perfect of his predeceſſors, had erred§.

It ſoon appeared, that Luther had not formed raſh conjectures concerning the intentions of the Romiſh church. A bull, of a date prior to his appeal, was iſſued by the pope, in which he magnifies the virtue and efficacy of indulgences, in terms as extravagant as any of his predeceſſors had ventured to uſe in the darkeſt ages; and without applying ſuch palliatives, or mentioning ſuch conceſſions, as a more enlightened period, and the diſpoſitions in the minds of many men at that juncture, ſeemed to call for, he required all Chriſtians to aſſent to what he delivered as the doctrine of the catholic church, and ſubjected thoſe who ſhould hold or teach any contrary opinion to the heavieſt eccleſiaſtical cenſures.

Among Luther's followers, this bull, which they conſidered as an unjuſtifiable effort of the pope, in order to preſerve that rich branch of his revenue which aroſe from indulgences, produced little effect. But, among the reſt of his countrymen, ſuch a clear deciſion of the ſovereign pontiff againſt him, and enforced by ſuch dreadful penalties, muſt have been attended with conſequences very fatal to his cauſe; if theſe had not been prevented in a great meaſure by the death of the emperor Maximilian, [January 17, 1519,] whom both his principles and his intereſt prompted to ſup-

* Seckend. p. 59. § Sleid. Hiſt. 12. Luth. Oper. i. 179.

port the authority of the holy ſee. In conſequence of this event, the vicariat of that part of Germany which is governed by the Saxon laws, devolved to the elector of Saxony; and under the ſhelter of his friendly adminiſtration, Luther not only enjoyed tranquillity, but his opinions were ſuffered, during the interregnum which preceded Charles's election, to take root in different places, and to grow up to ſome degree of ſtrength and firmneſs. At the ſame time, as the election of an emperor was a point more intereſting to Leo than a theological controverſy, which he did not underſtand, and of which he could not foreſee the conſequences, he was ſo extremely ſolicitous not to irritate a prince of ſuch conſiderable influence in the electoral college as Frederic, that he diſcovered a great unwillingneſs to pronounce the ſentence of excommunication againſt Luther, which his adverſaries continually demanded with the moſt clamorous importunity.

To theſe political views of the pope, as well as to his natural averſion from ſevere meaſures, was owing the ſuſpenſion of any further proceedings againſt Luther for eighteen months. Perpetual negotiations, however, in order to bring the matter to ſome amicable iſſue, were carried on during that ſpace. The manner in which theſe were conducted having given Luther many opportunities of obſerving the corruption of the court of Rome; its obſtinacy in adhering to eſtabliſhed errors; and its indifference about truth, however clearly propoſed, or ſtrongly proved, he began to utter ſome doubts with regard to the divine original of the papal authority. A public diſputation was held upon this important queſtion at Leipſic, between Luther and Eccius, one of his moſt learned and formidable antagoniſts; but it was as fruitleſs and indeciſive as ſuch ſcholaſtic combats uſually prove. Both parties boaſted of having obtained the victory; both were confirmed in their own opinions; and no progreſs was made towards deciding the point in controverſy*.

* Luth. Oper. i. 199.

Nor did this ſpirit of oppoſition to the doctrines and uſurpations of the Romiſh church break out in Saxony alone; an attack no leſs violent, and occaſioned by the ſame cauſes, was made upon them about this time in Switzerland. The Franciſcans being entruſted with the promulgation of indulgences in that country, executed their commiſſion with the ſame indiſcretion and rapaciouſneſs which had rendered the Dominicans ſo odious in Germany. They proceeded, nevertheleſs, with uninterrupted ſucceſs till they arrived at Zurich. There Zuinglius, a man not inferior to Luther himſelf in zeal and intrepidity, ventured to oppoſe them; and being animated with a republican boldneſs, and free from thoſe reſtraints which ſubjection to the will of a prince impoſed on the German reformer, he advanced with more daring and rapid ſteps to overturn the whole fabric of the eſtabliſhed religion†. The appearance of ſuch a vigorous auxiliary, and the progreſs which he made, was, at firſt, matter of great joy to Luther. On the other hand, the decrees of the univerſities of Cologne and Louvain, which pronounced his opinions to be erroneous, afforded great cauſe of triumph to his adverſaries.

But the undaunted ſpirit of Luther acquired additional fortitude from every inſtance of oppoſition; and puſhing on his inquiries and attacks from one doctrine to another, he began to ſhake the firmeſt foundations on which the wealth or power of the church were eſtabliſhed. Leo came at laſt to be convinced, that all hopes of reclaiming him by forbearance were vain; ſeveral prelates of great wiſdom exclaimed no leſs than Luther's perſonal adverſaries, againſt the pope's unprecedented lenity in permitting an incorrigible heretic, who during three years had been endeavouring to ſubvert every thing ſacred and venerable, ſtill to remain within the boſom of the church; the dignity of the papal ſee rendered the moſt vigorous proceedings neceſſary; the new emperor, it was hoped, would ſupport its authority;

† Sleid. Hiſt. 22. Seckend. 59.

nor did it ſeem probable that the elector of Saxony would ſo far forget his uſual caution, as to ſet himſelf in oppoſition to their united power. The college of cardinals was often aſſembled, in order to prepare the ſentence with due deliberation, and the ableſt canoniſts were conſulted how it might be expreſſed with unexceptionable formality. At laſt, on the fifteenth of June, one thouſand five hundred and twenty, the bull, ſo fatal to the church of Rome, was iſſued. Forty-one propoſitions, extracted out of Luther's works, are therein condemned as heretical, ſcandalous, and offenſive to pious ears; all perſons are forbidden to read his writings, upon pain of excommunication; ſuch as had any of them in their cuſtody are commanded to commit them to the flames; he himſelf, if he did not, in ſixty days, publicly recant his errors, and burn his books, is pronounced an obſtinate heretic; is excommunicated, and delivered unto Satan for the deſtruction of his fleſh; and all ſecular princes are required, under pain of incurring the ſame cenſure, to ſeize his perſon, that he might be puniſhed as his crimes deſerved*.

The publication of this bull in Germany excited various paſſions in different places. Luther's adverſaries exulted, as if his party and opinions had been cruſhed at once by ſuch a deciſive blow. His followers, whoſe reverence for the papal authority daily diminiſhed, read Leo's anathemas with more indignation than terror. In ſome cities, the people violently obſtructed the promulgation of the bull; in others, the perſons who attempted to publiſh it were inſulted, and the bull itſelf torn in pieces, and trodden under foot†.

This ſentence, which he had for ſome time expected, did not diſconcert or intimidate Luther. After renewing his appeal to the general council [Nov. 17,] he publiſhed remarks upon the bull of excommunication; and being now

* Palavic. 27. Luth. Oper. i. 423.
† Seckend. p. 116.

perſuaded that Leo had been guilty both of impiety and injuſtice in his proceedings againſt him, he boldly declared the pope to be that man of ſin, or Antichriſt, whoſe appearance is foretold in the New Teſtament; he declaimed againſt his tyranny and uſurpations with greater violence than ever; he exhorted all Chriſtian princes to ſhake off ſuch an ignominious yoke; and boaſted of his own happineſs in being marked out as the object of eccleſiaſtical indignation, becauſe he had ventured to aſſert the liberty of mankind. Nor did he confine his expreſſions of contempt for the papal power to words alone; Leo having, in execution of the bull, appointed Luther's books to be burnt at Rome, he, by way of retaliation, aſſembled all the profeſſors and ſtudents in the univerſity of Wittemburg, and with great pomp, in preſence of a vaſt multitude of ſpectators, caſt the volumes of the canon law, together with the bull of excommunication, into the flames; and his example was imitated in ſeveral cities of Germany. The manner in which he juſtified this action was ſtill more offenſive than the action itſelf. Having collected from the canon law ſome of the moſt extravagant propoſitions with regard to the plenitude and omnipotence of the papal power, as well as the ſubordination of all ſecular juriſdiction to the authority of the holy ſee, he publiſhed theſe with a commentary, pointing out the impiety of ſuch tenets, and their evident tendency to ſubvert all civil government *.

Such was the progreſs which Luther had made, and ſuch the ſtate of his party, when Charles arrived in Germany. No ſecular prince had hitherto embraced Luther's opinions; no change in the eſtabliſhed forms of worſhip had been introduced, and no encroachments had been made upon the poſſeſſions or juriſdiction of the clergy; neither party had yet proceeded to action; and the controverſy, though conducted with great heat and paſſion on both ſides, was ſtill carried on with its proper weapons, with theſes,

* Luth. Oper. ii. 316.

diſputations, and replies. A deep impreſſion, however, was made upon the minds of the people; their reverence for ancient inſtitutions and doctrines was ſhaken; and the materials were already ſcattered, which kindled into the combuſtion that ſoon ſpread over all Germany. Students crowded from every province of the empire to Wittemberg; and under Luther himſelf, Melancthon, Carloſtadius, and other maſters then reckoned eminent, imbibed opinions, which, on their return, they propagated among their countrymen, who liſtened to them with that fond attention, which truth, when accompanied with novelty, naturally commands†.

During the courſe of theſe tranſactions, the court of Rome, though under the direction of one of its ableſt pontiffs, neither formed its ſchemes with that profound ſagacity, nor executed them with that ſteady perſeverance, which had long rendered it the moſt perfect model of political wiſdom to the reſt of Europe. When Luther began to declaim againſt indulgences, two different methods of treating him lay before the pope; by adopting of which, the attempt, it is probable, might have been cruſhed, and by the other it might been rendered innocent. If Luther's firſt departure from the doctrines of the church had inſtantly drawn upon him the weight of its cenſures, the dread of theſe might have reſtrained the elector of Saxony from protecting him, might have deterred the people from liſtening to his diſcourſes, or even might have overawed Luther himſelf; and his name, like that of many good men before his time, would now have been known to the world only for his honeſt but ill-timed effort to correct the corruptions of the Romiſh church. On the other hand, if the pope had early teſtified ſome diſpleaſure with the vices and exceſſes of the friars who had been employed in publiſhing indulgences; if he had forbidden the mentioning of controverted points in diſcourſes addreſſed to the people; if he had enjoined the diſputants on both ſides to be ſilent; if he had been

† Seckend. 59.

careful not to riſque the credit of the church, by defining articles which had hitherto been left undetermined; Luther would, probably, have ſtopt ſhort at his firſt diſcoveries: he would not have been forced, in ſelf-defence, to venture upon new ground, and the whole controverſy might poſſibly have died away inſenſibly; or being confined entirely to the ſchools, might have been carried on with as little detriment to the peace and unity of the Romiſh church, as that which the Franciſcans maintain with the Dominicans concerning the immaculate conception, or that between the Janſeniſts and Jeſuits concerning the operations of grace. But Leo, by fluctuating between theſe oppoſite ſyſtems, and by embracing them alternately, defeated the effects of both. By an improper exertion of authority, Luther was exaſperated, but not reſtrained. By a miſtaken exerciſe of lenity, time was given for his opinions to ſpread, but no progreſs was made towards reconciling him to the church; and even the ſentence of excommunication, which at another juncture might have been deciſive, was delayed ſo long, that it became at laſt ſcarcely an object of terror.

Such a ſeries of errors in the meaſures of a court ſeldom chargeable with miſtaking its own true intereſt, is not more aſtoniſhing than the wiſdom which appeared in Luther's conduct. Though a perfect ſtranger to the maxims of worldly wiſdom, and incapable, from the impetuoſity of his temper, of obſerving them, he was led naturally, by the method in which he made his diſcoveries, to carry on his operations in a manner which contributed more to their ſucceſs, than if every ſtep he took had been preſcribed by the moſt artful policy. At the time when he ſet himſelf to oppoſe Tetzel, he was far from intending that reformation which he afterwards effected; and would have trembled with horror at the thoughts of what at laſt he gloried in accompliſhing. The knowledge of truth was not poured into his mind all at once, by any ſpecial revelation; he acquired it by induſtry and meditation, and his progreſs, of conſequence, was

gradual. The doctrines of popery are ſo cloſely connected, that the expoſing of one error conducted him naturally to the detection of others; and all the parts of that artificial fabric were ſo united together, that the pulling down of one looſened the foundation of the reſt, and rendered it more eaſy to overturn them. In confuting the extravagant tenets concerning indulgences, he was obliged to inquire into the true cauſe of our juſtification and acceptance with God. The knowledge of that diſcovered to him by degrees the inutility of pilgrimages and penances; the vanity of relying on the interceſſion of ſaints; the impiety of worſhipping them; the abuſes of auricular confeſſion; and the imaginary exiſtence of purgatory. The detection of ſo many errors led him of courſe to conſider the character of the clergy who taught them; and their exorbitant wealth, the ſevere injunction of celibacy, together with the intolerable rigour of monaſtic vows, appeared to him the great ſources of their corruption. From thence, it was but one ſtep to call in queſtion the divine original of the papal power, which authorized and ſupported ſuch a ſyſtem of errors. As the unavoidable reſult of the whole, he diſclaimed the infallibility of the pope, the deciſions of ſchoolmen, or any other human authority, and appealed to the word of God as the only ſtandard of theological truth. To this gradual progreſs Luther owed his ſucceſs. His hearers were not ſhocked at firſt by any propoſition too repugnant to their ancient prejudices, or too remote from eſtabliſhed opinions. They were conducted inſenſibly from one doctrine to another. Their faith and conviction were able to keep pace with his diſcoveries. To the ſame cauſe was owing the inattention, and even indifference, with which Leo viewed Luther's firſt proceedings. A direct or violent attack upon the authority of the church would at once have drawn upon Luther the whole weight of its vengeance; but as this was far from his thoughts, as he continued long to profeſs great reſpect for the pope, and made repeated offers of ſubmiſſion to his deci-

ſions, there ſeemed to be no reaſon for apprehending that he would prove the author of any deſperate revolt; and he was ſuffered to proceed ſtep by ſtep, in undermining the conſtitution of the church, until the remedy applied at laſt came too late to produce any effect.

But whatever advantages Luther's cauſe derived, either from the miſtakes of his adverſaries, or from his own good conduct, the ſudden progreſs and firm eſtabliſhment of his doctrines muſt not be aſcribed to theſe alone. The ſame corruptions in the church of Rome which he condemned, had been attacked long before his time. The ſame opinions which he now propagated, had been publiſhed in different places, and were ſupported by the ſame arguments. Waldus in the twelfth century, Wickliff in the fourteenth, and Huſs in the fifteenth, had inveighed againſt the errors of popery with great boldneſs, and confuted them with more ingenuity and learning than could have been expected in thoſe illiterate ages in which they flouriſhed. But all theſe premature attempts towards a reformation proved abortive. Such feeble lights, incapable of diſpelling the darkneſs which then covered the church, were ſoon extinguiſhed; and though the doctrines of theſe pious men produced ſome effects, and left ſome traces in the countries where they taught, they were neither extenſive nor conſiderable. Many powerful cauſes contributed to facilitate Luther's progreſs, which either did not exiſt, nor did not operate with full force in their days; and at that critical and mature juncture when he appeared, circumſtances of every kind concurred in rendering each ſtep that he took ſucceſsful.

The long and ſcandalous ſchiſm which divided the church during the latter part of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries, had a great effect in diminiſhing the veneration with which the world had been accuſtomed to view the papal dignity. Two or three contending pontiffs roaming about Europe at a time; fawning on the princes, whom they wanted to gain; extorting large ſums of

money from the countries which acknowledged their authority; excommunicating their rivals, and curſing thoſe who adhered to them; diſcredited their pretenſions to infallibility, and expoſed both their perſons and their office to contempt. The laity, to whom all parties appealed, came to learn that ſome right of private judgment belonged to them, and acquired the exerciſe of it ſo far as to chuſe, among theſe infallible guides, whom they would pleaſe to follow. The proceedings of the councils of Conſtance and Baſil ſpread this diſreſpect for the Romiſh ſee ſtill wider, and by their bold exertion of authority in depoſing and electing popes, taught the world that there was in the church a juriſdiction ſuperior even to the papal power, which they had long believed to be ſupreme.

The wound given on that occaſion to the papal authority was ſcarcely healed up, when the pontificates of Alexander VI. and Julius II. both able princes, but deteſtable eccleſiaſtics, raiſed new ſcandal in Chriſtendom. The profligate morals of the former in private life; the fraud, the injuſtice, and cruelty of his public adminiſtration, place him on a level with thoſe tyrants, whoſe deeds are the greateſt reproach to human nature. The latter, though a ſtranger to the odious paſſions which prompted his predeceſſor to commit ſo many unnatural crimes, was under the dominion of a reſtleſs and ungovernable ambition, that ſcorned all conſiderations of gratitude, of decency, or of juſtice, when they obſtructed the execution of his ſchemes. It was hardly poſſible to be firmly perſuaded that the infallible knowledge of a religion, whoſe chief precepts are purity and humility, was depoſited in the breaſts of the profligate Alexander or the overbearing Julius. The opinion of thoſe who exalted the authority of a council above that of the pope, ſpread wonderfully under their pontificates: and as the emperor and French kings, who were alternately engaged in hoſtilities with thoſe active pontiffs, permitted and even encouraged their ſubjects to expoſe their vices with all the violence of invective and all the

petulance of ridicule, men's ears being accuſtomed to theſe, were not ſhocked with the bold or ludicrous diſcourſes of Luther and his followers concerning the papal dignity.

Nor were ſuch exceſſes confined to the head of the church alone. Many of the dignified clergy, ſecular as well as regular, being the younger ſons of noble families, who had aſſumed the eccleſiaſtical character for no other reaſon but that they found in the church ſtations of great dignity and affluence, were accuſtomed totally to neglect the duties of their office, and indulged themſelves without reſerve in all the vices to which great wealth and idleneſs naturally give birth. Though the inferior clergy were prevented by their poverty from imitating the expenſive luxury of their ſuperiors, yet groſs ignorance and low debauchery rendered them as contemptible as the other were odious*. The ſevere and unnatural law of celibacy, to which both were equally ſubject, occaſioned ſuch irregularities, that in ſeveral parts of Europe the concubinage of prieſts was not only permitted, but enjoined. The employing of a remedy ſo contrary to the precepts of the Chriſtian religion, is the ſtrongeſt proof that the crimes it was intended to prevent were both numerous and flagrant. Long before the ſixteenth century, many authors of great name and authority give ſuch deſcriptions of the diſſolute morals of the clergy, as ſeem almoſt incredible in the preſent age†. The voluptuous lives of eccleſi-

* The corrupt ſtate of the church, prior to the Reformation, is acknowledged by an author, who was both abundantly able to judge concerning this matter, and who was not over-forward to confeſs it. "For ſome years (ſays Bellarmine) before the Lutheran and Calviniſtic hereſies were publiſhed, there was not (as contemporary authors teſtify) any ſeverity in eccleſiaſtical judicatories, any diſcipline with regard to morals, any knowledge of ſacred literature, any reverence for divine things; there was not almoſt any religion remaining." Bellarminus Concio xxviii. Oper. tom. vi. col. 296. edit. Colon. 1617. apud Gerdeſii Hiſt. Evan. Renovati, vol. i. p. 25.

† Centum Gravamina Nation. German, in Faſciculo Rer. expetend. & fugiendarum, per Ortuinum Gratium, vol. i. 361. See innumerable paſſages to the ſame purpoſe in the appendix, or ſecond volume, publiſhed by Edw. Brown. See alſo Herm. vonder Hardt,

aſtics occaſioned great ſcandal, not only becauſe their manners were inconſiſtent with their ſacred character; but the laity being accuſtomed to ſee ſeveral of them raiſed from the loweſt ſtations to the greateſt affluence, did not ſhew the ſame indulgence to their exceſſes, as to thoſe of perſons poſſeſſed of hereditary wealth or grandeur; and viewing their condition with more envy, they cenſured their crimes with greater ſeverity. Nothing, therefore, could be more acceptable to Luther's hearers, than the violence with which he exclaimed againſt the immoralities of church-men, and every perſon in his audience could, from his own obſervation, confirm the truth of his invectives.

The ſcandal of theſe crimes was greatly increaſed by the facility with which ſuch as committed them obtained pardon. In all the European kingdoms, the impotence of the civil magiſtrate, under forms of government extremely irregular and turbulent, made it neceſſary to relax the rigour of juſtice, and upon payment of a certain fine or compoſition preſcribed by law, judges were accuſtomed to remit farther puniſhment, even of the moſt atrocious crimes. The court of Rome, always attentive to the means of augmenting its reve-

Hiſt. Lit. Reform. pars iii. and the vaſt collections of Walchius in his four volumes of Monumenta Medii Ævi. Gotting. 1757.

The authors I have quoted enumerate the vices of the clergy. When they ventured upon actions manifeſtly criminal, we may conclude that they would be leſs ſcrupulous with reſpect to the decorum of behaviour. Accordingly their neglect of the decent conduct ſuitable to their profeſſion, ſeems to have given great offence. In order to illuſtrate this, I ſhall tranſcribe one paſſage, becauſe it is taken not from any author whoſe profeſſed purpoſe it was to deſcribe the improper conduct of the clergy; and who, from prejudice or artifice, may be ſuppoſed to aggravate the charge againſt them. The emperor Charles IV. in a letter to the archbiſhop of Mentz, A. D. 1359, exhorting him to reform the diſorders of the clergy, thus expreſſes himſelf: "De Chriſti patrimonio, ludos, haſtiludia & torneamenta exercent; habitum militarem cum prætextis aureis et argenteis geſtant, et calceos militares; comam & barbam nutriunt, & nihil quod ad vitam & ordinem eccleſiaſticum ſpectat, oſtendunt. Militaribus ſe duntaxat & ſecularibus actibus, vita & moribus, in ſuæ ſalutis diſpendium, & generale populi ſcandalum, immiſcent." Codex Diplomaticus Anecdotorum, per Val. Ferd. Gudenum, 4to. vol. iii. p. 438.

nues, imitated this practice, and, by a prepoſterous accommodation of it to religious concerns, granted its pardons to ſuch tranſgreſſors as gave a ſum of money in order to purchaſe them. As the idea of a compoſition for crimes was then familiar, this ſtrange traffic was ſo far from ſhocking mankind, that it ſoon became general; and in order to prevent any impoſition in carrying it on, the officers of the Roman chancery publiſhed a book, containing the preciſe ſum to be exacted for the pardon of every particular ſin. A deacon guilty of murder was abſolved for twenty crowns. A biſhop or abbot might aſſaſſinate for three hundred livres. Any eccleſiaſtic might violate his vows of chaſtity, even with the moſt aggravating circumſtances, for the third part of that ſum. Even ſuch ſhocking crimes, as occur ſeldom in human life, and perhaps exiſt only in the impure imagination of a caſuiſt, were taxed at a very moderate rate. When a more regular and perfect mode of diſpenſing juſtice came to be introduced into civil courts, the practice of paying a compoſition for crimes went gradually into diſuſe; and mankind having acquired more accurate notions concerning religion and morality, the conditions on which the court of Rome beſtowed its pardons appeared impious, and were conſidered as one great ſource of eccleſiaſtical corruption‡.

This degeneracy of manners among the clergy might have been tolerated, perhaps, with greater indulgence, if their exorbitant riches and power had not enabled them, at the ſame time, to encroach on the rights of every other order of men. It is the genius of ſuperſtition, fond of whatever is pompous or grand, to ſet no bounds to its liberality towards perſons whom it eſteems ſacred, and to think its expreſſions of regard defective, unleſs it hath raiſed them to the height of wealth and authority. Hence flowed the ex-

‡ Faſcicul. Rer. expet. & fug. i. 355. J. G. Schelhornii Amenit. Literar. Francof. 1725. vol. ii. 369. Diction. de Bayle, Artic. Banck & Tuppius. Taxa Cancellar. Romanæ, edit. Francof. 1651. paſſim.

tenſive revenues and juriſdiction poſſeſſed by the church in every country of Europe, and which were become intolerable to the laity, from whoſe undiſcerning bounty they were at firſt derived.

The burden, however, of eccleſiaſtical oppreſſion had fallen with ſuch peculiar weight on the Germans, as rendered them, though naturally exempt from levity, and tenacious of their ancient cuſtoms, more inclinable than any people in Europe to liſten to thoſe who called on them to aſſert their liberty. During the long conteſts between the popes and emperors concerning the right of inveſtiture, and the wars which theſe occaſioned, moſt of the conſiderable German eccleſiaſtics joined the papal faction; and while engaged in rebellion againſt the head of the empire, they ſeized the Imperial domains and revenues, and uſurped the Imperial juriſdiction within their own dioceſes. Upon the re-eſtabliſhment of tranquillity, they ſtill retained theſe uſurpations, as if by the length of an unjuſt poſſeſſion they had acquired a legal right to them. The emperors, too feeble to wreſt them out of their hands, were obliged to grant the clergy fiefs of thoſe ample territories, and they enjoyed all the immunities as well as honours which belonged to feudal barons. By means of theſe, many biſhops and abbots in Germany were not only eccleſiaſtics, but princes, and their character and manners partook more of the licence too frequent among the latter, than of the ſanctity which became the former*.

The unſettled ſtate of government in Germany, and the frequent wars to which that country was expoſed, contributed in another manner towards aggrandiſing eccleſiaſtics. The only property, during thoſe times of anarchy, which enjoyed ſecurity from the oppreſſion of the great, or the ravages of war, was that which belonged to the church. This was owing, not only to the great reverence for the ſacred character prevalent in thoſe ages, but to a ſuperſtitious dread of the ſentence of excommunication, which the cler-

* F. Paul, Hiſtory of Eccleſiaſt. Benefices, p. 107.

gy were ready to denounce againſt all who invaded their poſſeſſions. Many obſerving this, made a ſurrender of their lands to eccleſiaſtics, and conſenting to hold them in fee of the church, obtained as its vaſſals a degree of ſafety, which without this device they were unable to procure. By ſuch an increaſe of the number of their vaſſals, the power of eccleſiaſtics received a real and permanent augmentation; and as lands, held in fee by the limited tenures common in thoſe ages, often returned to the perſons on whom the fief depended, conſiderable additions were made in this way to the property of the clergy†.

The ſolicitude of the clergy in providing for the ſafety of their own perſons, was ſtill greater than that which they diſplayed in ſecuring their poſſeſſions; and their efforts to attain it were ſtill more ſucceſsful. As they were conſecrated to the prieſtly office with much outward ſolemnity; were diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of mankind by a peculiar garb and manner of life; and arrogated to their order many privileges which do not belong to other Chriſtians, they naturally became the objects of exceſſive veneration. As a ſuperſtitious ſpirit ſpread, they were regarded as beings of a ſuperior ſpecies to the profane laity, whom it would be impious to try by the ſame laws, or to ſubject to the ſame puniſhments. This exemption from civil juriſdiction, granted at firſt to eccleſiaſtics as a mark of reſpect, they ſoon claimed as a point of right. This valuable immunity of the prieſthood is aſſerted, not only in the decrees of popes and councils, but was confirmed in the moſt ample form by many of the greateſt emperors*. As long as the clerical character remained, the perſon of an eccleſiaſtic was in ſome degree ſacred; and unleſs he were degraded from his office, the unhallowed hand of the civil judge durſt not touch him. But as the power of degradation was lodged in the ſpiritual

† F. Paul, Hiſtory of Eccleſiaſt. Benefices, p. 66. Boulainvillers, Etat de France, tom. i. 169. Lond. 1737.

* Goldaſti Conſtitut. Imperial. Francof. 1673. vol. ii. 92, 107.

courts, the difficulty and expence of obtaining ſuch a ſentence, too often ſecured abſolute impunity to offenders. Many aſſumed the clerical character for no other reaſon, than that it might ſcreen them from the puniſhment which their actions deſerved‡. The German nobles complained loudly, that theſe anointed malefactors, as they called them†, ſeldom ſuffered capitally, even for the moſt atrocious crimes; and their independence on the civil magiſtrate is often mentioned in the remonſtrances of the diets, as a privilege equally pernicious to ſociety, and to the morals of the clergy.

While the clergy aſſerted the privileges of their own order with ſo much zeal, they made continual encroachments upon thoſe of the laity. All cauſes relative to matrimony, to teſtaments, to uſury, to legitimacy of birth, as well as thoſe which concerned eccleſiaſtical revenues, were thought to be ſo connected with religion, that they could be tried only in the ſpiritual courts. Not ſatisfied with this ample juriſdiction, which extended to one half of the ſubjects that give riſe to litigation among men, the clergy, with wonderful induſtry, and by a thouſand inventions, endeavoured to draw all other cauſes into their own courts*. As they had engroſſed almoſt the whole learning known in the dark ages, the ſpiritual judges were commonly ſo far ſuperior in knowledge and abilities to thoſe employed in the ſecular courts, that the people at firſt favoured any ſtretch that was made to bring their affairs under the cognizance of a judicature, on the deciſions of which they could rely with more perfect confidence than on thoſe of the civil courts. Thus the intereſt of the church, and the inclination of the people, concurring to elude the juriſdiction of the lay-magiſtrate, ſoon reduced it almoſt to nothing§. By means of this, vaſt pow-

‡ Rymer's Fœdera, vol. xiii. 532.
† Centum Gravam. § 31.
* Giannone Hiſt. of Naples, book xix. § 3.
§ Centum Gravam. § 9, 56, 64.

er accrued to eccleſiaſtics, and no inconſiderable addition was made to their revenue by the ſums paid in thoſe ages to the perſons who adminiſtered juſtice.

The penalty by which the ſpiritual courts enforced their ſentences, added great weight and terror to their juriſdiction. The cenſure of excommunication was inſtituted originally for preſerving the purity of the church; that obſtinate offenders, whoſe impious tenets or profane lives were a reproach to Chriſtianity, might be cut off from the ſociety of the faithful: this eccleſiaſtics did not ſcruple to convert into an engine for promoting their own power, and they inflicted it on the moſt frivolous occaſions. Whoever deſpiſed any of their deciſions, even concerning civil matters, immediately incurred this dreadful cenſure, which not only excluded them from all the privileges of a Chriſtian, but deprived them of their rights as men and citizens* and the dread of this rendered even the moſt fierce and turbulent ſpirits obſequious to the authority of the church.

Nor did the clergy neglect the proper methods of preſerving the wealth and power which they had acquired with ſuch induſtry and addreſs. The poſſeſſions of the church, being conſecrated to God, were declared to be unalienable; ſo that the funds of a ſociety, which was daily gaining, and could never loſe, grew to be immenſe. In Germany, it was computed that the eccleſiaſtics had got into their hands more than one half of the national property†. In other countries, the proportion varied; but the ſhare belonging to the church was every where prodigious. Theſe vaſt poſſeſſions were not ſubject to the burdens impoſed on the lands of the laity. The German clergy were exempted by law from all taxes§, and if, on any extraordinary emergence, eccleſiaſtics were pleaſed to grant ſome aid towards ſupplying the public exigencies, this was conſider-

* Centum Gravam. § 34. † Ibid. § 28.
§ Ibid. § 28. Goldaſti Conſt. Imper. ii. 79, 108. Pfeffel Hiſt. du Droit Publ. 350, 374.

ed as a free gift flowing from their own generoſity, which the civil magiſtrate had no title to demand, far leſs to exact. In conſequence of this ſtrange ſoleciſm in government, the laity in Germany had the mortification to find themſelves loaded with exceſſive impoſitions, becauſe ſuch as poſſeſſed the greateſt property were freed from any obligation to ſupport or to defend the ſtate.

Grievous, however, as the exorbitant wealth and numerous privileges of the clerical order were to the other members of the Germanic body, they would have reckoned it ſome mitigation of the evil, if theſe had been poſſeſſed only by eccleſiaſtics reſiding among themſelves, who would have been leſs apt to make an improper uſe of their riches, or to exerciſe their rights with unbecoming rigour. But the biſhops of Rome having early put in a claim, the boldeſt that ever human ambition ſuggeſted, of being ſupreme and infallible heads of the Chriſtian church, they, by their profound policy and unwearied perſeverance, by their addreſs in availing themſelves of every circumſtance which occured, by taking advantage of the ſuperſtition of ſome princes, of the neceſſity of others, and of the credulity of the people, at length eſtabliſhed their pretenſions, in oppoſition both to the intereſt and common ſenſe of mankind. Germany was the country which theſe eccleſiaſtical ſovereigns governed with moſt abſolute authority. They excommunicated and depoſed ſome of its moſt illuſtrious emperors, and excited their ſubjects, their miniſters, and even their children, to take arms againſt them. Amidſt theſe conteſts, the popes continually extended their own immunities, ſpoiling the ſecular princes gradually of their moſt valuable prerogatives, and the German church felt all the rigour of that oppreſſion which flows from ſubjection to foreign dominion, and foreign exactions.

The right of conferring benefices, which the popes uſurped during that period of confuſion, was an acquiſition of great importance, and exalted the eccleſiaſtical power upon

the ruins of the temporal. The emperors and other princes of Germany had long been in poſſeſſion of this right, which ſerved to increaſe both their authority and their revenue. But by wreſting it out of their hands, the popes were enabled to fill the empire with their own creatures; they accuſtomed a great body of every prince's ſubjects to depend not upon him, but upon the Roman ſee; they beſtowed upon ſtrangers the richeſt benefices in every country, and drained their wealth to ſupply the luxury of a foreign court. Even the patience of the moſt ſuperſtitious ages could no longer bear ſuch oppreſſion; and ſo loud and frequent were the complaints and murmurs of the Germans, that the popes, afraid of irritating them too far, conſented, contrary to their uſual practice, to abate ſomewhat of their pretenſions, and to reſt ſatisfied with the right of nomination to ſuch benefices as happened to fall vacant during ſix months in the year, leaving the diſpoſal of the remainder to the princes and other legal patrons*.

But the court of Rome eaſily found expedients for eluding an agreement which put ſuch reſtraints on its power. The practice of reſerving certain benefices in every country to the pope's immediate nomination, which had been long known, and often complained of, was extended far beyond its ancient bounds. All the benefices poſſeſſed by cardinals, or any of the numerous officers in the Roman court; thoſe held by perſons who happened to die at Rome or within forty miles of that city, on their journey to or from it; ſuch as became vacant by tranſlation, with many others were included in the number of *reſerved* benefices; Julius II. and Leo X. ſtretching the matter to the utmoſt, often collated to benefices where the right of reſervation had not been declared, on pretence of having mentally reſerved this privilege to themſelves. The right of reſervation, however even with this extenſion, had certain limits, as it could be

* F. Paul, Hiſt. of Eccleſ. Benef. 204. Gold. Conſtit. Imper. i. 408.

exerciſed only where the benefice was actually vacant, and therefore in order to render the exertion of papal power unbounded, *expectative graces*, or mandates nominating a perſon to ſucceed to a benefice upon the firſt vacancy that ſhould happen, were brought into uſe. By means of theſe, Germany was filled with perſons who was ſervilely dependent on the court of Rome, from which they had received ſuch reverſionary grants; princes were defrauded, in a great degree, of their prerogatives; the rights of lay-patrons were pre-occupied, and rendered almoſt entirely vain †.

The manner in which theſe extraordinary powers were exerciſed, rendered them ſtill more odious and intolerable. The avarice and extortion of the court of Rome were become exceſſive almoſt to a proverb. The practice of ſelling benefices was ſo notorious, that no pains were taken to conceal, or to diſguiſe it. Companies of merchants openly purchaſed the benefices of different diſtricts in Germany from the pope's miniſters, and retailed them at an advanced price ‡. Pious men beheld with deep regret theſe ſimoniacal tranſactions, ſo unworthy the miniſters of a Chriſtian church; while politicians complained of the loſs ſuſtained by the exportation of ſo much wealth in that irreligious traffic.

The ſums, indeed, which the court of Rome drew, by its ſtated and legal impoſitions, from all the countries acknowledging its authority, were ſo conſiderable, that it is not ſtrange that princes, as well as their ſubjects, murmured at the ſmalleſt addition made to them by unneceſſary or illicit means. Every eccleſiaſtical perſon, upon his admiſſion to his benefice, paid *annats*, or one year's produce of his living to the pope; and as that tax was exacted with great rigour, its amount was very great. To this muſt be added, the

† Centum Gravam. § 21. Faſcic. Rer. expet. &c. 334. Gold. Conſt. Imper. i. 391, 404, 405. F. Paul, Hiſt. of Eccl. Benef. 167, 199.

‡ Faſcic. Rer. expet. i. 359.

frequent demands made by the popes of free gifts from the clergy, together with the extraordinary levies of tenths upon eccleſiaſtical benefices, on pretence of expeditions againſt the Turks, ſeldom intended, or carried into execution; and from the whole, the vaſt proportion of the revenues of the church, which flowed continually to Rome, may be eſtimated.

Such were the diſſolute manners the exorbitant wealth, the enormous power and privileges of the clergy, before the Reformation; ſuch the oppreſſive rigour of that dominion which the popes had eſtabliſhed over the Chriſtian world; and ſuch the ſentiments concerning them that prevailed in Germany at the beginning of the ſixteenth century. Nor has this ſketch been copied from the controverſial writers of that age, who, in the heat of diſputation, may be ſuſpected of having exaggerated the errors, or of having miſrepreſented the conduct of that church which they laboured to overturn; it is formed upon more authentic evidence, upon the memorials and remonſtrances of the Imperial diets, coolly enumerating the grievances under which the empire groaned, in order to obtain the redreſs of them. Diſſatisfaction muſt have riſen to a great height among the people, when theſe grave aſſemblies expreſſed themſelves with that degree of acrimony which abounds in their remonſtrances; and if they demanded the abolition of thoſe enormities with ſo much vehemence, the people, we may be aſſured, uttered their ſentiments and deſires in bolder and more virulent language.

To men thus prepared for ſhaking off the yoke, Luther addreſſed himſelf with certainty of ſucceſs. As they had long felt its weight, and had born it with impatience, they liſtened with joy to the firſt offer of procuring them deliverance. Hence proceeded the fond and eager reception that his doctrines met with, and the rapidity with which they ſpread over all the provinces of Germany. Even the impetuoſity and fierceneſs of Luther's ſpirit, his confidence in

aſſerting his own opinions, and the arrogance as well as contempt wherewith he treated all who differed from him, which in ages of greater moderation and refinement, have been reckoned defects in the character of that reformer, did not appear exceſſive to his contemporaries, whoſe minds were ſtrongly agitated by thoſe intereſting controverſies which he carried on, and who had themſelves endured the rigour of papal tyranny, and ſeen the corruptions in the church againſt which he exclaimed.

Nor were they offended at that groſs ſcurrility with which his polemical writings are filled, or at the low buffoonery which he ſometimes introduces into his graveſt diſcourſes. No diſpute was managed in thoſe rude times without a large portion of the former; and the latter was common, even on the moſt ſolemn occaſions, and in treating the moſt ſacred ſubjects. So far were either of theſe from doing hurt to his cauſe, that invective and ridicule had ſome effect, as well as more laudable arguments, in expoſing the errors of popery, and in determining mankind to abandon them.

Beſides all theſe cauſes of Luther's rapid progreſs, ariſing from the nature of his enterpriſe, and the juncture at which he undertook it, he reaped advantage from ſome foreign and adventitious circumſtances, the beneficial influence of which none of his forerunners in the ſame courſe had enjoyed. Among theſe may be reckoned the invention of the art of printing, about half a century before his time. By this fortunate diſcovery, the facility of acquiring and of propagating knowledge was wonderfully increaſed, and Luther's books, which muſt otherwiſe have made their way ſlowly and with uncertainty into diſtant countries, ſpread at once all over Europe. Nor were they read only by the rich and the learned, who alone had acceſs to books before that invention; they got into the hands of the people, who, upon this appeal to them as judges, ventured to examine and to reject

many doctrines which they had formerly been required to believe, without being taught to understand them.

The revival of learning at the same period was a circumstance extremely friendly to the Reformation. The study of the ancient Greek and Roman authors, by enlightening the human mind with liberal and sound knowledge, roused it from that profound lethargy in which it had been sunk during several centuries. Mankind seem, at that period, to have recovered the powers of inquiring and of thinking for themselves, faculties of which they had long lost the use; and fond of the acquisition, they exercised them with great boldness upon all subjects. They were not now afraid of entering an uncommon path, or of embracing a new opinion. Novelty appears rather to have been a recommendation of a doctrine; and instead of being startled when the daring hand of Luther drew aside or tore the veil which covered established errors, the genius of the age applauded and aided the attempt. Luther, though a stranger to elegance in taste or composition, zealously promoted the cultivation of ancient literature; and sensible of its being necessary to the right understanding of the scriptures, he himself had acquired considerable knowledge both in the Hebrew and Greek tongues. Melancthon, and some other of his disciples, were eminent proficients in the polite arts; and as the same ignorant monks who opposed the introduction of learning into Germany, set themselves with equal fierceness against Luther's opinions, and declared the good reception of the latter to be the effect of the progress which the former had made, the cause of learning and of the Reformation came to be considered as closely connected with each other, and, in every country, had the same friends and the same enemies. This enabled the reformers to carry on the contest at first with great superiority. Erudition, industry, accuracy of sentiment, purity of composition, even wit and raillery, were almost wholly on their side, and triumphed with ease over illiterate monks, whose rude arguments, ex-

preſſed in a perplexed and barbarous ſtyle, were found inſufficient for the defence of a ſyſtem, the errors of which, all the art and ingenuity of its later and more learned advocates have not been able to palliate.

That bold ſpirit of inquiry, which the revival of learning excited in Europe, was ſo favourable to the Reformation, that Luther was aided in his progreſs, and mankind were prepared to embrace his doctrines, by perſons who did not wiſh ſucceſs to his undertaking. The greater part of the ingenious men who applied to the ſtudy of ancient literature towards the cloſe of the fifteenth century, and the beginning of the ſixteenth, though they had no intention, and perhaps no wiſh, to overturn the eſtabliſhed ſyſtem of religion, had diſcovered the abſurdity of many tenets and practices authorized by the church, and perceived the futility of thoſe arguments by which illiterate monks endeavoured to defend them. Their contempt of theſe advocates for the received errors, led them frequently to expoſe the opinions which they ſupported, and to ridicule their ignorance with great freedom and ſeverity. By this, men were prepared for the more ſerious attacks made upon them by Luther, and their reverence both for the doctrines and perſons againſt whom he inveighed was conſiderably abated. This was particularly the caſe in Germany. When the firſt attempts were made to revive a taſte for ancient learning in that country, the eccleſiaſtics there, who were ſtill more ignorant than their brethren on the other ſide of the Alps, ſet themſelves to oppoſe its progreſs with more active zeal; and the patrons of the new ſtudies, in return, attacked them with greater violence. In the writings of Reuchlin, Hutten, and the other revivers of learning in Germany, the corruptions of the church of Rome are cenſured with an acrimony of ſtyle little inferior to that of Luther himſelf*.

From the ſame cauſe proceeded the frequent ſtrictures

* Gerdeſius Hiſt. Evang. Renov. vol. i. p. 141, 157. Seckend. lib. i. p. 103. Vonder Hardt Hiſt. Literar. Reform. pars ii.

of Eraſmus upon the errors of the church, as well as upon the ignorance and vices of the clergy. His reputation and authority were ſo high in Europe, at the beginning of the ſixteenth century, and his works were read with ſuch univerſal admiration, that the effect of theſe deſerves to be mentioned as one of the circumſtances which contributed conſiderably towards Luther's ſucceſs. Eraſmus, having been deſtined for the church, and trained up in the knowledge of eccleſiaſtical literature, applied himſelf more to theological inquiries than any of the revivers of learning in that age. His acute judgment and extenſive erudition enabled him to diſcover many errors, both in the doctrine and worſhip of the Romiſh church. Some of theſe he confuted with great ſolidity of reaſoning and force of eloquence. Others he treated as objects of ridicule, and turned againſt them that irreſiſtible torrent of popular and ſatirical wit, of which he had the command. There was hardly any opinion or practice of the Romiſh church, which Luther endeavoured to reform, but what had been previouſly animadverted upon by Eraſmus, and had afforded him ſubject either of cenſure or of raillery. Accordingly, when Luther firſt began his attack upon the church, Eraſmus ſeemed to applaud his conduct; he courted the friendſhip of ſeveral of his diſciples and patrons, and condemned the behaviour and ſpirit of his adverſaries*. He concurred openly with him in inveighing againſt the ſchool divines, as the teachers of a ſyſtem equally unedifying and obſcure. He joined him in endeavouring to turn the attention of men to the ſtudy of the holy ſcriptures, as the only ſtandard of religious truth†.

Various circumſtances, however, prevented Eraſmus from holding the ſame courſe with Luther. The natural timidity of his temper; his want of that ſtrength of mind which alone can prompt a man to aſſume the character of a reform-

* Seckend. lib. i. p. 40. 96.

† Vonder Hardt Hiſtor. Literar. Reform. pars. i. Gerdeſ. Hiſt. Evang. Renov. i. 147.

er*; his exceſſive deference for perſons in high ſtation; his dread of loſing the penſions and other emoluments, which their liberality had conferred upon him; his extreme love of peace, and hopes of reforming abuſes gradually, and by gentle methods, all concurred in determining him not only to repreſs and to moderate the zeal with which he had once been animated againſt the errors of the church†, but to aſſume the character of a mediator between Luther and his opponents. But though Eraſmus ſoon began to cenſure Luther as too daring and impetuous, and was at laſt prevailed upon to write againſt him, he muſt, nevertheleſs, be conſidered as his forerunner and auxiliary in this war upon the church. He firſt ſcattered the ſeeds, which Luther cheriſhed and brought to maturity. His raillery and oblique cenſures prepared the way for Luther's invectives and more direct attacks. In this light Eraſmus appeared to the zealous defenders of the Romiſh church in his own times‡. In this light he muſt be conſidered by every perſon converſant in the hiſtory of that period.

In this long enumeration of the circumſtances which combined in favouring the progreſs of Luther's opinions, or in weakening the reſiſtance of his adverſaries, I have avoided entering into any diſcuſſion of the theological doctrines of popery, and have not attempted to ſhew how repugnant they are to the ſpirit of Chriſtianity, and how deſtitute of any foundation in reaſon, in the word of God, or in the practice of the primitive church, leaving thoſe topics

* Eraſmus himſelf is candid enough to acknowledge this: "Luther," ſays he, "has given us many a wholeſome doctrine, and many a good counſel. I wiſh he had not defeated the effect of them by intolerable faults. But if he had written every thing in the moſt unexceptionable manner, I had no inclination to die for the ſake of truth. Every man hath not the courage requiſite to make a martyr; and I am afraid that, if I were put to the trial, I ſhould imitate St. Peter." Epiſt. Eraſmi in Jortin's Life of Eraſm. vol. i. p. 273.

† Jortin's Life of Eraſmus, vol. i. p. 258.

‡ Vonder Hardt Hiſt. Literar. Reform. pars i. p. 2.

entirely to eccleſiaſtical hiſtorians, to whoſe province they peculiarly belong. But when we add the effect of theſe religious conſiderations to the influence of political cauſes, it is obvious that the united operation of both on the human mind muſt have been ſudden and irreſiſtible. Though, to Luther's contemporaries, who were too near perhaps to the ſcene, or too deeply intereſted in it, to trace the cauſe with accuracy, or to examine them with coolneſs, the rapidity with which his opinions ſpread appeared to be ſo unaccountable, that ſome of them imputed it to a certain uncommon and malignant poſition of the ſtars, which ſcattered the ſpirit of giddineſs and innovation over the world†, it is evident, that the ſucceſs of the Reformation was the natural effect of powerful cauſes prepared by peculiar providence, and happily conſpiring to that end. This attempt to inveſtigate theſe cauſes, and to throw light on an event ſo ſingular and important, will not, perhaps, be deemed an unneceſſary digreſſion.—I return from it to the courſe of the hiſtory.

The diet at Worms conducted its deliberations with that ſlow formality peculiar to ſuch aſſemblies. Much time was ſpent in eſtabliſhing ſome regulations with regard to the internal police of the empire. The juriſdiction of the Imperial chamber was confirmed, and the forms of its proceeding rendered more fixed and regular. A council of regency was appointed to aſſiſt Ferdinand in the government of the empire during any occaſional abſence of the emperor; which, from the extent of the emperor's dominions, as well as the multiplicity of his affairs, was an event that might be frequently expected*. The ſtate of religion was then taken into conſideration. There was not wanting ſome plauſible reaſon which might have induced Charles to have declared himſelf the protector of Luther's cauſe, or at leaſt

† Jovii Hiſtoria, Lut. 1553. fol. p. 134.
* Pont. Heuter. Rer. Auſtr. lib. viii. c. 11. p. 195. Pfeffel Abregé Chronol p. 598.

to have connived at its progreſs. If he had poſſeſſed no other dominions but thoſe which belonged to him in Germany, and no other crown beſides the Imperial, he might have been diſpoſed, perhaps, to favour a man, who aſſerted ſo boldly the privileges and immunities for which the empire had ſtruggled ſo long with the popes. But the vaſt and dangerous ſchemes which Francis I. was forming againſt Charles, made it neceſſary for him to regulate his conduct by views more extenſive than thoſe which would have ſuited a German prince; and it being of the utmoſt importance to ſecure the pope's friendſhip, this determined him to treat Luther with great ſeverity, as the moſt effectual method of ſoothing Leo into a concurrence with his meaſures. His eagerneſs to accompliſh this rendered him not unwilling to gratify the papal legates in Germany, who inſiſted that, without any delay or formal deliberation, the diet ought to condemn a man whom the pope had already excommunicated as an incorrigible heretic. Such an abrupt manner of proceeding, however, being deemed unprecedented and unjuſt by the members of the diet, they made a point of Luther's appearing in perſon, and declaring whether he adhered or not to thoſe opinions which had drawn upon him the cenſures of the church*. Not only the emperor, but all the princes through whoſe territories he had to paſs, granted him a ſafe-conduct; and Charles wrote to him at the ſame time [March 6th,] requiring his immediate attendance on the diet, and renewing his promiſes of protection from any injury or violence†. Luther did not heſitate one moment about yielding obedience, and ſet out for Worms, attended by the herald who had brought the emperor's letter and ſafe-conduct. While on his journey, many of his friends, whom the fate of Huſs under ſimilar circumſtances, and notwithſtanding the ſame ſecurity of an Imperial ſafe-conduct, filled with ſolicitude, adviſed and entreated him not to ruſh wantonly into the midſt of danger. But Luther, ſuperior to ſuch

* P. Mart. Ep. 722. † Luth. Oper. ii. 412.

terrors, silenced them with this reply, "I am lawfully called," said he," "to appear in that city, and thither will I go in the name of the Lord, though as many devils, as there are tiles on the houses, were there combined against me*."

The reception which he met with at Worms was such as he might have reckoned a full reward of all his labours, if vanity and the love of applause had been the principles by which he was influenced. Greater crowds assembled to behold him, than had appeared at the emperor's public entry; his apartments were daily filled with princes and personages of the highest rank §, and he was treated with all the respect paid to those who possess the power of directing the understanding and sentiments of other men; an homage, more sincere, as well as more flattering, than any which pre-eminence in birth or condition can command. At his appearance before the diet, he behaved with great decency, and with equal firmness. He readily acknowledged an excess of vehemence and acrimony in his controversial writings, but refused to retract his opinions, unless he were convinced of their falsehood; or to consent to their being tried by any other rule than the word of God. When neither threats nor entreaties could prevail on him to depart from his resolution, some of the ecclesiastics proposed to imitate the example of the council of Constance, and by punishing the author of this pestilent heresy, who was now in their power, to deliver the church at once from such an evil. But the members of the diet, refusing to expose the German integrity to fresh reproach by a second violation of public faith; and Charles being no less unwilling to bring a stain upon the beginning of his administration by such an ignominious action, Luther was permitted to depart in safety‡. A few days after he left the city [April 26,] a severe edict was published in the emperor's name, and by authority of the

* Luth. Oper. ii. 411. § Seckend, 156. Luth. Oper. ii. 414.
‡ F. Paul. Hist. of Counc. p. 13. Seckend. 160.

diet, depriving him, as an obſtinate and excommunicated criminal, of all the privileges which he enjoyed as a ſubject of the empire, forbidding any prince to harbour or protect him, and requiring all to concur in ſeizing his perſon as ſoon as the term ſpecified in his ſafe-conduct was expired†.

But this rigorous decree had no conſiderable effect, the execution of it being prevented, partly by the multiplicity of occupations, which the commotions in Spain, together with the wars in Italy and the Low Countries, created to the emperor; and partly by a prudent precaution employed by the elector of Saxony, Luther's faithful and diſcerning patron. As Luther, on his return from Worms, was paſſing near Altenſtein in Thuringia, a number of horſemen in maſks ruſhed ſuddenly out of a wood, where the elector had appointed them to lie in wait for him, and ſurrounding his company, carried him, after diſmiſſing all his attendants, to Wartburg, a ſtrong caſtle not far diſtant. There the elector ordered him to be ſupplied with every thing neceſſary or agreeable, but the place of his retreat was carefully concealed, until the fury of the preſent ſtorm againſt him began to abate, upon a change in the political ſituation of Europe. In this ſolitude, where he remained nine months, and which he frequently called his Patmos, after the name of that iſland to which the apoſtle John was baniſhed, he exerted his uſual vigour and induſtry in defence of his doctrines, or in confutation of his adverſaries, publiſhing ſeveral treatiſes, which revived the ſpirit of his followers, aſtoniſhed to a great degree, and diſheartened at the ſudden diſappearance of their leader.

During his confinement, his opinions continued to gain ground, acquiring the aſcendant in almoſt every city in Saxony. At this time, the Auguſtinians of Wittemburg, with the approbation of the univerſity, and the connivance of the elector, ventured upon the firſt ſtep towards an alteration in the eſtabliſhed forms of public worſhip, by aboliſhing the

† Gold. Conſt. Imperial. ii. 408.

celebration of private maſſes, and by giving the cup as well as the bread to the laity in adminiſtering the ſacrament of the Lord's ſupper.

Whatever conſolation the courage and ſucceſs of his diſciples, or the progreſs of his doctrines in his own country, afforded Luther in his retreat, he there received information of two events which conſiderably damped his joy, as they ſeemed to lay inſuperable obſtacles in the way of propagating his principles, in the two moſt powerful kingdoms of Europe. One was, a ſolemn decree, condemning his opinions, publiſhed by the univerſity of Paris, the moſt ancient, and, at that time, the moſt reſpectable of the learned ſocieties in Europe. The other was the anſwer written to his book concerning the Babyloniſh captivity by Henry VIII. of England. That monarch, having been educated under the eye of a ſuſpicious father, who, in order to prevent his attending to buſineſs, kept him occupied in the ſtudy of literature, ſtill retained a greater love of learning, and ſtronger habits of application to it, than are common among princes of ſo active a diſpoſition and ſuch violent paſſions. Being ambitious of acquiring glory of every kind, as well as zealouſly attached to the Romiſh church, and highly exaſperated againſt Luther, who had treated Thomas Aquinas, his favourite author, with great contempt, Henry did not think it enough to exert his royal authority in oppoſing the opinions of the reformer, but reſolved likewiſe to combat them with ſcholaſtic weapons. With this view he publiſhed his treatiſe on the *Seven Sacraments*, which, though forgotten at preſent, as books of controverſy always are, when the occaſion that produced them is paſt, is not deſtitute of polemical ingenuity and acuteneſs, and was repreſented by the flattery of his courtiers to be a work of ſuch wonderful ſcience and learning, as exalted him no leſs above other authors in merit, than he was diſtinguiſhed among them by his rank. The pope, to whom it was preſented with the greateſt formality in full conſiſtory, ſpoke of it in ſuch terms, as

if it had been dictated by immediate inſpiration; and as a teſtimony of the gratitude of the church for his extraordinary zeal, conferred on him the title of *Defender of the Faith*, an appellation which Henry ſoon forfeited in the opinion of thoſe from whom he derived it, and which is ſtill retained by his ſucceſſors, though the avowed enemies of thoſe opinions, by contending for which he merited that honourable diſtinction. Luther, who was not overawed, either by the authority of the univerſity, or the dignity of the monarch, ſoon publiſhed his animadverſions on both, in a ſtyle no leſs vehement and ſevere, than he would have uſed in confuting his meaneſt antagoniſt. This indecent boldneſs, inſtead of ſhocking his contemporaries, was conſidered by them as a new proof of his undaunted ſpirit. A controverſy managed by diſputants ſo illuſtrious, drew univerſal attention; and ſuch was the contagion of the ſpirit of innovation, diffuſed through Europe in that age, and ſo powerful the evidence which accompanied the doctrines of the reformers on their firſt publication, that, in ſpite of both the civil and eccleſiaſtical powers combined againſt them, they daily gained converts both in France and in England.

How deſirous ſoever the emperor might be to put a ſtop to Luther's progreſs, he was often obliged, during the diet at Worms, to turn his thoughts to matters ſtill more intereſting, and which demanded more immediate attention. A war was ready to break out between him and the French king in Navarre, in the Low Countries, and in Italy; and it required either great addreſs to avert the danger, or timely and wiſe precautions to reſiſt it. Every circumſtance, at that juncture, inclined Charles to prefer the former meaſure. Spain was torn with inteſtine commotions. In Italy, he had not hitherto ſecured the aſſiſtance of any one ally. In the Low Countries, his ſubjects trembled at the thoughts of a rupture with France, the fatal effects of which on their commerce they had often experienced. From theſe conſiderations, as well as from the ſolicitude of Chievres, dur-

ing his whole adminiſtration, to maintain peace between the two monarchs, proceeded the emperor's backwardneſs to commence hoſtilities. But Francis and his miniſters did not breathe the ſame pacific ſpirit. He eaſily foreſaw that concord could not long ſubſiſt, where intereſt, emulation, and ambition conſpired to diſſolve it; and he poſſeſſed ſeveral advantages which flattered him with the hopes of ſurpriſing his rival, and of overpowering him before he could put himſelf in a poſture of defence. The French king's dominions, from their compact ſituation, from their ſubjection to the royal authority, from the genius of the people, fond of war, and attached to their ſovereign by every tie of duty and affection, were more capable of a great or ſudden effort, than the larger but diſunited territories of the emperor, in one part of which the people were in arms againſt his miniſters, and in all his prerogative was more limited than that of his rival.

The only princes, in whoſe power it was to have kept down, or to have extinguiſhed this flame on its firſt appearance, either neglected to exert themſelves, or were active in kindling and ſpreading it. Henry VIII. though he affected to aſſume the name of mediator, and both parties made frequent appeals to him, had laid aſide the impartiality which ſuited that character. Wolſey, by his artifices, had eſtranged him ſo entirely from the French king, that he ſecretly fomented the diſcord which he ought to have compoſed, and waited only for ſome decent pretext to join his arms to thoſe of the emperor*.

Leo's endeavours to excite diſcord between the emperor and Francis were more avowed, and had greater influence. Not only his duty, as the common father of Chriſtendom, but his intereſt as an Italian potentate, called upon the pope to act as the guardian of the public tranquillity, and to avoid any meaſure that might overturn the ſyſtem, which, after much bloodſhed, and many negotiations, was now eſtabliſh-

* Herbert. Fiddes's Life of Wolſey. 258.

ed in Italy. Accordingly Leo, who inſtantly diſcerned the propriety of this conduct, had formed a ſcheme, upon Charles's promotion to the Imperial dignity, of rendering himſelf the umpire between the rivals, by ſoothing them alternately, while he entered into no cloſe confederacy with either; and a pontiff leſs ambitious and enterpriſing, might have ſaved Europe from many calamities by adhering to this plan. But this high-ſpirited prelate, who was ſtill in the prime of life, longed paſſionately to diſtinguiſh his pontificate by ſome ſplendid action. He was impatient to waſh away the infamy of having loſt Parma and Placentia, the acquiſition of which reflected ſo much luſtre on the adminiſtration of his predeceſſor Julius. He beheld, with the indignation natural to Italians in that age, the dominion which the Tranſalpine, or as they, in imitation of the Roman arrogance, denominated them, the barbarous nations, had attained in Italy. He flattered himſelf, that after aſſiſting the one monarch to ſtrip the other of his poſſeſſions in that country, he might find means of driving out the victor in his turn, and acquire the glory of reſtoring Italy to the liberty and happineſs which it had enjoyed before the invaſion of Charles VIII. when every ſtate was governed by its native princes, or its own laws, and unacquainted with a foreign yoke. Extravagant and chimerical as this project may ſeem, it was the favourite object of almoſt every Italian eminent for genius or enterpriſe during great part of the ſixteenth century. They vainly hoped, that by ſuperior ſkill in the artifices and refinements of negotiation, they ſhould be able to baffle the efforts of nations, leſs poliſhed indeed than themſelves, but much more powerful and warlike. So alluring was the proſpect of this to Leo, that notwithſtanding the gentleneſs of his diſpoſition, and his fondneſs for the pleaſures of a refined and luxurious eaſe, he haſtened to diſturb the peace of Europe, and to plunge himſelf into a dangerous war, with an impetuoſity ſcarcely inferior to that of the turbulent and martial Julius*.

* Guic. lib. xiv. p. 173.

It was in Leo's power, however, to chuſe which of the monarchs he would take for his confederate againſt the other. Both of them courted his friendſhip; he wavered for ſome time between them, and at laſt concluded an alliance with Francis. The object of this treaty was the conqueſt of Naples, which the confederates agreed to divide between them. The pope, it is probable, flattered himſelf, that the briſk and active ſpirit of Francis, ſeconded by the ſame qualities in his ſubjects, would get the ſtart of the ſlow and wary councils of the emperor, and that they might over-run with eaſe this detached portion of his dominions, ill provided for defence, and always the prey of every invader. But whether the French king, by diſcovering too openly his ſuſpicion of Leo's ſincerity, diſappointed theſe hopes; whether the treaty was only an artifice of the pope's to cover the more ſerious negotiations which he was carrying on with Charles; whether he was enticed by the proſpect of reaping greater advantages from an union with that prince; or whether he was ſoothed by the zeal which Charles had manifeſted for the honour of the church in condemning Luther; certain it is, that he ſoon deſerted his new ally, and made overtures of friendſhip, though with great ſecrecy, to the emperor*. Don John Manuel, the ſame man who had been the favourite of Philip, and whoſe addreſs had diſconcerted all Ferdinand's ſchemes, having been delivered, upon the death of that monarch, from the priſon to which he had been confined, was now the Imperial ambaſſador at Rome, and fully capable of improving this favourable diſpoſition in the pope to his maſter's advantage§. To him the conduct of this negotiation was entirely committed; and being carefully concealed from Chievres, whoſe averſion from a war with France would have prompted him to retard or to defeat it, an alliance between the pope and emperor was quickly con-

* Guic. lib. xiv. p. 175. Mem. de Bellay, Par. 1573. p. 24.
§ Jovii Vita Leonis, lib. iv. p. 89.

cluded* [May 8]. The chief articles in this treaty, which proved the foundation of Charles's grandeur in Italy, were, that the pope and emperor ſhould join their forces to expel the French out of the Milaneſe, the poſſeſſion of which ſhould be granted to Francis Sforza, a ſon of Ludovico the Moor, who had reſided at Trent ſince the time that his brother Maximilian had been diſpoſſeſſed of his dominions by the French king; that Parma and Placentia ſhould be reſtored to the church; that the emperor ſhould aſſiſt the pope in conquering Ferrara; that the annual tribute paid by the kingdom of Naples to the Holy See ſhould be increaſed; that the emperor ſhould take the family of Medici under his protection; that he ſhould grant to the cardinal of that name a penſion of ten thouſand ducats upon the archbiſhopric of Toledo; and ſhould ſettle lands in the kingdom of Naples to the ſame value upon Alexander the natural ſon of Lorenzo de Medici.

The tranſacting an affair of ſuch moment without his participation, appeared to Chievres ſo deciſive a proof of his having loſt the aſcendant which he had hitherto maintained over the mind of his pupil, that his chagrin on this account, added to the melancholy with which he was overwhelmed on taking a view of the many and unavoidable calamities attending a war againſt France, is ſaid to have ſhortened his days§. But though this, perhaps, may be only the conjecture of hiſtorians, fond of attributing every thing that befals illuſtrious perſonages to extraordinary cauſes, and of aſcribing even their diſeaſes and death to the effect of political paſſions, which are more apt to diſturb the enjoyment than to abridge the period of life, it is certain that his death, at this critical juncture, extinguiſhed all hopes of avoiding a rupture with France†. This event, too, delivered Charles

* Guic. l. xiv. 181. Mem de Bellay, p. 24. Du Mont, Corps Diplom. tom. iv. ſuppl. p. 96.

§ Belcarii Comment de Reb. Gallic. 483.

† P. Heuter. Rer. Auſtriac. lib. viii. c. 11. p. 197.

from a miniſter, to whoſe authority he had been accuſtomed from his infancy to ſubmit with ſuch implicit deference, as checked and depreſſed his genius, and retained him in a ſtate of pupilage, unbecoming his years as well as his rank. But this reſtraint being removed, the native powers of his mind were permitted to unfold themſelves, and he began to diſplay ſuch great talents, both in council and in action, as exceeded the hopes of his contemporaries‖, and command the admiration of poſterity.

While the pope and emperor were preparing, in conſequence of their ſecret alliance, to attack Milan, hoſtilities commenced in another quarter. The children of John d'Albret, king of Navarre, having often demanded the reſtitution of their hereditary dominions, in terms of the treaty of Noyon, and Charles having as often eluded their requeſts upon very frivolous pretexts, Francis thought himſelf authorized by that treaty to aſſiſt the exiled family. The juncture appeared extremely favourable for ſuch an enterpriſe. Charles was at a diſtance from that part of his dominions; the troops uſually ſtationed there had been called away to quell the commotions in Spain; the Spaniſh malecontents warmly ſolicited him to invade Navarre†, in which a conſiderable faction was ready to declare for the deſcendents of their ancient monarchs. But in order to avoid, as much as poſſible, giving offence to the emperor or king of England, Francis directed forces to be levied, and the war to be carried on, not in his own name, but in that of Henry d'Albret. The conduct of theſe troops was committed to Andrew de Foix, de l'Eſparre, a young nobleman, whom his near alliance to the unfortunate king, whoſe battles he was to fight, and what was ſtill more powerful, the intereſt of his ſiſter, Madam de Chateau-Briand, Francis's favourite miſtreſs, recommended to that important truſt, for which he had neither talents nor experience. But as there was no army in the field to oppoſe him, he became maſter, in a few days, of the whole king-

‖ P. Mart. Ep. 735. † P. Mart. Ep 721.

dom of Navarre, without meeting with any obſtruction but from the citadel of Pampeluna. The additional works to this fortreſs, begun by Ximenes, were ſtill unfiniſhed; nor would its ſlight reſiſtance have deſerved notice, if Ignatio Loyola, a Biſcayan gentleman, had not been dangerouſly wounded in its defence. During the progreſs of a lingering cure, Loyola happened to have no other amuſement than what he found in reading the lives of the ſaints: the effect of this on his mind, naturally enthuſiaſtic, but ambitious and daring, was to inſpire him with ſuch a deſire of emulating the glory of theſe fabulous worthies of the Romiſh church, as led him into the wildeſt and moſt extravagant adventures, which terminated at laſt in inſtituting the ſociety of Jeſuits, the moſt political and beſt regulated of all the monaſtic orders, and from which mankind have derived more advantages, and received greater injury, than from any other of thoſe religious fraternities.

If, upon the reduction of Pampeluna, L'Eſparre had been ſatisfied with taking proper precautions for ſecuring his conqueſt, the kingdom of Navarre might ſtill have remained annexed to the crown of France, in reality, as well as in title. But puſhed on by youthful ardour, and encouraged by Francis, who was too apt to be dazzled with ſucceſs, he ventured to paſs the confines of Navarre, and to lay ſiege to Logrogno, a ſmall town in Caſtile. This rouſed the Caſtilians, who had hitherto beheld the rapid progreſs of his arms with great unconcern, and the diſſenſions in that kingdom (of which a full account ſhall be given) being almoſt compoſed, both parties exerted themſelves with emulation in defence of their country; the one, that it might efface the memory of paſt miſconduct by its preſent zeal; the other, that it might add to the merit of having ſubdued the emperor's rebellious ſubjects, that of repulſing his foreign enemies. The ſudden advance of their troops, together with the gallant defence made by the inhabitants of Logrogno, obliged the French general to adandon his raſh enterpriſe. The Spaniſh army, which

increaſed every day, haraſſing him during his retreat, he, inſtead of taking ſhelter under the cannon of Pampeluna, or waiting the arrival of ſome troops which were marching to join him, attacked the Spaniards, though far ſuperior to him in number, with great impetuoſity, but with ſo little conduct, that his forces were totally routed, he himſelf, together with his principal officers, was taken priſoner, and Spain recovered poſſeſſion of Navarre in ſtill ſhorter time than the French had ſpent in the conqueſt of it*.

While Francis endeavoured to juſtify his invaſion of Navarre, by carrying it on in the name of Henry d'Albret, he had recourſe to an artifice much of the ſame kind, in attacking another part of the emperor's territories. Robert de la Mark, lord of the ſmall but independent territory of Bouillon, ſituated on the frontiers of Luxembourg and Champagne, having abandoned Charles's ſervice on account of an encroachment which the Aulic council had made on his juriſdiction, and having thrown himſelf upon France for protection, was eaſily perſuaded, in the heat of his reſentment, to ſend a herald to Worms, and to declare war againſt the emperor in form. Such extravagant inſolence in a petty prince ſurpriſed Charles, and appeared to him a certain proof of his having received promiſes of powerful ſupport from the French king. The juſtneſs of this concluſion ſoon became evident. Robert entered the dutchy of Luxembourg with troops levied in France, by the king's connivance, though ſeemingly in contradiction to his orders, and after ravaging the open country, laid ſiege to Vireton. Of this Charles complained loudly, as a direct violation of the peace ſubſiſting between the two crowns, and ſummoned Henry VIII. in terms of the treaty concluded at London in the year 1518, to turn his arms againſt Francis as the firſt aggreſſor. Francis pretended that he was not anſwerable for Robert's conduct, whoſe army fought under his own ſtandards, and in his own quarrel; and affirmed, that,

* Mem. de Bellay, p. 21. P. Mart. Ep 726.

contrary to an expreſs prohibition, he had ſeduced ſome ſubjects of France into his ſervice; but Henry paid ſo little regard to this evaſion, that the French king, rather than irritate a prince whom he ſtill hoped to gain, commanded De la Mark to diſband his troops†.

The emperor, meanwhile, was aſſembling an army to chaſtiſe Robert's inſolence. Twenty thouſand men, under the count of Naſſau, invaded his little territories, and in a few days became maſters of every place in them but Sedan. After making him feel ſo ſenſibly the weight of his maſter's indignation, Naſſau advanced towards the frontiers of France; and Charles, knowing that he might preſume ſo far on Henry's partiality in his favour, as not to be overawed by the ſame fears which had reſtrained Francis, ordered his general to beſiege Mouſon. The cowardice of the garriſon having obliged the governor to ſurrender almoſt without reſiſtance, Naſſau inveſted Mezieres, a place at that time of no conſiderable ſtrength, but ſo advantageouſly ſituated, that by getting poſſeſſion of it, the Imperial army might have penetrated into the heart of Champagne, in which there was hardly any other town capable of obſtructing its progreſs. Happily for France, its monarch, ſenſible of the importance of this fortreſs, and of the danger to which it was expoſed, committed the defence of it to the chevalier Bayard, diſtinguiſhed among his contemporaries by the appellation of *The knight without fear, and without reproach*‡. This man, whoſe proweſs in combat, whoſe punctilious honour and formal gallantry, bear a nearer reſemblance, than any thing recorded in hiſtory, to the character aſcribed to the heroes of chivalry, poſſeſſed all the talents which form a great general. Theſe he had many occaſions of exerting in the defence of Mezieres; partly by his valour, partly by his conduct, he protracted the ſiege to a great length, and in the end obliged the Imperialiſts to raiſe it, with diſgrace and loſs§. Francis, at

† Mem. de Bellay, p. 22, &c. Mem. de Fleuranges, p. 335, &c.
‡ Oeuvres de Brantome, tom. vi. 114. § Mem. de Bellay, p. 25, &c.

the head of a numerous army, ſoon retook Mouſon, and entering the Low Countries, made ſeveral conqueſts of ſmall importance. In the neighbourhood of Valenciennes, through an exceſs of caution, an error with which he cannot be often charged, he loſt an opportunity of cutting off the whole Imperial army§; and what was ſtill more unfortunate, he diſguſted Charles duke of Bourbon, high conſtable of France, by giving the command of the van to the duke D'Alençon, though this poſt of honour belonged to Bourbon, as a prerogative of his office.

During theſe operations in the field, a congreſs was held at Calais (Auguſt) under the mediation of Henry VIII. in order to bring all differences to an amicable iſſue; and if the intentions of the mediator had correſponded in any degree to his profeſſions, it could hardly have failed of producing ſome good effect. But Henry committed the ſole management of the negotiation, with unlimited powers, to Wolſey; and this choice alone was ſufficient to have rendered it abortive. That prelate, bent on attaining the papal crown, the great object of his ambition, and ready to ſacrifice every thing in order to gain the emperor's intereſt, was ſo little able to conceal his partiality, that, if Francis had not been well acquainted with his haughty and vindictive temper, he would have declined his mediation. Much time was ſpent in enquiring who had begun hoſtilities, which Wolſey affected to repreſent as the principal point; and by throwing the blame of that on Francis, he hoped to juſtify, by the treaty of London, any alliance into which his maſter ſhould enter with Charles. The conditions on which hoſtilities might be terminated came next to be conſidered; but with regard to theſe, the emperor's propoſals were ſuch, as diſcovered either that he was utterly averſe to peace, or that he knew Wolſey would approve of whatever terms ſhould be offered in his name. He demanded the reſtitution of the dutchy of Burgundy, a province, the poſſeſſion of which would have

§ P. Mart Ep. 747. Mem. de Bellay, 35.

given him acceſs into the heart of France; and required to be releaſed from the homage due to the crown of France for the counties of Flanders and Artois, which none of his anceſtors had ever refuſed, and which he had bound himſelf by the treaty of Noyon to renew. Theſe terms, to which an high-ſpirited prince would ſcarcely have liſtened, after the diſaſters of an unfortunate war, Francis rejected with great diſdain; and Charles ſhewing no inclination to comply with the more equal and moderate propoſitions of the French monarch, that he ſhould reſtore Navarre to its lawful prince, and withdraw his troops from the ſiege of Tournay, the congreſs broke up without any other effect than that which attends unſucceſsful negotiations, the exaſperating of the parties whom it was intended to reconcile†.

During the continuance of the congreſs, Wolſey, on pretence that the emperor himſelf would be more willing to make reaſonable conceſſions than his miniſters, made an excurſion to Bruges, to meet that monarch. He was received by Charles, who knew his vanity, with as much reſpect and magnificence as if he had been king of England. But inſtead of advancing the treaty of peace by this interview, Wolſey, in his maſter's name, concluded a league with the emperor againſt Francis; in which it was ſtipulated, that Charles ſhould invade France on the ſide of Spain, and Henry in Picardy, each with an army of forty thouſand men; and that, in order to ſtrengthen their union, Charles ſhould eſpouſe the princeſs Mary, Henry's only child, and the apparent heir of his dominions *. Henry produced no better reaſons for this meaſure, equally unjuſt and impolitic, than the article in the treaty of London, by which he pretended that he was bound to take arms againſt the French king as the firſt aggreſſor; and the injury which he alleged Francis had done him, in permitting the duke of Albany,

† Rymer, Fœder. xiii. Herbert.
* P. Mart. Ep. 739. Herbert.

the head of a faction in Scotland, which oppoſed the intereſt of England, to return into that kingdom. He was influenced, however, by other conſiderations. The advantages which accrued to his ſubjects from maintaining an exact neutrality, or the honour that reſulted to himſelf from acting as the arbiter between the contending princes, appeared to his youthful imagination ſo inconſiderable, when compared with the glory which might be reaped from leading armies or conquering provinces, that he determined to remain no longer in a ſtate of inactivity. Having once taken this reſolution, his inducements to prefer an alliance with Charles were obvious. He had no claim upon any part of that prince's dominions, moſt of which were ſo ſituated, that he could not attack them without great difficulty and diſadvantage; whereas ſeveral maritime provinces of France had been long in the hands of the Engliſh monarchs, whoſe pretenſions, even to the crown of that kingdom, were not as yet altogether forgotten; and the poſſeſſion of Calais not only gave him eaſy acceſs into ſome of thoſe provinces, but in caſe of any diſaſter, afforded him a ſecure retreat. While Charles attacked France on one frontier, Henry flattered himſelf that he ſhould find little reſiſtance on the other, and that the glory of re-annexing to the crown of England the ancient inheritance of its monarchs on the continent was reſerved for his reign. Wolſey artfully encouraged theſe vain hopes, which led his maſter into ſuch meaſures as were moſt ſubſervient to his own ſecret ſchemes; and the Engliſh, whoſe hereditary animoſity againſt the French was apt to rekindle on every occaſion, did not diſapprove of the martial ſpirit of their ſovereign.

Meanwhile the league between the pope and the emperor produced great effects in Italy, and rendered Lombardy the chief theatre of war. There was, at that time, ſuch contrariety between the character of the French and Italians, that the latter ſubmitted to the government of the former with greater impatience than they expreſſed under the

dominion of other foreigners. The phlegm of the Germans and gravity of the Spanairds ſuited their jealous temper and ceremonious manners better than the French gaiety, too prone to gallantry, and too little attentive to decorum. Lewis XII. however, by the equity and gentleneſs of his adminiſtration, and by granting the Milaneſe more extenſive privileges than thoſe they had enjoyed under their native princes, had overcome, in a great meaſure, their prejudices, and reconciled them to the French government. Francis, on recovering that dutchy, did not imitate the example of his predeceſſor. Though too generous himſelf to oppreſs his people, his boundleſs confidence in his favourites, and his negligence in examining into the conduct of thoſe whom he entruſted with power, emboldened them to venture upon many acts of oppreſſion. The government of Milan was committed by him to Odet de Foix, Marechal de Lautrec, another brother of Madame de Chateau-Briand, an officer of great experience and reputation, but haughty, imperious, rapacious, and incapable either of liſtening to advice or of bearing contradiction. His inſolence and exactions totally alienated the affections of the Milaneſe from France, drove many of the conſiderable citizens into baniſhment, and forced others to retire for their own ſafety. Among the laſt was Jerome Moronè, vice-chancellor of Milan, a man whoſe genius for intrigue and enterpriſe diſtinguiſhed him in an age and country, where violent factions, as well as frequent revolutions, affording great ſcope for ſuch talents, produced or called them forth in great abundance. He repaired to Francis Sforza, whoſe brother Maximilian he had betrayed; and ſuſpecting the pope's intention of attacking the Milaneſe, although his treaty with the emperor was not yet made public, he propoſed to Leo, in name of Sforza, a ſcheme for ſurpriſing ſeveral places in that dutchy by means of the exiles, who, from hatred to the French, and from attachment to their former maſters, were ready for any deſperate enterpriſe. Leo not only encou-

raged the attempt, but advanced a conſiderable ſum towards the execution of it; and when, through unforeſeen accidents, it failed of ſucceſs in every part, he allowed the exiles, who had aſſembled in a body, to retire to Reggio, which belonged at that time to the church. The Marechal de Foix, who commanded at Milan in abſence of his brother Lautrec, who was then in France, tempted with the hopes of catching at once, as in a ſnare, all the avowed enemies of his maſter's government in that country, ventured to march into the eccleſiaſtical territories [June 24], and to inveſt Reggio. But the vigilance and conduct of Guicciardini the hiſtorian, governor of that place, obliged the French general to abandon the enterpriſe with diſgrace†. Leo, on receiving this intelligence, with which he was highly pleaſed, as it furniſhed him a decent pretence for a rupture with France, immediately aſſembled the conſiſtory of cardinals. After complaining bitterly of the hoſtile intentions of the French king, and magnifying the emperor's zeal for the church, of which he had given a recent proof by his proceedings againſt Luther, he declared that he was conſtrained in ſelf-defence, and as the only expedient for the ſecurity of the eccleſiaſtical ſtate, to join his arms to thoſe of that prince. For this purpoſe he now pretended to conclude a treaty with Don John Manuel, although it had really been ſigned ſome months before this time; and he publicly excommunicated De Foix, as an impious invader of St. Peter's patrimony.

Leo had already begun preparations for war, by taking into pay a conſiderable body of Swiſs; but the Imperial troops advanced ſo ſlowly from Naples and Germany, that it was the middle of autumn before the army took the field under the command of Proſper Colonna, the moſt eminent of the Italian generals, whoſe extreme caution, the effect of long experience in the art of war, was oppoſed with great propriety to the impetuoſity of the French. In the

† Guic. lib. xiv. 183. Mem. de Bellay, p. 38, &c.

mean time, De Foix diſpatched courier after courier to inform the king of the danger which was approaching. Francis, whoſe forces were either employed in the Low Countries, or aſſembling on the frontiers of Spain, and who did not expect ſo ſudden an attack in that quarter, ſent ambaſſadors to his allies the Swiſs, to procure from them the immediate levy of an additional body of troops; and commanded Lautrec to repair forthwith to his government. That general, who was well acquainted with the great neglect of economy in the adminiſtration of the king's finances, and who knew how much the troops in the Milaneſe had already ſuffered from the want of their pay, refuſed to ſet out unleſs the ſum of three hundred thouſand crowns was immediately put into his hands. But the king, Louiſe of Savoy his mother, and Semblancy, the ſuperintendent of finances, having promiſed, even with an oath, that on his arrival at Milan he ſhould find remittances for the ſum which he demanded; upon the faith of this, he departed. Unhappily for France, Louiſe, a woman deceitful, vindictive, rapacious, and capable of ſacrificing any thing to the gratification of her paſſions, but who had acquired an abſolute aſcendent over her ſon by her maternal tenderneſs, her care of his education, and her great abilities, was reſolved not to perform this promiſe. Lautrec having incurred her diſpleaſure by his haughtineſs in neglecting to pay court to her, and by the freedom with which he had talked concerning ſome of her adventures in gallantry, ſhe, in order to deprive him of the honour which he might have gained by a ſucceſsful defence of the Milaneſe, ſeized the three hundred thouſand crowns deſtined for that ſervice, and detained them for her own uſe.

Lautrec, notwithſtanding this cruel diſappointment, found means to aſſemble a conſiderable army, though far inferior in number to that of the confederates. He adopted the plan of defence moſt ſuitable to his ſituation, avoiding a pitched battle with the greateſt care, while he haraſſed the

enemy continually with his light troops, beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys, and covered or relieved every place which they attempted to attack. By this prudent conduct, he not only retarded their progrefs, but would have ſoon wearied out the pope, who had hitherto defrayed almoſt the whole expence of the war, as the emperor, whoſe revenues in Spain were diſſipated during the commotions in that country, and who was obliged to ſupport a numerous army in the Netherlands, could not make any conſiderable remittances into Italy. But an unforeſeen accident diſconcerted all his meaſures, and occaſioned a fatal reverſe in the French affairs. A body of twelve thouſand Swiſs ſerved in Lautrec's army under the banners of the republic, with which France was in alliance. In conſequence of a law, no leſs political than humane, eſtabliſhed among the cantons, their troops were never hired out by public authority to both the contending parties in any war. This law, however, the love of gain had ſometimes eluded, and private perſons had been allowed to enliſt in what ſervice they pleaſed, though not under the public banners, but under thoſe of their particular officers. The cardinal of Sion, who ſtill preſerved his intereſt among his countrymen, and his enmity to France, having prevailed on them to connive at a levy of this kind, twelve thouſand Swiſs, inſtigated by him, joined the army of the confederates. But the leaders in the cantons, when they ſaw ſo many of their countrymen marching under hoſtile ſtandards, and ready to turn their arms againſt each other, became ſo ſenſible of the infamy to which they would be expoſed by permitting this, as well as the loſs they might ſuffer, that they diſpatched couriers, commanding their people to leave both armies, and to return forthwith into their own country. The cardinal of Sion, however, had the addreſs, by corrupting the meſſengers appointed to carry this order, to prevent it from being delivered to the Swiſs in the ſervice of the confederates; but being intimated in due form to thoſe in the French army, they, fa-

tigued with the length of the campaign, and murmuring for want of pay, inſtantly yielded obedience, in ſpite of Lautrec's remonſtrances and entreaties.

After the deſertion of a body which formed the ſtrength of his army, Lautrec durſt no longer face the confederates. He retired towards Milan, encamped on the banks of the Adda, and placed his chief hopes of ſafety in preventing the enemy from paſſing that river; an expedient for defending a country ſo precarious, that there are few inſtances of its being employed with ſucceſs againſt any general of experience or abilities. Accordingly Colonna, notwithſtanding Lautrec's vigilance and activity, paſſed the Adda with little loſs, and obliged him to ſhut himſelf up within the walls of Milan, which the confederates were preparing to beſiege, when an unknown perſon, who never afterwards appeared either to boaſt of this ſervice, or to claim a reward for it, came from the city, and acquainted Moronè, that if the army would advance that night, the Ghibelline or Imperial faction, would put them in poſſeſſion of one of the gates. Colonna, though no friend to raſh enterpriſes, allowed the marquis de Peſcara to advance with the Spaniſh infantry, and he himſelf followed with the reſt of his troops. About the beginning of night, Peſcara arrived at the Roman gate in the ſuburbs, ſurpriſed the ſoldiers whom he found there; thoſe poſted in the fortifications adjoining to it immediately fled; the marquis ſeizing the works which they abandoned, and puſhing forward inceſſantly, though with no leſs caution than vigour, became maſter of the city with little bloodſhed, and almoſt without reſiſtance; the victors being as much aſtoniſhed as the vanquiſhed at the facility and ſucceſs of the attempt. Lautrec retired precipitately towards the Venetian territories with the remains of his ſhattered army; the cities of the Milaneſe, following the fate of the capital, ſurrendered to the confederates; Parma and Placentia were united to the eccleſiaſtical ſtate, and of all their conqueſts in Lombardy, only the town of Cremona, the caſtle

of Milan, and a few conſiderable forts, remained in the hands of the French*.

Leo received the accounts of this rapid ſucceſſion of proſperous events with ſuch tranſports of joy, as brought on (if we may believe the French hiſtorians) a ſlight fever, which being neglected, occaſioned his death on the ſecond of December, while he was ſtill of a vigorous age, and at the height of his glory. By this unexpected accident, the ſpirit of the confederacy was broken, and its operations ſuſpended. The cardinals of Sion, and Medici left the army that they might be preſent in the conclave; the Swiſs were recalled by their ſuperiors; ſome other mercenaries diſbanded for want of pay; and only the Spaniards and a few Germans in the emperor's ſervice, remained to defend the Milaneſe. But Lautrec, deſtitute both of men and of money, was unable to improve this favourable opportunity in the manner which he would have wiſhed. The vigilance of Moronè, and the good conduct of Colonna, diſappointed his feeble attempts on the Milaneſe. Guicciardini, by his addreſs and valour, repulſed a bolder and more dangerous attack which he made on Parma†.

Great diſcord prevailed in the conclave which followed upon Leo's death, and all the arts natural to men grown old in intrigue, when contending for the higheſt prize an eccleſiaſtic can obtain, were practiſed. Wolſey's name, notwithſtanding all the emperor's magnificent promiſes to favour his pretenſions, of which that prelate did not fail to remind him, was hardly mentioned in the conclave. Julio cardinal de Medici, Leo's nephew, who was more eminent than any other member of the ſacred college for his abilities, his wealth, and his experience in tranſacting great affairs, had already ſecured fifteen voices, a number ſufficient, ac-

* Guic. l. xiv. 190, &c. Mem. de Bellay, 42, &c. Galeacii Capella de reb. geſt. pro reſtitut. Franc. Sfortiæ Comment. ap. Scardium, vol. ii. 180, &c.

† Guic. l. xiv. 214.

cording to the forms of the conclave, to exclude any other candidate, though not to carry his own election. As he was ſtill in the prime of life, all the aged cardinals combined againſt him, without being united in favour of any other perſon. While theſe factions were endeavouring to gain, to corrupt, or to weary out each other, Medici and his adherents voted one morning at the ſcrutiny, which according to form was made every day, for cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, who at that time governed Spain in the emperor's name. This they did merely to protract time. But the adverſe party inſtantly cloſing with them, to their own amazement, and that of all Europe, a ſtranger to Italy, unknown to the perſons who gave their ſuffrages in his favour, and unacquainted with the manners of the people, or the intereſt of the ſtate, the government of which they conferred upon him, was unanimouſly raiſed to the papal throne [January 9,] at a juncture ſo delicate and critical, as would have demanded all the ſagacity and experience of one of the moſt able prelates in the ſacred college. The cardinals themſelves, unable to give a reaſon for this ſtrange choice, on account of which, as they marched in proceſſion from the conclave, they were loaded with inſults and curſes by the Roman people, aſcribed it to an immediate impulſe of the Holy Ghoſt. It may be imputed with greater certainty to the influence of Don John Manuel, the Imperial ambaſſador, who by his addreſs and intrigues facilitated the election of a perſon devoted to his maſter's ſervice, from gratitude, from intereſt, and from inclination *.

Beſide the influence which Charles acquired by Adrian's promotion, it threw great luſtre on his adminiſtration. To beſtow on his preceptor ſuch a noble recompence, and to place on the papal throne one whom he had raiſed from obſcurity, were acts of uncommon magnificence and power. Francis obſerved, with the ſenſibility of a rival, the pre-emi-

* Herm. Moringi Vita Hadriani, ap. Caſp. Burman. in Analect. de Hadr. p. 52. Conclave Hadr. Ibid. p. 144, &c.

nence which the emperor was gaining, and reſolved to exert himſelf with freſh vigour, in order to wreſt from him his late conqueſts in Italy. The Swiſs, that they might make ſome reparation to the French king, for having withdrawn their troops from his army ſo unſeaſonably as to occaſion the loſs of the Milaneſe, permitted him to levy ten thouſand men in the republic. Together with this reinforcement, Lautrec received from the king a ſmall ſum of money, which enabled him once more to take the field; and after ſeizing by ſurpriſe, or force, ſeveral places in the Milaneſe, to advance within a few miles of the capital. The confederate army was in no condition to obſtruct his progreſs; for though the inhabitants of Milan, by the artifices of Morone, and by the popular declamations of a monk whom he employed, were inflamed with ſuch enthuſiaſtic zeal againſt the French government, that they conſented to raiſe extraordinary contributions, Colonna muſt ſoon have abandoned the advantageous camp which he had choſen at Bicocca, and have diſmiſſed his troops for want of pay, if the Swiſs in the French ſervice had not once more extricated him out of his difficulties.

The inſolence or caprice of thoſe mercenaries were often no leſs fatal to their friends, than their valour and diſcipline were formidable to their enemies. Having now ſerved ſome months without pay, of which they complained loudly, a ſum deſtined for their uſe was ſent from France under a convoy of horſe; but Morone, whoſe vigilant eye nothing eſcaped, poſted a body of troops in their way, ſo that the party which eſcorted the money durſt not advance. On receiving intelligence of this, the Swiſs loſt all patience, and officers as well as ſoldiers crowding around Lautrec, threatened with one voice inſtantly to retire, if he did not either advance the pay which was due, or promiſed to lead them next morning to battle. In vain did Lautrec remonſtrate againſt theſe demands, repreſenting to them the impoſſibility of the former, and the raſhneſs of the latter, which muſt

be attended with certain deſtruction, as the enemy occupied a camp naturally of great ſtrength, and which by art they had rendered almoſt inacceſſible. The Swiſs, deaf to reaſon, and perſuaded that their valour was capable of ſurmounting every obſtacle, renewed their demand with greater fierceneſs, offering themſelves to form the vanguard, and to begin the attack. Lautrec, unable to overcome their obſtinacy, complied with their requeſt, hoping, perhaps, that ſome of thoſe unforeſeen accidents which ſo often determine the fate of battles, might crown this raſh enterpriſe with undeſerved ſucceſs; and convinced that the effects of a defeat could not be more fatal than thoſe which would certainly follow upon the retreat of a body which compoſed one half of his army. Next morning [May] the Swiſs were early in the field, and marched with the greateſt intrepidity againſt an enemy deeply entrenched on every ſide, ſurrounded with artillery, and prepared to receive them. As they advanced, they ſuſtained a furious cannonade with great firmneſs, and without waiting for their own artillery, ruſhed impetuouſly upon the entrenchments. But after incredible efforts of valour, which were ſeconded with great ſpirit by the French, having loſt their braveſt officers and beſt ſoldiers, and finding that they could make no impreſſion on the enemy's works, they ſounded a retreat; leaving the field of battle, however, like men repulſed, but not vanquiſhed, in cloſe array, and without receiving any moleſtation from the enemy.

Next day, ſuch as ſurvived ſet out for their own country; and Lautrec, deſpairing of being able to make any farther reſiſtance, retired into France, after throwing garriſons into Cremona and a few other places; all which, except the citadel of Cremona, Colonna ſoon obliged to ſurrender.

Genoa, however, and its territories, remaining ſubject to France, ſtill gave Francis conſiderable footing in Italy, and made it eaſy for him to execute any ſcheme for the recovery of the Milaneſe. But Colonna, rendered enterprizing by continual ſucceſs, and excited by the ſolicitations of the fac-

tion of Adorni, the hereditary enemies of the Fregoſi, who under the protection of France poſſeſſed the chief authority in Genoa, determined to attempt the reduction of that ſtate; and accompliſhed it with amazing facility. He became maſter of Genoa by an accident as unexpected as that which had given him poſſeſſion of Milan; and almoſt without oppoſition or bloodſhed, the power of the Adorni, and the authority of the emperor, were eſtabliſhed in Genoa†.

Such a cruel ſucceſſion of misfortunes affected Francis with deep concern, which was not a little augmented by the arrival of an Engliſh herald, who, in the name of his ſovereign, declared war in form againſt France [May 29]. This ſtep was taken in conſequence of the treaty which Wolſey had concluded with the emperor at Bruges, and which had hitherto been kept ſecret. Francis, though he had reaſon to be ſurpriſed with this denunciation, after having been at ſuch pains to ſoothe Henry and to gain his miniſter, received the herald with great compoſure and dignity§; and without abandoning any of the ſchemes which he was forming againſt the emperor, began vigorous preparations for reſiſting this new enemy. His treaſury, however, being exhauſted by the efforts which he had already made, as well as by the ſums he expended on his pleaſures, he had recourſe to extraordinary expedients for ſupplying it. Several new offices were created, and expoſed to ſale; the royal demeſnes were alienated; unuſual taxes were impoſed; and the tomb of St. Martin was ſtripped of a rail of maſſive ſilver, with which Louis XI. in one of his fits of devotion, had encircled it. By means of theſe expedients he was enabled to levy a conſiderable army, and to put the frontier towns in a good poſture of defence.

The emperor, meanwhile, was no leſs ſolicitous to draw as much advantage as poſſible from the acceſſion of ſuch a powerful ally; and the proſperous ſituation of his affairs, at

† Jovii Vita Ferdin. Davali, p. 344. Guic. l. xiv. 233.
§ Journal de Louiſe de Savoie, p. 199.

this time, permitting him to ſet out for Spain, where his preſence was extremely neceſſary, he viſited the court of England in his way to that country. He propoſed by this interview not only to ſtrengthen the bonds of friendſhip which united him with Henry, and to excite him to puſh the war againſt France with vigour, but hoped to remove any diſguſt or reſentment that Wolſey might have conceived on account of the mortifying diſappointment which he had met with in the late conclave. His ſucceſs exceeded his moſt ſanguine expectations; and by his artful addreſs, during a reſidence of ſix weeks in England, he gained not only the king and the miniſter, but the nation itſelf. Henry, whoſe vanity was ſenſibly flattered by ſuch a viſit, as well as by the ſtudied reſpect with which the emperor treated him on every occaſion, entered warmly into all his ſchemes. The cardinal foreſeeing, from Adrian's age and infirmities, a ſudden vacancy in the papal ſee, diſſembled or forgot his reſentment; and, as Charles, beſides augmenting the penſions which he had already ſettled on him, renewed his promiſe of favouring his pretenſions to the papacy, with all his intereſt, he endeavoured to merit the former, and to ſecure the accompliſhment of the latter, by freſh ſervices. The nation, ſharing in the glory of its monarch, and pleaſed with the confidence which the emperor placed in the Engliſh, by creating the earl of Surrey his high-admiral, diſcovered no leſs inclination to commence hoſtilities than Henry himſelf.

In order to give Charles, before he left England, a proof of this general ardour, Surrey ſailed with ſuch forces as were ready, and ravaged the coaſts of Normandy. He then made a deſcent on Bretagne, where he plundered and burnt Morlaix, and ſome other places of leſs conſequence. After theſe ſlight excurſions, attended with greater diſhonour than damage to France, he repaired to Calais, and took the command of the principal army, conſiſting of ſixteen thouſand men; with which, having joined the Flemiſh troops under the Count de Buren, he advanced into Picardy. The army

which Francis had aſſembled was far inferior in number to theſe united bodies. But during the long wars between the two nations, the French had diſcovered the proper method of defending their country againſt the Engliſh. They had been taught by their misfortunes to avoid a pitched battle with the utmoſt care, and to endeavour, by throwing garriſons into every place capable of reſiſtance, by watching all the enemy's motions, by intercepting their convoys, attacking their advanced poſts, and haraſſing them continually with their numerous cavalry, to ruin them with the length of the war, or to beat them by piece-meal. This plan the duke of Vendome, the French general in Picardy, purſued with no leſs prudence than ſucceſs; and not only prevented Surrey from taking any town of importance, but obliged him to retire with his army greatly reduced by fatigue, by want of proviſions, and by the loſs which it had ſuſtained in ſeveral unſucceſsful ſkirmiſhes.

Thus ended the ſecond campaign, in a war the moſt general that had hitherto been kindled in Europe; and though Francis, by his mother's ill-timed reſentment, by the diſguſting inſolence of his general, and the caprice of the mercenary troops which he employed, had loſt his conqueſts in Italy, yet all the powers combined againſt him had not been able to make any impreſſion on his hereditary dominions; and wherever they either intended or attempted an attack, he was well prepared to receive them.

While the Chriſtian princes were thus waſting each other's ſtrength, Solyman the Magnificent entered Hungary with a numerous army, and inveſting Belgrade, which was deemed the chief barrier of that kingdom againſt the Turkiſh arms, ſoon forced it to ſurrender. Encouraged by this ſucceſs, he turned his victorious arms againſt the iſland of Rhodes, the ſeat, at that time, of the knights of St. John of Jeruſalem. This ſmall ſtate he attacked with ſuch a numerous army as the lords of Aſia have been accuſtomed in every age to bring into the field. Two hundred thouſand men, and a

fleet of four hundred ſail, appeared againſt a town defended by a garriſon conſiſting of five thouſand ſoldiers, and ſix hundred knights, under the command of Villiers de L'Iſle Adam, the grand maſter, whoſe wiſdom and valour rendered him worthy of that ſtation at ſuch a dangerous juncture. No ſooner did he begin to ſuſpect the deſtination of Solyman's vaſt armaments, than he diſpatched meſſengers to all the Chriſtian courts, imploring their aid againſt the common enemy. But though every prince in that age acknowledged Rhodes to be the great bulwark of Chriſtendom in the eaſt, and truſted to the gallantry of its knights as the beſt ſecurity againſt the progreſs of the Ottoman arms; though Adrian, with a zeal which became the head and father of the church, exhorted the contending powers to forget their private quarrels, and, by uniting their arms, to prevent the Infidels from deſtroying a ſociety which did honour to the Chriſtian name; yet ſo violent and implacable was the animoſity of both parties, that regardleſs of the danger to which they expoſed all Europe, and unmoved by the intreaties of the grand maſter, or the admonitions of the pope, they ſuffered Solyman to carry on his operations againſt Rhodes without diſturbance. The grand maſter, after incredible efforts of courage, of patience, and of military conduct during a ſiege of ſix months; after ſuſtaining many aſſaults, and diſputing every poſt with amazing obſtinacy, was obliged at laſt to yield to numbers; and having obtained an honourable capitulation from the ſultan, who admired and reſpected his virtue, he ſurrendered the town, which was reduced to a heap of rubbiſh, and deſtitute of every reſource†. Charles and Francis, aſhamed of having occaſioned ſuch a loſs to Chriſtendom by their ambitious conteſts, endeavoured to throw the blame of it on each other, while all Europe, with greater juſtice, imputed it equally to both. The emperor, by way of reparation, granted the knights of St. John

† Fontanus de Bello Rhodio, ap Scard. Script. Rer. German. vol. ii. p. 88. P. Barre. Hiſt. d'Allem. tom. viii. 57.

the ſmall iſland of Malta, in which they fixed their reſidence, retaining, though with leſs power and ſplendour, their ancient ſpirit and implacable enmity to the Infidels.

BOOK III.

CHARLES, having had the ſatisfaction of ſeeing hoſtilities begun between France and England, took leave of Henry, and arrived in Spain on the ſeventeenth of June. He found that country juſt beginning to recover order and ſtrength after the miſeries of a civil war, to which it had been expoſed during his abſence; an account of the riſe and progreſs of which, as it was but little connected with the other events which happened in Europe, hath been reſerved to this place.

No ſooner was it known that the Cortes aſſembled in Galicia had voted the emperor a *free gift*, without obtaining the redreſs of any one grievance, than it excited univerſal indignation. The citizens of Toledo, who conſidered themſelves, on account of the great privileges which they enjoyed, as guardians of the liberties of the Caſtilian commons, finding that no regard was paid to the remonſtrances of their deputies againſt that unconſtitutional grant, took arms with tumultuary violence, and ſeizing the gates of the city which were fortified, attacked the alcazar, or caſtle, which they ſoon obliged the governor to ſurrender. Emboldened by this ſucceſs, they deprived of all authority every perſon whom they ſupected of any attachment to the court, eſtabliſhed a popular form of government, compoſed of deputies from the ſeveral pariſhes in the city, and levied troops in their own defence. The chief leader of the people in theſe inſurrections was Don John de Padilla, the eldeſt ſon of the commendator of Caſtile, a young nobleman of a generous temper, of undaunted courage, and poſſeſſed of the talents

as well as of the ambition which, in times of civil diſcord, raiſe men to power and eminence*.

The reſentment of the citizens of Segovia produced effects ſtill more fatal. Tordeſillas, one of the repreſentatives in the late Cortes, had voted for the donative, and being a bold and haughty man, ventured upon his return, to call together his fellow-citizens in the great church, that he might give them, according to cuſtom, an account of his conduct in that aſſembly. But the multitude, unable to bear his inſolence, in attempting to juſtify what they thought inexcuſable, burſt open the gates of the church with the utmoſt fury, and ſeizing the unhappy Tordeſillas, dragged him through the ſtreets, with a thouſand curſes and inſults, towards the place of public execution. In vain did the dean and canons come forth in proceſſion with the holy ſacrament, in order to appeaſe their rage. In vain did the monks of thoſe monaſteries by which they paſſed, conjure them on their knees, to ſpare his life, or at leaſt to allow him time to confeſs, and to receive abſolution of his ſins. Without liſtening to the dictates either of humanity or religion, they cried out, "That the hangman alone could abſolve ſuch a traitor to his country;" they then hurried him along with greater violence; and perceiving that he had expired under their hands, they hung him up with his head downwards on the common gibbet‡. The ſame ſpirit ſeized the inhabitants of Burgos, Zamora, and ſeveral other cities; and though their repreſentatives, taking warning from the fate of Tordeſillas, had been ſo wiſe as to ſave themſelves by a timely flight, they were burnt in effigy, their houſes razed to the ground, and their effects conſumed with fire; and ſuch was the horror which the people had conceived againſt them, as betrayers of the public liberty, that not one in thoſe licentious multitudes would touch any thing, however valuable, which had belonged to them†.

* Sandov. p. 77. ‡ P. Mart. Ep. 671.
† Sandov. 103. P. Mart. Ep. 674.

Adrian, at that time regent of Spain, had ſcarcely fixed the ſeat of his government at Valladolid, when he was alarmed with an account of theſe inſurrections. He immediately aſſembled the privy council [June 5, 1520], to deliberate concerning the proper method of ſuppreſſing them. The counſellors differed in opinion; ſome inſiſting that it was neceſſary to check this audacious ſpirit in its infancy by a ſevere execution of juſtice; others adviſing to treat with lenity a people who had ſome reaſon to be incenſed, and not to drive them beyond all the bounds of duty by an ill-timed rigour. The ſentiments of the former being warmly ſupported by the archbiſhop of Granada, preſident of the council, a perſon of great authority, but choleric and impetuous, were approved by Adrian, whoſe zeal to ſupport his maſter's authority, hurried him into a meaſure, to which, from his natural caution and timidity, he would otherwiſe have been averſe. He commanded Ronquillo, one of the king's judges, to repair inſtantly to Segovia, which had ſet the firſt example of mutiny, and to proceed againſt the delinquents according to law; and leſt the people ſhould be ſo outrageous as to reſiſt his authority, a conſiderable body of troops were appointed to attend him. The Segovians, foreſeeing what they might expect from a judge ſo well known for his auſtere and unforgiving temper, took arms with one conſent, and having muſtered twelve thouſand men, ſhut their gates againſt him. Ronquillo, enraged at this inſult, denounced them rebels and outlaws, and his troops ſeizing all the avenues to the town, hoped that it would ſoon be obliged to ſurrender for want of proviſions. The inhabitants, however, defended themſelves with vigour, and having received a conſiderable reinforcement from Toledo, under the command of Padilla, attacked Ronquillo, and forced him to retire with the loſs of his baggage and military cheſt *.

Upon this, Adrian ordered Antonio de Fonſeca, whom

* Sandov. 112. P. Mart. Ep. 679. Miniana, Contin. p. 15.

the emperor had appointed commander in chief of the forces in Caſtile, to aſſemble an army, and to beſiege Segovia in form. But the inhabitants of Medina del Campo, where cardinal Ximenes had eſtabliſhed a vaſt magazine of military ſtores, would not ſuffer him to draw from it a train of battering cannon, or to deſtroy their countrymen with thoſe arms which had been prepared againſt the enemies of the kingdom. Fonſeca, who could not execute his orders without artillery, determined to ſeize the magazine by force; and the citizens ſtanding on their defence, he aſſaulted the town with great briſkneſs [Aug. 21]; but his troops were ſo warmly received, that deſpairing of carrying the place, he ſet fire to ſome of the houſes, in hopes that the citizens would abandon the walls, in order to ſave their families and effects. Inſtead of that the expedient to which he had recourſe ſerved only to increaſe their fury, and he was repulſed with great diſgrace, while the flames, ſpreading from ſtreet to ſtreet, reduced to aſhes almoſt the whole town, one of the moſt conſiderable at that time in Spain, and the great mart for the manufactures of Segovia and ſeveral other cities. As the warehouſes were then filled with goods for the approaching fair, the loſs was immenſe, and was felt univerſally. This, added to the impreſſion which ſuch a cruel action made on a people long unaccuſtomed to the horrors of civil war, enraged the Caſtilians almoſt to madneſs. Fonſeca became the object of general hatred, and was branded with the name of incendiary, and enemy to his country. Even the citizens of Valladolid, whom the preſence of the cardinal had hitherto reſtrained, declared that they could no longer remain inactive ſpectators of the ſufferings of their countrymen. Taking arms with no leſs fury than the other cities, they burnt Fonſeca's houſe to the ground, elected new magiſtrates, raiſed ſoldiers, appointed officers to command them, and guarded their walls with as much diligence as if an enemy had been ready to attack them.

The cardinal, though virtuous and diſintereſted, and capable of governing the kingdom with honour in times of tranquillity, poſſeſſed neither the courage nor the ſagacity neceſſary at ſuch a dangerous juncture. Finding himſelf unable to check theſe outrages committed under his own eye, he attempted to appeaſe the people, by proteſting that Fonſeca had exceeded his orders, and had by his raſh conduct offended him, as much as he had injured them. This condeſcenſion, the effect of irreſolution and timidity, rendered the malecontents bolder and more inſolent; and the cardinal having ſoon afterwards recalled Fonſeca, and diſmiſſed his troops, which he could no longer afford to pay, as the treaſury, drained by the rapaciouſneſs of the Flemiſh miniſters, had received no ſupply from the great cities, which were all in arms, the people were left at full liberty to act without controul, and ſcarcely any ſhadow of power remained in his hands.

Nor were the proceedings of the commons the effects merely of popular and tumultuary rage; they aimed at obtaining redreſs of their political grievances, and an eſtabliſhment of public liberty on a ſecure baſis, objects worthy of all the zeal which they diſcovered in contending for them. The feudal government in Spain was at that time in a ſtate more favourable to liberty than in any other of the great European kingdoms. This was owing chiefly to the number of great cities in that country, a circumſtance I have already taken notice of, and which contributes more than any other to mitigate the rigour of the feudal inſtitutions, and to introduce a more liberal and equal form of government. The inhabitants of every city formed a great corporation, with valuable immunities and privileges; they were delivered from a ſtate of ſubjection and vaſſalage; they were admitted to a conſiderable ſhare in the legiſlature; they had acquired the arts of induſtry, without which cities cannot ſubſiſt; they had accumulated wealth, by engaging in commerce; and being free and independent themſelves, were ever ready

to act as the guardians of the public freedom and independence. The genius of the internal government eſtabliſhed among the inhabitants of cities, which, even in countries where deſpotic power prevails moſt, is democratical and republican, rendered the idea of liberty familiar and dear to them. Their repreſentatives in the Cortes were accuſtomed, with equal ſpirit, to check the encroachments of the king and the oppreſſion of the nobles. They endeavoured to extend the privileges of their own order; they laboured to ſhake off the remaining incumbrances with which the ſpirit of feudal policy, favourable only to the nobles, had burdened them; and, conſcious of being one of the moſt conſiderable orders in the ſtate, were ambitious of becoming the moſt powerful.

The preſent juncture appeared favourable for puſhing any new claim. Their ſovereign was abſent from his dominions; by the ill conduct of his miniſters he had loſt the eſteem and affection of his ſubjects; the people, exaſperated by many injuries, had taken arms, though without concert, almoſt by general conſent; they were animated with rage capable of carrying them to the moſt violent extremes; the royal treaſury was exhauſted; the kingdom deſtitute of troops; and the government committed to a ſtranger, of great virtue indeed, but of abilities unequal to ſuch a truſt. The firſt care of Padilla, and the other popular leaders who obſerved and determined to improve theſe circumſtances, was to eſtabliſh ſome form of union or aſſociation among the malecontents, that they might act with greater regularity, and purſue one common end; and as the different cities had been prompted to take arms by the ſame motives, and were accuſtomed to conſider themſelves as a diſtinct body from the reſt of the ſubjects, they did not find this difficult. A general convention was appointed to be held at Avila. Deputies appeared there in name of almoſt all the cities entitled to have repreſentatives in the Cortes. They all bound themſelves, by ſolemn oath, to live and die in the ſervice of

the king, and in defence of the privileges of their order; and aſſuming the name of the holy *Junta*, or aſſociation, proceeded to deliberate concerning the ſtate of the nation, and the proper method of redreſſing its grievances. The firſt that naturally preſented itſelf, was the nomination of a foreigner to be regent; this they declared with one voice to be a violation of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and reſolved to ſend a deputation of their members to Adrian, requiring him in their name to lay aſide all the enſigns of his office, and to abſtain for the future from the exerciſe of a juriſdiction which they had pronounced illegal*.

While they were preparing to execute this bold reſolution, Padilla accompliſhed an enterpriſe of the greateſt advantage to the cauſe. After relieving Segovia, he marched ſuddenly to Tordeſillas [Aug. 29,] the place where the unhappy queen Joanna had reſided ſince the death of her huſband, and being favoured by the inhabitants, was admitted into the town, and became maſter of her perſon, for the ſecurity of which Adrian had neglected to take proper precautions†. Padilla waited immediately upon the queen, and accoſting her with that profound reſpect, which ſhe exacted from the few perſons whom ſhe deigned to admit into her preſence, acquainted her at large with the miſerable condition of her Caſtilian ſubjects under the government of her ſon, who being deſtitute of experience himſelf, permitted his foreign miniſters to treat them with ſuch rigour as had obliged them to take arms in defence of the liberties of their country. The queen, as if ſhe had been awakened out of a lethargy, expreſſed great aſtoniſhment, at what he ſaid, and told him, that as ſhe had never heard, until that moment, of the death of her father, or known the ſufferings of her people, no blame could be imputed to her, but that now ſhe would take care to provide a ſufficient remedy; and in the mean

* P. Mart. Ep. 691.

† Vita dell' Imper. Carl. V. dell' Alf. Ulloa. Ven. 1509. p. 67. Miniana, Contin. p. 17.

time, added ſhe, let it be your concern to do what is neceſſary for the public welfare. Padilla, too eager in forming a concluſion agreeable to his wiſhes, miſtook this lucid interval of reaſon for a perfect return of that faculty; and acquainting the Junta with what had happened, adviſed them to remove to Tordeſillas, and to hold their meetings in that place. This was inſtantly done; but though Joanna received very graciouſly an addreſs of the Junta, beſeeching her to take upon herſelf the government of the kingdom, and in token of her compliance admitted all the deputies to kiſs her hand; though ſhe was preſent at a tournament held on that occaſion, and ſeemed highly ſatisfied with both theſe ceremonies, which were conducted with great magnificence in order to pleaſe her, ſhe ſoon relapſed into her former melancholy and ſullenneſs, and could never be brought, by any arguments or entreaties, to ſign any one paper neceſſary for the diſpatch of buſineſs*.

The Junta, concealing as much as poſſible this laſt circumſtance, carried on all their deliberations in the name of Joanna; and as the Caſtilians, who idolized the name of Iſabella, retained a wonderful attachment to her daughter, no ſooner was it known that ſhe had conſented to aſſume the reins of government, than the people expreſſed the moſt univerſal and immoderate joy; and believing her recovery to be complete, aſcribed it to a miraculous interpoſition of Heaven, in order to reſcue their country from the oppreſſion of foreigners. The Junta, conſcious of the reputation and power which they had acquired by ſeeming to act under the royal authority, were no longer ſatisfied with requiring Adrian to reſign the office of regent; they detached Padilla to Valladolid with a conſiderable body of troops, ordering him to ſeize ſuch members of the council as were ſtill in that city, to conduct them to Tordeſillas, and to bring away the ſeals of the kingdom, the public archives, and treaſury books. Padilla, who was received by the citizens as the deliverer of his

* Sandov. 164. P. Mart. Ep. 685, 686.

country, executed his commiſſion with great exactneſs; permitting Adrian, however, ſtill to reſide in Valladolid, though only as a private perſon, and without any ſhadow of power*.

The emperor, to whom frequent accounts of theſe tranſactions were tranſmitted while he was ſtill in Flanders, was ſenſible of his own imprudence and that of his miniſters, in having deſpiſed too long the murmurs aud remonſtrances of the Caſtilians. He beheld, with deep concern, a kingdom, the moſt valuable of any he poſſeſſed, and in which lay the ſtrength and ſinews of his power, juſt ready to diſown his authority, and on the point of being plunged in all the miſeries of civil war. But though his preſence might have averted this calamity, he could not, at that time, viſit Spain without endangering the Imperial crown, and allowing the French king full leiſure to execute his ambitious ſchemes. The only point now to be deliberated upon, was, whether he ſhould attempt to gain the malecontents by indulgence and conceſſions, or prepare directly to ſuppreſs them by force; and he reſolved to make trial of the former, while, at the ſame time, if that ſhould fail of ſucceſs, he prepared for the latter. For this purpoſe, he iſſued circular letters to all the cities of Caſtile, exhorting them in moſt gentle terms, and with aſſurances of full pardon, to lay down their arms; he promiſed ſuch cities as had continued faithful, not to exact from them the ſubſidy granted in the late Cortes, and offered the ſame favour to ſuch as returned to their duty; he engaged that no office ſhould be conferred for the future upon any but native Caſtilians. On the other hand, he wrote to the nobles, exciting them to appear with vigour in defence of their own rights, and thoſe of the crown, againſt the exorbitant claims of the commons; he appointed the high admiral Don Fadrique Enriquez, and the high conſtable of Caſtile, Don Inigo de Velaſco, two noblemen of great abilities as well as influence, regents of the kingdom in conjunction with Adrian; and he gave them full power and inſtructions,

* Sandov. 174. P. Mart. Ep. 791.

time, added ſhe, let it be your concern to do what is neceſſary for the public welfare. Padilla, too eager in forming a concluſion agreeable to his wiſhes, miſtook this lucid interval of reaſon for a perfect return of that faculty; and acquainting the Junta with what had happened, adviſed them to remove to Tordeſillas, and to hold their meetings in that place. This was inſtantly done; but though Joanna received very graciouſly an addreſs of the Junta, beſeeching her to take upon herſelf the government of the kingdom, and in token of her compliance admitted all the deputies to kiſs her hand; though ſhe was preſent at a tournament held on that occaſion, and ſeemed highly ſatisfied with both theſe ceremonies, which were conducted with great magnificence in order to pleaſe her, ſhe ſoon relapſed into her former melancholy and ſullenneſs, and could never be brought, by any arguments or entreaties, to ſign any one paper neceſſary for the diſpatch of buſineſs*.

The Junta, concealing as much as poſſible this laſt circumſtance, carried on all their deliberations in the name of Joanna; and as the Caſtilians, who idolized the name of Iſabella, retained a wonderful attachment to her daughter, no ſooner was it known that ſhe had conſented to aſſume the reins of government, than the people expreſſed the moſt univerſal and immoderate joy; and believing her recovery to be complete, aſcribed it to a miraculous interpoſition of Heaven, in order to reſcue their country from the oppreſſion of foreigners. The Junta, conſcious of the reputation and power which they had acquired by ſeeming to act under the royal authority, were no longer ſatisfied with requiring Adrian to reſign the office of regent; they detached Padilla to Valladolid with a conſiderable body of troops, ordering him to ſeize ſuch members of the council as were ſtill in that city, to conduct them to Tordeſillas, and to bring away the ſeals of the kingdom, the public archives, and treaſury books. Padilla, who was received by the citizens as the deliverer of his

* Sandov. 164. P. Mart. Ep. 685, 686.

country, executed his commiſſion with great exactneſs; permitting Adrian, however, ſtill to reſide in Valladolid, though only as a private perſon, and without any ſhadow of power*.

The emperor, to whom frequent accounts of theſe tranſactions were tranſmitted while he was ſtill in Flanders, was ſenſible of his own imprudence and that of his miniſters, in having deſpiſed too long the murmurs and remonſtrances of the Caſtilians. He beheld, with deep concern, a kingdom, the moſt valuable of any he poſſeſſed, and in which lay the ſtrength and ſinews of his power, juſt ready to diſown his authority, and on the point of being plunged in all the miſeries of civil war. But though his preſence might have averted this calamity, he could not, at that time, viſit Spain without endangering the Imperial crown, and allowing the French king full leiſure to execute his ambitious ſchemes. The only point now to be deliberated upon, was, whether he ſhould attempt to gain the malecontents by indulgence and conceſſions, or prepare directly to ſuppreſs them by force; and he reſolved to make trial of the former, while, at the ſame time, if that ſhould fail of ſucceſs, he prepared for the latter. For this purpoſe, he iſſued circular letters to all the cities of Caſtile, exhorting them in moſt gentle terms, and with aſſurances of full pardon, to lay down their arms; he promiſed ſuch cities as had continued faithful, not to exact from them the ſubſidy granted in the late Cortes, and offered the ſame favour to ſuch as returned to their duty; he engaged that no office ſhould be conferred for the future upon any but native Caſtilians. On the other hand, he wrote to the nobles, exciting them to appear with vigour in defence of their own rights, and thoſe of the crown, againſt the exorbitant claims of the commons; he appointed the high admiral Don Fadrique Enriquez, and the high conſtable of Caſtile, Don Inigo de Velaſco, two noblemen of great abilities as well as influence, regents of the kingdom in conjunction with Adrian; and he gave them full power and inſtructions,

* Sandov. 174. P. Mart. Ep. 791.

if the obſtinacy of the malecontents ſhould render it neceſſary, to vindicate the royal authority by force of arms†.

Theſe conceſſions, which, at the time of his leaving Spain, would have fully ſatisfied the people, came now too late to produce any effect. The Junta, relying on the unanimity with which the nation ſubmitted to their authority, elated with the ſucceſs which hitherto had accompanied all their undertakings, and ſeeing no military force collected to defeat or obſtruct their deſigns, aimed at a more thorough reformation of political abuſes. They had been employed for ſome time in preparing a remonſtrance containing a large enumeration, not only of the grievances of which they craved redreſs, but of ſuch new regulations as they thought neceſſary for the ſecurity of their liberties. This remonſtrance, which is divided into many articles relating to all the different members, of which the conſtitution was compoſed, as well as the various departments in the adminiſtration of government, furniſhes us with more authentic evidence concerning the intentions of the Junta, than can be drawn from the teſtimony of the later Spaniſh hiſtorians, who lived in times when it became faſhionable and even neceſſary to repreſent the conduct of the malecontents in the worſt light, and as flowing from the worſt motives. After a long preamble concerning the various calamities under which the nation groaned, and the errors and corruption in government to which theſe were to be imputed, they take notice of the exemplary patience wherewith the people had endured them, until ſelf-preſervation, and the duty which they owed to their country, had obliged them to aſſemble, in order to provide in a legal manner for their own ſafety, and that of the conſtitution: For this purpoſe, they demanded that the king would be pleaſed to return to his Spaniſh dominions and reſide there, as all their former monarchs had done; that he would not marry but with conſent of the Cortes; that if he ſhould be obliged at any time to leave

†. P. Heuter. Rer. Auſtr. lib. viii. c. 6. p. 188.

the kingdom, it ſhall not be lawful to appoint any foreigner to be regent; that the preſent nomination of cardinal Adrian to that office ſhall inſtantly be declared void; that he would not, at his return, bring along with him any Flemings or other ſtrangers; that no foreign troops ſhall, on any pretence whatever, be introduced into the kingdom; that none but natives ſhall be capable of holding any office or benefice either in church or ſtate; that no foreigner ſhall be naturalized; that free quarters ſhall not be granted to ſoldiers, nor to the members of the king's houſehold, for any longer time than ſix days, and that only when the court is in a progreſs; that all the taxes ſhall be reduced to the ſame ſtate they were in at the death of queen Iſabella; that all alienations of the royal demeſnes or revenues ſince that queen's death ſhall be reſumed; that all new offices created ſince that period ſhall be aboliſhed; that the ſubſidy granted by the late Cortes in Galicia, ſhall not be exacted; that in all future Cortes each city ſhall ſend one repreſentative of the clergy, one of the gentry, and one of the commons, each to be elected by his own order; that the crown ſhall not influence or direct any city with regard to the choice of its repreſentatives; that no member of the Cortes ſhall receive an office or penſion from the king, either for himſelf or for any of his family, under pain of death, and confiſcation of his goods; that each city or community ſhall pay a competent ſalary to its repreſentative, for his maintenance during his attendance on the Cortes; that the Cortes ſhall aſſemble once in three years at leaſt, whether ſummoned by the king or not, and ſhall then enquire into the obſervation of the articles now agreed upon, and deliberate concerning public affairs; that the rewards which have been given or promiſed to any of the members of the Cortes held in Galicia, ſhall be revoked; that it ſhall be declared a capital crime to ſend gold, ſilver or jewels out of the kingdom; that judges ſhall have fixed ſalaries aſſigned them, and ſhall not receive any ſhare of the fines and forfeitures of

perſons condemned by them; that no grant of the goods of perſons accuſed ſhall be valid, if given before ſentence was pronounced againſt them; that all privileges which the nobles have at any time obtained, to the prejudice of the commons, ſhall be revoked; that the government of cities or towns ſhall not be put into the hands of noblemen; that the poſſeſſions of the nobility ſhall be ſubject to all public taxes in the ſame manner as thoſe of the commons; that an inquiry be made into the conduct of ſuch as have been entruſted with the management of the royal patrimony ſince the acceſſion of Ferdinand; and if the king do not within thirty days appoint perſons properly qualified for that ſervice, it ſhall be lawful for the Cortes to nominate them; that indulgences ſhall not be preached or diſperſed in the kingdom until the cauſe of publiſhing them be examined and approved of by the Cortes; that all the money ariſing from the ſale of indulgences ſhall be faithfully employed in carrying on war againſt the Infidels; that ſuch prelates as do not reſide in their dioceſes ſix months in the year, ſhall forfeit their revenues during the time they are abſent; that the eccleſiaſtical judges and their officers ſhall not exact greater fees than thoſe which are paid in the ſecular courts; that the preſent archbiſhop of Toledo, being a foreigner, be compelled to reſign that dignity, which ſhall be conferred upon a Caſtilian; that the king ſhall ratify and hold, as good ſervice done to him and to the kingdom, all the proceedings of the Junta, and pardon any irregularities which the cities may have committed from an exceſs of zeal in a good cauſe: that he ſhall promiſe and ſwear in the moſt ſolemn manner to obſerve all theſe articles, and on no occaſion attempt either to elude, or to repeal them; and that he ſhall never ſolicit the pope or any other prelate to grant him a diſpenſation or abſolution from this oath and promiſe*.

Such were the chief articles preſented by the Junta to their ſovereign. As the feudal inſtitutions in the ſeveral

* Sandov. 206. P. Mart. Ep. 686.

kingdoms of Europe were originally the ſame, the genius of thoſe governments which aroſe from them bore a ſtrong reſemblance to each other, and the regulations which the Caſtilians attempted to eſtabliſh on this occaſion, differ little from thoſe which other nations have laboured to procure, in their ſtruggles with their monarchs for liberty. The grievances complained of, and the remedies propoſed by the Engliſh commons in their conteſts with the princes of the houſe of Stuart, particularly reſemble thoſe upon which the Junta now inſiſted. But the principles of liberty ſeem to have been better underſtood, at this period, by the Caſtilians, than by any other people in Europe; they had acquired more liberal ideas with reſpect to their own rights and privileges; they had formed more bold and generous ſentiments concerning government; and diſcovered an extent of political knowledge to which the Engliſh themſelves did not attain until more than a century afterwards.

It is not improbable, however, that the ſpirit of reformation among the Caſtilians, hitherto unreſtrained by authority, and emboldened by ſucceſs, became too impetuous, and prompted the Junta to propoſe innovations which, by alarming the other members of the conſtitution, proved fatal to their cauſe. The nobles, who, inſtead of obſtructing, had favoured or connived at their proceedings, while they confined their demands of redreſs to ſuch grievances as had been occaſioned by the king's want of experience, and by the imprudence and rapaciouſneſs of his foreign miniſters, were filled with indignation when the Junta began to touch the privileges of their order, and plainly ſaw that the meaſures of the commons tended no leſs to break the power of the ariſtocracy, than to limit the prerogatives of the crown. The reſentment which they had conceived on account of Adrian's promotion to the regency, abated conſiderably upon the emperor's raiſing the conſtable and admiral to joint power with him in that office; and as their pride and dignity were leſs hurt by ſuffering the prince to

poſſeſs an extenſive prerogative, than by admitting the high pretenſions of the people, they determined to give their ſovereign the aſſiſtance which he had demanded of them, and began to aſſemble their vaſſals for that purpoſe.

The Junta, meanwhile, expected with impatience the emperor's anſwer to their remonſtrance, which they had appointed ſome of their number to preſent. The members entruſted with this commiſſion ſet out immediately for Germany [Oct. 20], but having received at different places certain intelligence from court, that they could not venture to appear there without endangering their lives, they ſtopt ſhort in their journey, and acquainted the Junta of the information which had been given them *. This excited ſuch violent paſſions as tranſported the whole party beyond all bounds of prudence or of moderation. That a king of Caſtile ſhould deny his ſubjects acceſs into his preſence, or refuſe to liſten to their humble petitions, was repreſented as an act of tyranny ſo unprecedented and intolerable, that nothing now remained but with arms in their hands to drive away that ravenous band of foreigners which encompaſſed the throne, who, after having devoured the wealth of the kingdom, found it neceſſary to prevent the cries of an injured people from reaching the ears of their ſovereign. Many inſiſted warmly on approving a motion which had formerly been made, for depriving Charles, during the life of his mother, of the regal titles and authority which had been too raſhly conferred upon him, from a falſe ſuppoſition of her total inability for government. Some propoſed to provide a proper perſon to aſſiſt her in the adminiſtration of public affairs, by marrying the queen to the prince of Calabria, the heir of the Aragoneſe kings of Naples, who had been detained in priſon ſince the time that Ferdinand had diſpoſſeſſed his anceſtors of their crown. All agreed, that as the hopes of obtaining redreſs and ſecurity, merely by preſenting their requeſts to their ſovereign, had kept them

* Sandov. 143.

too long in a ſtate of inaction, and prevented them from taking advantage of the unanimity with which the nation declared in their favour, it was now neceſſary to collect their whole force, and to exert themſelves with vigour, in oppoſing this fatal combination of the king and the nobility againſt their liberties*.

They ſoon took the field with twenty thouſand men. Violent diſputes aroſe concerning the command of this army. Padilla, the darling of the people and ſoldiers, was the only perſon whom they thought worthy of this honour. But Don Pedro de Giron, the eldeſt ſon of the Condé de Uruena, a young nobleman of the firſt order, having lately joined the commons out of private reſentment againſt the emperor, the reſpect due to his birth, together with a ſecret deſire of diſappointing Padilla, of whoſe popularity many members of the Junta had become jealous, procured him the office of general [Nov. 23]; though he ſoon gave them a fatal proof that he poſſeſſed neither the experience, the abilities, nor the ſteadineſs, which that important ſtation required.

The regents, meanwhile, appointed Rioſeco as the place of rendezvous for their troops, which, though far inferior to thoſe of the commons in number, excelled them greatly in diſcipline and in valour. They had drawn a conſiderable body of regular and veteran infantry out of Navarre. Their cavalry, which formed the chief ſtrength of their army, conſiſted moſtly of gentlemen accuſtomed to the military life, and animated with the martial ſpirit peculiar to their order in that age. The infantry of the Junta was formed entirely of citizens and mechanics, little acquainted with the uſe of arms. The ſmall body of cavalry which they had been able to raiſe was compoſed of perſons of ignoble birth, and perfect ſtrangers to the ſervice into which they entered. The character of the generals differed no leſs than that of their troops. The royaliſts were commanded by the Condè de

* P. Mart. Ep. 688.

Haro, the conſtable's eldeſt ſon, an officer of great experience and of diſtinguiſhed abilities.

Giron marched with his army directly to Rioſeco, and ſeizing the villages and paſſes around it hoped that the royaliſts would be obliged either to ſurrender for want of proviſions, or to fight with diſadvantage before all their troops were aſſembled. But he had not the abilities, nor his troops the patience and diſcipline neceſſary for the execution of ſuch a ſcheme. The Condé de Haro found little difficulty in conducting a conſiderable reinforcement through all his poſts into the town; and Giron, deſpairing of being able to reduce it, advanced ſuddenly to Villa-panda, a place belonging to the conſtable, in which the enemy had their chief magazine of proviſions. By this ill-judged motion, he left Tordeſillas open to the royaliſts, whom the Condé de Haro led thither in the night, with the utmoſt ſecrecy and diſpatch; and attacking the town [Dec. 5], in which Giron had left no other garriſon than a regiment of prieſts raiſed by the biſhop of Zamora, he, by break of day, forced his way into it after a deſperate reſiſtance, became maſter of the queen's perſon, took priſoners many members of the Junta, and recovered the great ſeal, with the other enſigns of government.

By this fatal blow, the Junta loſt all the reputation and authority which they had derived from ſeeming to act by the queen's commands; ſuch of the nobles as had hitherto been wavering or undetermined in their choice, now joined the regents with all their forces; and an univerſal conſternation ſeized the partizans of the commons. This was much increaſed by the ſuſpicions they began to entertain of Giron, whom they loudly accuſed of having betrayed Tordeſillas to the enemy; and though that charge ſeems to have been deſtitute of foundation, the ſucceſs of the royaliſts being owing to Giron's ill conduct rather than to his treachery, he ſo

entirely loſt credit with his party, that he reſigned his commiſſion, and retired to one of his caſtles‡.

Such members of the Junta as had eſcaped the enemy's hands at Tordeſillas, fled to Valladolid; and as it would have required long time to ſupply the places of thoſe who were priſoners by a new election, they made choice among themſelves of a ſmall number of perſons, to whom they committed the ſupreme direction of affairs. Their army, which grew ſtronger every day by the arrival of troops from different parts of the kingdom, marched likewiſe to Valladolid; and Padilla being appointed commander in chief, the ſpirits of the ſoldiery revived, and the whole party forgetting the late misfortune, continued to expreſs the ſame ardent zeal for the liberties of their country, and the ſame implacable animoſity againſt their oppreſſors.

What they ſtood moſt in need of, was money to pay their troops. A great part of the current coin had been carried out of the kingdom by the Flemings; the ſtated taxes levied in times of peace were inconſiderable; commerce of every kind being interrupted by the war, the ſum which it yielded decreaſed daily; and the Junta were afraid of diſguſting the people by burdening them with new impoſitions, to which, in that age, they were little accuſtomed. But from this difficulty they were extricated by Donna Maria Pacheco, Padilla's wife, a woman of noble birth, of great abilities, of boundleſs ambition, and animated with the moſt ardent zeal in ſupport of the cauſe of the Junta. She, with a boldneſs ſuperior to thoſe ſuperſtitious fears which often influence her ſex, propoſed to ſeize all the rich and magnificent ornaments in the cathedral of Toledo; but leſt that action, by its appearance of impiety, might offend the people, ſhe and her retinue marched to the church in ſolemn proceſſion, in mourning habits, with tears in their eyes, beating their breaſts, and falling on their knees, implored the pardon of the ſaints whoſe ſhrines ſhe was about to violate. By this

‡ Miſcellaneous Tracts by Dr. Mich. Geddes, vol. i. 278.

artifice, which ſcreened her from the imputation of ſacrilege, and perſuaded the people that neceſſity and zeal for a good cauſe had conſtrained her, though with reluctance, to venture upon this action, ſhe ſtripped the cathedral of whatever was valuable, and procured a conſiderable ſupply of money for the Junta*. The regents, no leſs at a loſs how to maintain their troops, the revenues of the crown having either been diſſipated by the Flemings, or ſeized by the commons, were obliged to take the queen's jewels, together with the plate belonging to the nobility, and apply them to that purpoſe; and when thoſe failed, they obtained a ſmall ſum by way of loan from the king of Portugal†.

The nobility diſcovered great unwillingneſs to proceed to extremities with the Junta. They were animated with no leſs hatred than the commons againſt the Flemings; they approved much of ſeveral articles in the remonſtrance; they thought the juncture favourable, not only for redreſſing paſt grievances, but for rendering the conſtitution more perfect and ſecure by new regulations; they were afraid, that while the two orders, of which the legiſlature was compoſed, waſted each other's ſtrength by mutual hoſtilities, the crown would riſe to power on the ruin or weakneſs of both, and encroach no leſs on the independence of the nobles, than on the privileges of the commons. To this diſpoſition were owing the frequent overtures of peace which the regents made to the Junta, and the continual negotiations they carried on during the progreſs of their military operations. Nor were the terms which they offered unreaſonable; for on condition that the Junta would paſs from a few articles moſt ſubverſive of the royal authority, or inconſiſtent with the rights of the nobility, they engaged to procure the emperor's conſent to their other demands, which if he, through the influence of evil counſellors, ſhould refuſe, ſeveral of the nobles promiſed to join with the commons in their endea-

* Sandov. 308. Dict. de Bayle, art. Padilla.

† P. Mart. Ep. 718.

vours to extort it†. Such diviſions, however, prevailed among the members of the Junta, as prevented their deliberating calmly, or judging with prudence. Some of the cities which had entered into the confederacy, were filled with that mean jealouſy and diſtruſt of each other, which rivalſhip in commerce or in grandeur is apt to inſpire; the conſtable, by his influence and promiſes, had prevailed on the inhabitants of Burgos to abandon the Junta, and other noblemen had ſhaken the fidelity of ſome of the leſſer cities; no perſon had ariſen among the commons of ſuch ſuperior abilities or elevation of mind as to acquire the direction of their affairs; Padilla, their general, was a man of popular qualities, but diſtruſted for that reaſon by thoſe of higheſt rank who adhered to the Junta; the conduct of Giron led the people to view, with ſuſpicion, every perſon of noble birth who joined their party; ſo that the ſtrongeſt marks of irreſolution, mutual diſtruſt, and mediocrity of genius, appeared in all their proceedings at this time. After many conſultations held concerning the terms propoſed by the regents, they ſuffered themſelves to be ſo carried away by reſentment againſt the nobility, that, rejecting all thoughts of accommodation, they threatened to ſtrip them of the crown lands, which they or their anceſtors had uſurped, and to reannex theſe to the royal domain. Upon this prepoſterous ſcheme, which would at once have annihilated all the liberties for which they had been ſtruggling, by rendering the kings of Caſtile abſolute and independent on their ſubjects, they were ſo intent, that they now exclaimed with leſs vehemence againſt the exactions of the foreign miniſters, than againſt the exorbitant power and wealth of the nobles, and ſeemed to hope that they might make peace with Charles, by offering to enrich him with their ſpoils.

The ſucceſs which Padilla had met with in ſeveral ſmall encounters, and in reducing ſome inconſiderable towns, helped to precipitate the members of the Junta into this

† P. Mart. Ep. 695, 713. Geddes's Tracts, i. 261.

meaſure, filling them with ſuch confidence in the valour of their troops, that they hoped for an eaſy victory over the royaliſts. Padilla, that his army might not remain inactive while fluſhed with good fortune, laid ſiege to Torrelobaton, a place of greater ſtrength and importance than any that he had hitherto ventured to attack, and which was defended by a ſufficient garriſon; and though the beſieged made a deſperate reſiſtance, and the admiral attempted to relieve them, he took the town by ſtorm [March 1, 1531], and gave it up to be plundered by his ſoldiers. If he had marched inſtantly with his victorious army to Tordeſillas, the head quarters of the royaliſts, he could hardly have failed of making an effectual impreſſion on their troops, whom he would have found in aſtoniſhment at the briſkneſs of his operations, and far from being of ſufficient ſtrength to give him battle. But the fickleneſs and imprudence of the Junta prevented his taking this ſtep. Incapable, like all popular aſſociations, either of carrying on war or of making peace, they liſtened again to overtures of accommodation, and even agreed to a ſhort ſuſpenſion of arms. This negotiation terminated in nothing; but while it was carrying on, many of Padilla's ſoldiers, unacquainted with the reſtraints of diſcipline, went off with the booty which they had got at Torrelobaton; and others, wearied out by the unuſual length of the campaign, deſerted†. The conſtable too had leiſure to aſſemble his forces at Burgos, and to prepare every thing for taking the field; and as ſoon as the truce expired, he effected a junction with the Condé de Haro, in ſpite of all Padilla's efforts to prevent it. They advanced immediately towards Torrelobaton; and Padilla, finding the number of his troops ſo diminiſhed that he durſt not riſk a battle, attempted to retreat to Toro, which, if he could have accompliſhed, the invaſion of Navarre at that juncture by the French, and the neceſſity which the regents muſt have been under of detaching men to that kingdom, might have ſaved him from danger. But

† Sandov. 336.

Haro, ſenſible how fatal the conſequences would be of ſuffering him to eſcape, marched with ſuch rapidity at the head of his cavalry, that he came up with him near Villalar [April 23], and, without waiting for his infantry, advanced to the attack. Padilla's army, fatigued and diſheartened by their precipitant retreat, which they could not diſtinguiſh from a flight, happened at that time to be paſſing over a ploughed field, on which ſuch a violent rain had fallen, that the ſoldiers ſunk almoſt to the knees at every ſtep, and remained expoſed to the fire of ſome field-pieces which the royaliſts had brought along with them. All theſe circumſtances ſo diſconcerted and intimidated raw ſoldiers, without facing the enemy, or making any reſiſtance, they fled in the utmoſt confuſion. Padilla exerted himſelf with extraordinary courage and activity in order to rally them, though in vain; fear rendering them deaf both to his threats and intreaties; upon which finding matters irretrievable, and reſolving not to ſurvive the diſgrace of that day, and the ruin of his party, he ruſhed into the thickeſt of the enemy; but being wounded and diſmounted, he was taken priſoner. His principal officers ſhared the ſame fate; the common ſoldiers was allowed to depart unhurt, the nobles being too generous to kill men who threw down their arms*.

The reſentment of his enemies did not ſuffer Padilla to linger long in expectation of what ſhould befal him. Next day he was condemned to loſe his head, though without any regular trial, the notoriety of the crime being ſuppoſed ſufficient to ſuperſede the formality of a legal proceſs. He was led inſtantly to execution, together with Don John Bravo, and Don Francis Maldonada, the former commander of the Segovians, and the latter of the troops of Salamanca. Padilla viewed the approach of death with calm but undaunted fortitude; and when Bravo, his fellow-ſufferer, ex-

* Sandov. 345, &c. P. Mart. Ep. 720. Miniana, Contin. p. 26. Epitome de la Vide y Hechos del Emper. Carlos V. por D. Juan Anton. de Vera y Zuniga. 4to. Madr. 1627. p. 19.

preſſed ſome indignation at hearing himſelf proclaimed a traitor, he checked him, by obſerving, "That yeſterday was the time to have diſplayed the ſpirit of gentlemen, this day to die with the meekneſs of Chriſtians." Being permitted to write to his wife and to the community of Toledo, the place of his nativity, he addreſſed the former with a manly and virtuous tenderneſs, and the latter with the exultation natural to one who conſidered himſelf as a martyr for the liberties of his country*. After this, he ſubmitted

* The ſtrain of theſe letters is ſo eloquent and high ſpirited, that I have tranſlated them for the entertainment of my readers.

The Letter of Don John Padilla to his Wife.

"SENORA,

"If your grief did not afflict me more than my own death, I ſhould deem myſelf perfectly happy. For the end of life being certain to all men, the Almighty confers a mark of diſtinguiſhing favour upon that perſon, for whom he appoints a death ſuch as mine, which, though lamented by many, is nevertheleſs acceptable unto him. It would require more time than I now have, to write any thing that could afford you conſolation. That my enemies will not grant me, nor do I wiſh to delay the reception of that crown which I hope to enjoy. You may bewail your own loſs, but not my death, which, being ſo honourable, ought not to be lamented by any. My ſoul, for nothing elſe is left to me, I bequeath to you. You will receive it, as the thing in this world which you valued moſt. I do not write to my father Pero Lopez, becauſe I dare not; for though I have ſhewn myſelf to be his ſon in daring to loſe my life, I have not been the heir of his good fortune. I will not attempt to ſay any thing more, that I may not tire the executioner, who waits for me, and that I may not excite a ſuſpicion, that, in order to prolong my life, I lengthen out my letter. My ſervant Soſia, an eye-witneſs, and to whom I have communicated my moſt ſecret thoughts, will inform you of what I cannot now write; and thus I reſt, expecting the inſtrument of your grief, and of my deliverance."

His Letter to the City of Toledo.

"To thee, the crown of Spain, and the light of the whole world, free from the time of the mighty Goths: to thee, who, by ſhedding the blood of ſtrangers, as well as thy own blood, haſt recovered liberty for thyſelf and thy neighbouring cities, thy legitimate ſon, Juan de Padilla, gives information, how by the blood of his body, thy ancient victories are to be refreſhed. If fate hath not permitted my actions to be placed among your ſucceſsful and celebrated exploits, the fault hath been in my ill fortune, not in my good will. This I requeſt of thee as of a mother, to accept, ſince God hath given me nothing more to loſe for thy ſake, than

quietly to his fate. Moſt of the Spaniſh hiſtorians, accuſtomed to ideas of government and of regal power, very different from thoſe upon which he acted, have been ſo eager to teſtify their diſapprobation of the cauſe in which he was engaged, that they have neglected, or have been afraid to do juſtice to his virtues; and by blackening his memory, have endeavoured to deprive him of that pity which is ſeldom denied to illuſtrious ſufferers.

The victory at Villalar, proved as deciſive as it was complete. Valladolid, the moſt zealous of all the aſſociated cities, opened its gates immediately to the conquerors, and being treated with great clemency by the regents, Medina del Campo, Segovia, and many other towns, followed its example. This ſudden diſſolution of a confederacy, formed not upon ſlight diſguſts, or upon trifling motives, into which the whole body of the people had entered, and which had been allowed time to acquire a conſiderable degree of order and conſiſtence by eſtabliſhing a regular plan of government, is the ſtrongeſt proof either of the inability of its leaders, or of ſome ſecret diſcord reigning among its members. Though part of that army by which they had been ſubdued was obliged, a few days after the battle, to march towards Navarre, in order to check the progreſs of the French in that kingdom, nothing could prevail on the dejected commons of Caſtile to take arms again, and to embrace ſuch a favourable opportunity of acquiring thoſe

that which I am now to relinquiſh. I am more ſolicitous about thy good opinion than about my own life. The ſhiftings of fortune, which never ſtands ſtill, are many. But this I ſee with infinite conſolation, that I, the leaſt of thy children, ſuffer death for thee; and that thou haſt nurſed at thy breaſts ſuch as may take vengeance for my wrongs. Many tongues will relate the manner of my death, of which I am ſtill ignorant, though I know it to be near. My end will teſtify what was my deſire. My ſoul I recommend to thee as to the patroneſs of Chriſtianity. Of my body I ſay nothing, for it is not mine. I can write nothing more, for at this very moment I feel the knife at my throat, with greater dread of thy diſpleaſure, than apprehenſion of my own pain." Sandov. Hiſt. vol. i. p. 478.

rights and privileges for which they had appeared ſo zealous. The city of Toledo alone, animated by Donna Maria Pacheco, Padilla's widow, who, inſtead of bewailing her huſband with a womaniſh ſorrow, prepared to revenge his death, and to proſecute that cauſe in defence of which he had ſuffered, muſt be excepted. Reſpect for her ſex, or admiration for her courage and abilities, as well as ſympathy with her misfortunes, and veneration for the memory of her huſband, ſecured her the ſame aſcendant over the people which he had poſſeſſed. The prudence and vigour with which ſhe acted, juſtified that confidence they placed in her. She wrote to the French general in Navarre, encouraging him to invade Caſtile by the offer of powerful aſſiſtance. She endeavoured by her letters and emiſſaries to revive the ſpirit and hopes of the other cities. She raiſed ſoldiers, and exacted a great ſum from the clergy belonging to the cathedral, in order to defray the expence of keeping them on foot*. She employed every artifice that could intereſt or inflame the populace. For this purpoſe ſhe ordered crucifixes to be uſed by her troops inſtead of colours, as if they had been at war with infidels and enemies of religion; ſhe marched through the ſtreets of Toledo with her ſon, a young child, clad in deep mourning ſeated on a mule, having a ſtandard carried before him, repreſenting the manner of his father's execution†. By all theſe means ſhe kept the minds of the people in ſuch perpetual agitation as prevented their paſſions from ſubſiding, and rendered them inſenſible of the dangers to which they were expoſed, by ſtanding alone in oppoſition to the royal authority. While the army was employed in Navarre, the regents were unable to attempt the reduction of Toledo by force; and all their endeavours, either to diminiſh Donna Maria's credit with the people, or to gain her by large promiſes and the ſolicitations of her brother the Marquis de Mondeiar, proved ineffectual. Upon the expulſion of the French out of Navarre, part of

* P. Mart. Ep. 727. † Sandov. 375.

the army returned into Caſtile, and inveſted Toledo. Even this made no impreſſion on the intrepid and obſtinate courage of Donna Maria. She defended the town with vigour, her troops in ſeveral ſallies beat the royaliſts, and no progreſs was made towards reducing the place, until the clergy, whom ſhe had highly offended by invading their property, ceaſed to ſupport her. As ſoon as they received information of the death of William de Croy, archbiſhop of Toledo, whoſe poſſeſſion of that ſee was their chief grievance, and that the emperor had named a Caſtilian to ſucceed him, they openly turned againſt her, and perſuaded the people that ſhe had acquired ſuch influence over them by the force of enchantments, that ſhe was aſſiſted by a familiar dæmon which attended her in the form of a Negro-maid, and that by its ſuggeſtions ſhe regulated every part of her conduct*. The credulous multitude, whom their impatience of a long blockade, and deſpair of obtaining ſuccours either from the cities formerly in confederacy with them, or from the French, rendered deſirous of peace, took arms againſt her, and driving her out of the city, ſurrendered it to the royaliſts [October 26.] She retired to the citadel, which ſhe defended with amazing fortitude four months longer; and when reduced to the laſt extremities, ſhe made her eſcape in diſguiſe [February 10,] and fled to Portugal, where ſhe had many relations†.

Upon her flight, the citadel ſurrendered. Tranquillity was re-eſtabliſhed in Caſtile; and this bold attempt of the commons, like all unſucceſsful inſurrections, contributed to confirm and extend the power of the crown, which it was intended to moderate and abridge. The Cortes ſtill continued to make a part of the Caſtilian conſtitution, and was ſummoned to meet whenever the king ſtood in need of money; but inſtead of adhering to their ancient and cautious form of examining and redreſſing public grievances, before

* P. Mart. Ep. 727.

† Sandov. 375. P. Mart. Ep. 754. Ferrer. viii. 563.

they proceeded to grant any ſupply, the more courtly cuſtom of voting a donative in the firſt place was introduced, and the ſovereign having obtained all that he wanted, never allowed them to enter into any enquiry, or to attempt any reformation injurious to his authority. The privileges which the cities had enjoyed were gradually circumſcribed or aboliſhed; their commerce began from this period to decline; and becoming leſs wealthy and leſs populous, they loſt that power and influence which they had acquired in the Cortes.

While Caſtile was expoſed to the calamities of civil war, the kingdom of Valencia was torn by inteſtine commotions ſtill more violent. The aſſociation which had been formed in the city of Valencia in the year one thouſand five hundred and twenty, and which was diſtinguiſhed by the name of the Germanada, continued to ſubſiſt after the emperor's departure from Spain. The members of it, upon pretext of defending the coaſts againſt the deſcents of the corſairs of Barbary, and under ſanction of that permiſſion which Charles had raſhly granted them, refuſed to lay down their arms. But as the grievances which the Valencians aimed at redreſſing, proceeded from the arrogance and exactions of the nobility, rather than from any unwarrantable exerciſe of the royal prerogative, their reſentment turned chiefly againſt the former. As ſoon as they were allowed the uſe of arms, and became conſcious of their own ſtrength, they grew impatient to take vengeance of their oppreſſors. They drove the nobles out of moſt of the cities, plundered their houſes, waſted their lands, and aſſaulted their caſtles. They then proceeded to elect thirteen perſons, one from each company of tradeſmen eſtabliſhed in Valencia, and committed the adminiſtration of government to them, under pretext that they would reform the laws, eſtabliſh one uniform mode of diſpenſing juſtice without partiality or regard to the diſtinction of ranks, and thus reſtore men to ſome degree of their original equality.

The nobles were obliged to take arms in ſelf-defence. Hoſtilities began, and were carried on with all the rancour with which reſentment at oppreſſion inſpired the one party, and the idea of inſulted dignity animated the other. As no perſon of honourable birth, or of liberal education, joined the Germanada, the councils as well as troops of the confederacy were conducted by low mechanics, who acquired the confidence of an enraged multitude chiefly by the fierceneſs of their zeal and the extravagance of their proceedings. Among ſuch men, the laws introduced in civilized nations, in order to reſtrain or moderate the violence of war, were unknown or deſpiſed; and they run into the wildeſt exceſſes of cruelty and outrage.

The emperor, occupied with ſuppreſſing the inſurrection in Caſtile, which more immediately threatened the ſubverſion of his power and prerogative, was unable to give much attention to the tumults in Valencia, and left the nobility of that kingdom to fight their own battles. His viceroy, the Condé de Melito, had the ſupreme command of the forces which the nobles raiſed among the vaſſals. The Germanada carried on the war during the years one thouſand five hundred and twenty and twenty-one with a more perſevering courage than could have been expected from a body ſo tumultuary, under the conduct of ſuch leaders. They defeated the nobility in ſeveral actions, which, though not conſiderable, were extremely ſharp. They repulſed them in their attempts to reduce different towns. But the nobles by their ſuperior ſkill in war, and at the head of troops more accuſtomed to ſervice, gained the advantage in moſt of the rencounters. At length they were joined by a body of Caſtilian cavalry, which the regents diſpatched towards Valencia, ſoon after their victory over Padilla at Villalar, and by their aſſiſtance the Valencian nobles acquired ſuch ſuperiority that they entirely broke and ruined the Germanada. The leaders of the party were put to death almoſt without any formality of legal trial, and ſuffered ſuch cruel puniſh-

ments as the ſenſe of recent injuries prompted their adverſaries to inflict. The government of Valencia was re-eſtabliſhed in its ancient form*.

In Aragon, violent ſymptoms of the ſame ſpirit of diſaffection and ſedition which reigned in the other kingdoms of Spain, began to appear, but by the prudent conduct of the viceroy, Don John de Lanuſa, they were ſo far compoſed, as to prevent their breaking out into any open inſurrection. But in the iſland of Majorca, annexed to the crown of Aragon, the ſame cauſes which had excited the commotions in Valencia, produced effects no leſs violent. The people, impatient of the hardſhips which they had endured under the rigid juriſdiction of the nobility, took arms in a tumultuary manner [March 19, 1521]; depoſed their viceroy; drove him out of the iſland; and maſſacred every gentleman who was ſo unfortunate as to fall into their hands. The obſtinacy with which the people of Majorca, perſiſted in their rebellion, was equal to the rage with which they began it. Many and vigorous efforts were requiſite in order to reduce them to obedience; and tranquillity was reeſtabliſhed in every part of Spain, before the Majorcans could be brought to ſubmit to their ſovereign†.

While the ſpirit of diſaffection was ſo general among the Spaniards, and ſo many cauſes concurred in precipitating them into ſuch violent meaſures in order to obtain the redreſs of their grievances, it may appear ſtrange that the malecontents in the different kingdoms ſhould have carried on their operations without any mutual concert, or even any intercourſe with each other. By uniting their councils and arms, they might have acted both with greater force and with more effect. The appearance of a national confedera-

* Argenſola Annales de Aragon, cap. 75, 90, 99, 118. Sayes Annales de Aragon, cap. 5, 12, &c. P. Mart. Ep. lib. xxxiii. & xxxiv. paſſim. Ferrer. Hiſt. d'Eſpagne, viii. 542, 564, &c.

† Argenſola Annales de Arragon, c. 113. Ferrer. Hiſt. viii. 542. Sayes Annales de Aragon, c. 7. 11, 14, 76, 81. Ferreras Hiſt. d'Eſpagne, viii. 579, &c. 609.

cy would have rendered it no leſs reſpectable among the people than formidable to the crown; and the emperor, unable to reſiſt ſuch a combination, muſt have complied with any terms which the members of it ſhould have thought fit to preſcribe. Many things, however, prevented the Spaniards from forming themſelves into one body, and purſuing common meaſures. The people of the different kingdoms in Spain, though they were become the ſubjects of the ſame ſovereign, retained, in full force, their national antipathy to each other. The remembrance of their ancient rivalſhip and hoſtilities was ſtill lively, and the ſenſe of reciprocal injuries ſo ſtrong, as to prevent them from acting with confidence and concert. Each nation choſe rather to depend on its own efforts, and to maintain the ſtruggle alone, than to implore the aid of neighbours whom they diſtruſted and hated. At the ſame time the forms of government in the ſeveral kingdoms of Spain were ſo different, and the grievances of which they complained, as well as the alterations and amendments in policy which they attempted to introduce, ſo various, that it was not eaſy to bring them to unite in any common plan. To this diſunion Charles was indebted for the preſervation of his Spaniſh crowns; and while each of the kingdoms followed ſeparate meaſures, they were all obliged at laſt to conform to the will of their ſovereign.

The arrival of the emperor in Spain filled his ſubjects who had been in arms againſt him with deep apprehenſions, from which he ſoon delivered them by an act of clemency no leſs prudent than generous. After a rebellion ſo general, ſcarcely twenty perſons, among ſo many criminals obnoxious to the law, had been puniſhed capitally in Caſtile. Though ſtrongly ſolicited by his council, Charles refuſed to ſhed any more blood by the hands of the executioner; and publiſhed a general pardon [October 28], extending to all crimes committed ſince the commencement of the inſurrections, from which only fourſcore perſons were excepted. Even theſe he ſeems to have named, rather with an intention to intimidate

others, than from any inclination to ſeize them; for when an officious courtier offered to inform him where one of the moſt conſiderable among them was concealed, he avoided it by a good-natured pleaſantry; "Go," ſays he, "I have now no reaſon to be afraid of that man, but he has ſome cauſe to keep at a diſtance from me, and you would be better employed in telling him that I am here, than in acquainting me with the place of his retreat†. By this appearance of magnanimity, as well as by his care to avoid every thing which had diſguſted the Caſtilians during his former reſidence among them; by his addreſs in aſſuming their manners, in ſpeaking their language, and in complying with all their humours and cuſtoms, he acquired an aſcendant over them which hardly any of their native monarchs had ever attained, and brought them to ſupport him in all his enterprizes with a zeal and valour to which he owed much of his ſucceſs and grandeur *.

About the time that Charles landed in Spain, Adrian ſet out for Italy to take poſſeſſion of his new dignity. But though the Roman people longed extremely for his arrival, they could not, on his firſt appearance, conceal their ſurprize and diſappointment. After being accuſtomed to the princely magnificence of Julius, and the elegant ſplendour of Leo, they beheld with contempt an old man of an humble deportment, and of auſtere manners, an enemy to pomp, deſtitute of taſte in the arts, and unadorned with any of the external accompliſhments which the vulgar expect in thoſe raiſed to eminent ſtations‡. Nor did his political views and maxims ſeem leſs ſtrange and aſtoniſhing to the pontifical miniſters. He acknowledged and bewailed the corruptions which abounded in the church, as well as in the court of Rome, and

† Sandov. 377, &c. Vida del Emper. Carlos, por Don Juan. Anton. de Vera y Zuniga, p. 30.

* Ulloa Vita de Carlo V. p. 85.

‡ Guic. l. xv. 238. Jovii Vita Adriani, 177. Bellefor. Epitr. des Princ. 84.

prepared to reform both; he diſcovered no intention of aggrandizing his family; he even ſcrupled at retaining ſuch territories as ſome of his predeceſſors had acquired by violence or fraud, rather than by any legal title, and for that reaſon he inveſted Franceſco Maria de Roverè anew in the dutchy of Urbino, of which Leo had ſtripped him, and ſurrendered to the duke of Ferrara, ſeveral places wreſted from him by the church*. To men little habituated to ſee princes regulate their conduct by the maxims of morality and the principles of juſtice, theſe actions of the new pope appeared inconteſtable proofs of his weakneſs or inexperience. Adrian, who was a perfect ſtranger to the complex and intricate ſyſtem of Italian politics, and who could place no confidence in perſons whoſe ſubtile refinements in buſineſs ſuited ſo ill with the natural ſimplicity and candour of his own character, being often embarraſſed and irreſolute in his deliberations, the opinion of his incapacity daily increaſed, until both his perſon and government became objects of ridicule among his ſubjects†.

Adrian, though devoted to the emperor, endeavoured to aſſume the impartiality which became the common father of Chriſtendom, and laboured to reconcile the contending princes, in order that they might unite in a league againſt Soliman, whoſe conqueſt of Rhodes rendered him more formidable than ever to Europe§. But this was an undertaking far beyond his abilities. To examine ſuch a variety of pretenſions, to adjuſt ſuch a number of interfering intereſts, to extinguiſh the paſſions which ambition, emulation, and mutual injuries had kindled, to bring ſo many hoſtile powers to purſue the ſame ſcheme with unanimity and vigour, required not only uprightneſs of intention, but great ſuperiority both of underſtanding and addreſs. The Italian ſtates were

* Guic. lib. xv. 240.

† Jov. Vita Adr. 118. P. Mart. Ep. 774. Ruſcelli Lettres de Princ. vol. 1. 87, 96, 101.

§ Bellefor. Epitr. p. 86.

no leſs deſirous of peace than the pope. The Imperial army under Colonna was ſtill kept on foot; but as the emperor's revenues in Spain, in Naples, and in the Low Countries, were either exhauſted or applied to ſome other purpoſe, it depended entirely for pay and ſubſiſtence on the Italians. A great part of it was quartered in the eccleſiaſtical ſtate, and monthly contributions were levied upon the Florentines, the Milaneſe, the Genoeſe, and Luccheſe, by the viceroy of Naples; and though all exclaimed againſt ſuch oppreſſion, and were impatient to be delivered from it, the dread of worſe conſequences from the rage of the army, or the reſentment of the emperor, obliged them to ſubmit*.

1523.] So much regard, however, was paid to the pope's exhortations, and to a bull which he iſſued, requiring all Chriſtian princes to conſent to a truce for three years, that the Imperial, the French, and Engliſh ambaſſadors at Rome, were empowered by their reſpective courts to treat of that matter; but while they waſted their time in fruitleſs negotiations, their maſters continued their preparations for war. The Venetians, who had hitherto adhered with great firmneſs to their alliance with Francis, being now convinced that his affairs in Italy were in a deſperate ſituation, entered into a league againſt him with the emperor [June 28;] to which Adrian, at the inſtigation of his countryman and friend Charles de Lannoy, viceroy of Naples, who perſuaded him that the only obſtacles to peace aroſe from the ambition of the French king, ſoon after acceded. The other Italian ſtates followed their example; and Francis was left without a ſingle ally to reſiſt the efforts of ſo many enemies, whoſe armies threatened, and whoſe territories encompaſſed, his dominions on every ſide†.

The dread of this powerful confederacy, it was thought, would have obliged Francis to keep wholly on the defenſive, or at leaſt have prevented his entertaining any thoughts of

* Guic. l. xv. 238.
† Guic. l. xv. 241, 248.

marching into Italy. But it was the character of that prince, too apt to become remiſs, and even negligent on ordinary occaſions, to rouſe at the approach of danger, and not only to encounter it with ſpirit and intrepidity, qualities which never forſook him, but to provide againſt it with diligence and induſtry. Before his enemies were ready to execute any of their ſchemes, Francis had aſſembled a numerous army. His authority over his own ſubjects was far greater than that which Charles or Henry poſſeſſed over theirs. They depended on their diets, their Cortes, and their parliaments, for money, which was uſually granted them in ſmall ſums, very ſlowly, and with much reluctance. The taxes he could impoſe were more conſiderable, and levied with greater diſpatch; ſo that on this, as well as on other occaſions, he brought his armies into the field while they were only deviſing ways and means for raiſing theirs. Senſible of this advantage, Francis hoped to diſconcert all the emperor's ſchemes by marching in perſon into the Milaneſe; and this bold meaſure, the more formidable becauſe unexpected, could ſcarcely have failed of producing that effect. But when the vanguard of his army had already reached Lyons, and he himſelf was haſtening after it with a ſecond diviſion of his troops, the diſcovery of a domeſtic conſpiracy, which threatened the ruin of the kingdom, obliged him to ſtop ſhort, and to alter his meaſures.

The author of this dangerous plot was Charles duke of Bourbon, lord high conſtable, whoſe noble birth, vaſt fortune, and high office, raiſed him to be the moſt powerful ſubject in France, as his great talents, equally ſuited to the field or the council, and his ſignal ſervices to the crown, rendered him the moſt illuſtrious and deſerving. The near reſemblance between the king and him in many of their qualities, both being fond of war, and ambitious to excel in manly exerciſes, as well as their equality in age, and their proximity of blood, ought naturally to have ſecured to him a conſiderable ſhare in that monarch's favour. But unhappily

Louiſe, the king's mother, had contracted a violent averſion to the houſe of Bourbon, for no better reaſon than becauſe Anne of Bretagne, the queen of Louis the XII. with whom ſhe lived in perpetual enmity, had diſcovered a peculiar attachment to that branch of the royal family; and had taught her ſon, who was too ſuſceptible of any impreſſion which his mother gave him, to view all the conſtable's actions with a mean and unbecoming jealouſy. His diſtinguiſhed merit at the battle of Marignano had not been ſufficiently rewarded; he had been recalled from the government of Milan upon very frivolous pretences, and had met with a cold reception, which his prudent conduct in that difficult ſtation did not deſerve; the payment of his penſions had been ſuſpended without any good cauſe; and during the campaign of one thouſand five hundred and twenty-one, the king as has already been related, had affronted him in preſence of the whole army, by giving the command of the van to the duke of Alençon. The conſtable, at firſt, bore theſe indignities with greater moderation than could have been expected from an high-ſpirited prince, conſcious of what was due to his rank and to his ſervices. Such a multiplicity of injuries, however, exhauſted his patience; and inſpiring him with thoughts of revenge, he retired from court, and began to hold a ſecret correſpondence with ſome of the emperor's miniſters.

About that time the dutcheſs of Bourbon happened to die without leaving any children. Louiſe, of a diſpoſition no leſs amorous than vindictive, and ſtill ſuſceptible of the tender paſſions at the age of forty-ſix, began to view the conſtable, a prince as amiable as he was accompliſhed, with other eyes; and notwithſtanding the great diſparity of their years, ſhe formed the ſcheme of marrying him. Bourbon, who might have expected every thing to which an ambitious mind can aſpire, from the doating fondneſs of a woman who governed her ſon and the kingdom, being incapable either of imitating the queen in her ſudden tranſition

from hatred to love, or of diſſembling ſo meanly as to pretend affection for one who had perſecuted him ſo long with unprovoked malice, not only rejected the match, but embittered his refuſal by ſome ſevere raillery on Louiſe's perſon and character. She, finding herſelf not only contemned but inſulted, her diſappointed love turned into hatred, and ſince ſhe could not marry, ſhe reſolved to ruin Bourbon.

For this purpoſe ſhe conſulted with chancellor Du Prat, a man who, by a baſe proſtitution of great talents and of ſuperior ſkill in his profeſſion, had riſen to that high office. By his advice, a law-ſuit was commenced againſt the conſtable, for the whole eſtate belonging to the houſe of Bourbon. Part of it was claimed in the king's name, as having fallen to the crown; part in that of Louiſe, as the neareſt heir in blood of the deceaſed dutcheſs. Both theſe claims were equally deſtitute of any foundation in juſtice; but Louiſe, by her ſolicitations and authority, and Du Prat, by employing all the artifices and chicanery of law, prevailed on the judges to order the eſtate to be ſequeſtered. This unjuſt deciſion drove the conſtable to deſpair, and to meaſures which deſpair alone could have dictated. He renewed his intrigues in the Imperial court, and flattering himſelf that the injuries which he had ſuffered would juſtify his having recourſe to any means in order to obtain revenge, he offered to transfer his allegiance from his natural ſovereign to the emperor, and to aſſiſt him in the conqueſt of France. Charles, as well as the king of England, to whom the ſecret was communicated*, expecting prodigious advantages from his revolt, were ready to receive him with open arms, and ſpared neither promiſes nor allurements which might help to confirm him in his reſolution. The emperor offered him in marriage his ſiſter Eleanor, the widow of the king of Portugal, with an ample portion. He was included as a principal in the treaty between Charles and Henry. The counties of Provence and Dauphiné were to be ſettled on him

* Rymer's Fœder. xiii. 794.

with the title of king. The emperor engaged to enter France by the Pyrenees; and Henry, ſupported by the Flemings, to invade Picardy; while twelve thouſand Germans, levied at their common charge, were to penetrate into Burgundy, and to act in concert with Bourbon, who undertook to raiſe ſix thouſand men among his friends and vaſſals in the heart of the kingdom. The execution of this deep-laid and dangerous plot was ſuſpended, until the king ſhould croſs the Alps with the only army capable of defending his dominions; and as he was far advanced in his march for that purpoſe, France was on the brink of deſtruction§.

Happily for that kingdom, a negotiation which had now been carrying on for ſeveral months, though conducted with the moſt profound ſecrecy, and communicated only to a few choſen confidents, could not altogether eſcape the obſervation of the reſt of the conſtable's numerous retainers, rendered more inquiſitive by finding that they were diſtruſted. Two of theſe gave the king ſome intimation of a myſterious correſpondence between their maſter and the count de Roeux, a Flemiſh nobleman of great confidence with the emperor. Francis, who could not bring himſelf to ſuſpect that the firſt prince of the blood would be ſo baſe as to betray the kingdom to its enemies, immediately repaired to Moulines, where the conſtable was in bed, feigning indiſpoſition that he might not be obliged to accompany the king into Italy, and acquainted him of the intelligence which he had received. Bourbon, with great ſolemnity, and the moſt impoſing affectation of ingenuity and candour, aſſerted his own innocence; and as his health, he ſaid, was now more confirmed, he promiſed to join the army within a few days. Francis, open and candid himſelf, and too apt to be deceived by the appearance of thoſe virtues in others, gave ſuch credit to what he ſaid, that he refuſed to arreſt him, although adviſed to take that precaution by his wiſeſt counſellors; and as if

§ Thuani Hiſt. lib. i. c. 10. Heuter. Rer. Auſtr. lib. viii. c. 18. p. 207.

the danger had been over, he continued his march towards Lyons. The conſtable ſet out ſoon after [September], ſeemingly with an intention to follow him; but turning ſuddenly to the left, he croſſed the Rhone, and after infinite fatigue and peril, eſcaped all the parties which the king, who became ſenſible too late of his own credulity, ſent out to intercept him, and reached Italy in ſafety‖.

Francis took every poſſible precaution to prevent the bad effects of the irreparable error which he had committed. He put garriſons in all the places of ſtrength in the conſtable's territories. He ſeized all the gentlemen whom he could ſuſpect of being his aſſociates; and as he had not hitherto diſcovered the whole extent of the conſpirator's ſchemes, nor knew how far the infection had ſpread among his ſubjects, he was afraid that his abſence might encourage them to make ſome deſperate attempt, and for that reaſon relinquiſhed his intention of leading his army in perſon into Italy.

He did not, however, abandon his deſign on the Milaneſe, but appointed Admiral Bonnivet to take the ſupreme command in his ſtead, and to march into that country with an army thirty thouſand ſtrong. Bonnivet did not owe this preferment to his abilities as a general; for of all the talents requiſite to form a great commander, he poſſeſſed only perſonal courage, the loweſt and the moſt common. But he was the moſt accompliſhed gentleman in the French court, of agreeable manners and inſinuating addreſs, and a ſprightly converſation; and Francis, who lived in great familiarity with his courtiers, was ſo charmed with theſe qualities, that he honoured him on all occaſions, with the moſt partial and diſtinguiſhing marks of his favour. He was, beſides, the implacable enemy of Bourbon; and as the king hardly knew whom to truſt at that juncture, he thought the chief command could be lodged no where ſo ſafely as in his hands.

Colonna, who was entruſted with the defence of the Mi-

‖ Mem. de Bellay, p. 64, &c. Paſquier Recherches de la France, p. 481.

laneſe, his own conqueſt, was in no condition to reſiſt ſuch a formidable army. He was deſtitute of money ſufficient to pay his troops, which were reduced to a ſmall number by ſickneſs or deſertion, and had, for that reaſon, been obliged to neglect every precaution neceſſary for the ſecurity of the country. The only plan which he formed was to defend the paſſage of the river Teſino againſt the French; and as if he had forgotten how eaſily he himſelf had diſconcerted a ſimilar ſcheme formed by Lautrec, he promiſed with great confidence on its being effectual. But in ſpite of all his caution, it ſucceeded no better with him than with Lautrec. Bonnivet paſſed the river without loſs, at a ford which had been neglected, and the Imperialiſts retired to Milan, preparing to abandon the town as ſoon as the French ſhould appear before it. By an unaccountable negligence, which Guicciardini imputes to infatuation†, Bonnivet did not advance for three or four days, and loſt the opportunity with which his good fortune preſented him. The citizens recovered from their conſternation; Colonna, ſtill active at the age of fourſcore, and Moronè, whoſe enmity to France rendered him indefatigable, were employed night and day in repairing the fortifications, in amaſſing proviſions, in collecting troops from every quarter; and by the time the French approached, had put the city in a condition to ſtand a ſiege. Bonnivet, after ſome fruitleſs attempts on the town, which haraſſed his own troops more than the enemy, was obliged, by the inclemency of the ſeaſon, to retire into winter quarters.

During theſe tranſactions, pope Adrian died; an event ſo much to the ſatisfaction of the Roman people, whoſe hatred or contempt of him augmented every day, that the night after his deceaſe they adorned the door of his chief phyſician's houſe with garlands, adding this inſcription, TO THE DELIVERER OF HIS COUNTRY*. The cardinal de Medici inſtantly renewed his pretenſions to the papal dignity, and entered the conclave with high ex-

† Guic. lib. xv. 254. * Jovii Vit. Adr. 127.

pectations on his own part, and a general opinion of the people that they would be ſucceſsful. But though ſupported by the Imperial faction, poſſeſſed of great perſonal intereſt, and capable of all the artifices, refinements, and corruption which reign in thoſe aſſemblies, the obſtinacy and intrigues of his rivals protracted the conclave to the unuſual length of fifty days. The addreſs and perſeverance of the cardinal at laſt ſurmounted every obſtacle. He was raiſed to the head of the church [November 28], and aſſumed the government of it by the name of Clement VII. The choice was univerſally approved of. High expectations were conceived of a pope, whoſe great talents, and long experience in buſineſs, ſeemed to qualify him no leſs for defending the ſpiritual intereſts of the church, expoſed to imminent danger by the progreſs of Luther's opinions, than for conducting its political operations with the prudence requiſite at ſuch a difficult juncture; and who, beſides theſe advantages, rendered the eccleſiaſtical ſtate more reſpectable, by having in his hands the government of Florence, together with the wealth of the family of Medici†.

Cardinal Wolſey, not diſheartened by the diſappointment of his ambitious views at the former election, had entertained more ſanguine hopes of ſucceſs on this occaſion. Henry wrote to the emperor, reminding him of his engagements to ſecond the pretenſions of his miniſter. Wolſey beſtirred himſelf with activity ſuitable to the importance of the prize for which he contended, and inſtructed his agents at Rome to ſpare neither promiſes nor bribes in order to gain his end. But Charles had either amuſed him with vain hopes which he never intended to gratify, or he judged it impolitic to oppoſe a candidate who had ſuch a proſpect of ſucceeding as Medici; or perhaps the cardinals durſt not venture to provoke the people of Rome, while their indignation againſt Adrian's memory was ſtill freſh, by placing another *Ultra-montane* on the papal throne. Wolſey, after all his expecta-

† Guic. l. xv. 263.

tions and endeavours, had the mortification to ſee a pope elected, of ſuch an age, and of ſo vigorous a conſtitution, that he could not derive much comfort to himſelf from the chance of ſurviving him. This ſecond proof fully convinced Wolſey of the Emperor's inſincerity, and it excited in him all the reſentment which an haughty mind feels on being at once diſappointed and deceived; and though Clement endeavoured to ſoothe his vindictive nature by granting him a commiſſion to be legate in England during life, with ſuch ample powers as veſted in him almoſt the whole papal juriſdiction in that kingdom, the injury he had now received made ſuch an impreſſion as entirely diſſolved the tie which had united him to Charles, and from that moment he meditated revenge. It was neceſſary, however, to conceal his intention from his maſter, and to ſuſpend the execution of it, until, by a dexterous improvement of the incidents which might occur, he ſhould be able gradually to alienate the king's affections from the emperor. For this reaſon he was ſo far from expreſſing any uneaſineſs on account of the repulſe which he had met with, that he abounded on every occaſion, private as well as public, in declarations of his high ſatisfaction with Clement's promotion *.

Henry had, during the campaign, fulfilled, with great ſincerity, whatever he was bound to perform by the league againſt France, though more ſlowly than he could have wiſhed. His thoughtleſs profuſion, and total neglect of economy, reduced him often to great ſtraits for money. The operations of war were now carried on in Europe in a manner very different from that which had long prevailed. Inſtead of armies ſuddenly aſſembled, which under diſtinct chieftains followed their prince into the field for a ſhort ſpace, and ſerved at their own coſt, troops were now levied at great charge, and received regularly conſiderable pay. Inſtead of impatience on both ſides to bring every quarrel to the iſſue of a battle, which commonly decided the fate of

* Fiddes's Life of Wolſey, 294, &c. Herbert.

open countries, and allowed the barons, together with their vaſſals, to return to their ordinary occupations; towns were fortified with great art, and defended with much obſtinacy; war, from a very ſimple, became a very intricate ſcience; and campaigns grew of courſe to be more tedious and leſs deciſive. The expence which theſe alterations in the military ſyſtem neceſſarily created, appeared intolerable to nations hitherto unaccuſtomed with the burden of heavy taxes. Hence proceeded the frugal, and even parſimonious ſpirit of the Engliſh parliaments in that age, which Henry, with all his authority, was ſeldom able to overcome. The commons, having refuſed at this time to grant him the ſupplies which he demanded, he had recourſe to the ample and almoſt unlimited prerogative which the kings of England then poſſeſſed, and by a violent and unuſual exertion of it, raiſed the money he wanted. This, however, waſted ſo much time, that it was late in the ſeaſon [Sept. 20], before his army, under the duke of Suffolk, could take the field. Being joined by a conſiderable body of Flemings, Suffolk marched into Picardy, and Francis, from his extravagant eagerneſs to recover the Milaneſe, having left that frontier almoſt unguarded, he penetrated as far as the banks of the river Oyſe, within eleven leagues of Paris, filling that capital with conſternation. But the arrival of ſome troops detached by the king, who was ſtill at Lyons; the active gallantry of the French officers, who allowed the allies no reſpite night or day; the rigour of a moſt unnatural ſeaſon, together with ſcarcity of proviſions, compelled Suffolk to retire [November]; and La Tremouille, who commanded in thoſe parts, had the glory not only of having checked the progreſs of a formidable army with an handful of men, but of driving them with ignominy out of the French territories†.

The emperor's attempts upon Burgundy and Guienne were not more fortunate, though in both theſe provinces

† Herbert. Mem. de Bellay, 73, &c.

Francis was equally unprepared to reſiſt them. The conduct and valour of his generals ſupplied his want of foreſight; the Germans, who made an irruption into one of theſe provinces, and the Spaniards, who attacked the other, were repulſed with great diſgrace.

Thus ended the year 1523, during which Francis's good fortune and ſucceſs had been ſuch as gave all Europe an high idea of his power and reſources. He had diſcovered and diſconcerted a dangerous conſpiracy, the author of which he had driven into exile, almoſt without an attendant; he had rendered abortive all the ſchemes of the powerful confederacy formed againſt him, he had protected his dominions when attacked on three different ſides; and though his army in the Milaneſe had not made ſuch progreſs as might have been expected from its ſuperiority to the enemy in number, he had recovered, and ſtill kept poſſeſſion of, one half of that dutchy.

1524.] The enſuing year opened with events more diſaſtrous to France. Fontarabia was loſt by the cowardice or treachery of its governor [Feb. 27.] In Italy, the allies reſolved on an early and vigorous effort, in order to diſpoſſeſs Bonnivet of that part of the Milaneſe which lies beyond the Teſino. Clement, who, under the pontificates of Leo and Adrian, had diſcovered an implacable enmity to France, began now to view the power which the emperor was daily acquiring in Italy, with ſo much jealouſy, that he refuſed to accede, as his predeceſſors had done, to the league againſt Francis, and forgetting private paſſions and animoſities, laboured, with the zeal which became his character, to bring about a reconciliation among the contending parties. But all his endeavours were ineffectual; a numerous army, to which each of the allies furniſhed their contingent of troops, was aſſembled at Milan by the beginning of March. Lannoy, viceroy of Naples, took the command of it upon Colonna's death, though the chief direction of military operations was committed to Bourbon and the

Marquis de Peſcara; the latter the ableſt and moſt enterpriſing of the Imperial generals; the former inſpired by his reſentment with new activity and invention, and acquainted ſo thoroughly with the characters of the French commanders, the genius of their troops, and the ſtrength as well as weakneſs of their armies, as to be of infinite ſervice to the party which he had joined. But all theſe advantages were nearly loſt through the emperor's inability to raiſe money ſufficient for executing the various and extenſive plans which he had formed. When his troops were commanded to march, they mutinied againſt their leaders, demanding the pay which was due to them for ſome months; and diſregarding both the menaces and intreaties of their officers, threatened to pillage the city of Milan, if they did not inſtantly receive ſatisfaction. Out of this difficulty the generals of the allies were extricated by Moronè, who prevailing on his countrymen, over whom his influence was prodigious, to advance the ſum that was requiſite, the army took the field†.

Bonnivet was deſtitute of troops to oppoſe this army, and ſtill more of the talents which could render him an equal match for its leaders. After various movements and encounters, deſcribed with great accuracy by the contemporary hiſtorians, a detail of which would now be equally unintereſting and uninſtructive, he was forced to abandon the ſtrong camp in which he had entrenched himſelf at Biagraſſa. Soon after, partly by his own miſconduct, partly by the activity of the enemy, who haraſſed and ruined his army by continual ſkirmiſhes, while they carefully declined a battle which he often offered them; and partly by the caprice of 6000 Swiſs, who refuſed to join his army, though within a day's march of it; he was reduced to the neceſſity of attempting a retreat into France, through the valley of Aoſt. Juſt as he arrived on the banks of the Seſſia, and began to paſs that river, Bourbon and Peſcara appeared with

† Guic. l. xv. 267. Capella, 190.

the vanguard of the allies, and attacked his rear with great fury. At the beginning of the charge, Bonnivet, while exerting himſelf with much valour, was wounded ſo dangerouſly, that he was obliged to quit the field; and the conduct of the rear was committed to the chevalier Bayard, who, though ſo much a ſtranger to the arts of a court that he never roſe to the chief command, was always called, in times of real danger, to the poſt of greateſt difficulty and importance. He put himſelf at the head of the men at arms, and animating them by his preſence and example to ſuſtain the whole ſhock of the enemy's troops, he gained time for the reſt of his countrymen to make good their retreat. But in this ſervice he received a wound which he immediately perceived to be mortal, and being unable to continue any longer on horſeback, he ordered one of his attendants to place him under a tree, with his face towards the enemy; then fixing his eyes on the guard of his ſword, which he held up inſtead of a croſs, he addreſſed his prayers to God, and in this poſture, which became his character both as a ſoldier and as a Chriſtian, he calmly waited the approach of death. Bourbon, who led the foremoſt of the enemy's troops, found him in this ſituation, and expreſſed regret and pity at the ſight. "Pity not me," cried the high-ſpirited chevalier, "I die as a man of honour ought, in the diſcharge of my duty; they indeed are objects of pity, who fight againſt their king, their country, and their oath." The marquis de Peſcara, paſſing ſoon after, manifeſted his admiration of Bayard's virtues, as well as his ſorrow for his fate, with the generoſity of a gallant enemy; and finding that he could not be removed with ſafety from that ſpot, ordered a tent to be pitched there, and appointed proper perſons to attend him. He died, notwithſtanding their care, as his anceſtors for ſeveral generations had done, in the field of battle. Peſcara ordered his body to be embalmed, and ſent to his relations; and ſuch was the reſpect paid to military merit in that age, that the duke of Savoy commanded it to

be received with royal honours in all the cities of his dominions; in Dauphinè, Bayard's native country, the people of all ranks came out in a ſolemn proceſſion to meet it *.

Bonnivet led back the ſhattered remains of his army into France; and in one ſhort campaign, Francis was ſtripped of all he had poſſeſſed in Italy, and left without one ally in that country.

While the war, kindled by the emulation of Charles and Francis, ſpread over ſo many countries of Europe, Germany enjoyed a profound tranquillity, extremely favourable to the reformation, which continued to make progreſs daily. During Luther's confinement in his retreat at Wartburg, Carloſtadius, one of his diſciples, animated with the ſame zeal, but poſſeſſed of leſs prudence and moderation than his maſter, began to propagate wild and dangerous opinions, chiefly among the lower people. Encouraged by his exhortations, they roſe in ſeveral villages of Saxony, broke into the churches with tumultuary violence, and threw down and deſtroyed the images with which they were adorned. Thoſe irregular and outrageous proceedings were ſo repugnant to all the elector's cautious maxims, that, if they had not received a timely check, they could hardly have failed of alienating from the reformers a prince, no leſs jealous of his own authority, than afraid of giving offence to the emperor, and other patrons of the ancient opinions. Luther, ſenſible of the danger, immediately quitted his retreat, without waiting for Frederic's permiſſion, and returned to Wittemberg [March 6, 1522.] Happily for the reformation, the veneration for his perſon and authority was ſtill ſo great, that his appearance alone ſuppreſſed that ſpirit of extravagance which began to ſeize his party. Carloſtadius and his fanatical followers, ſtruck dumb by his rebukes, ſubmitted at once, and

* Bellifor. Epitr. p. 73. Mem. de Bellay, 75. Oeuv. de Brant. tom. vi. 108, &c. Paſquier Recherches, p. 526.

declared that they heard the voice of an angel, not of a man §.

Before Luther left his retreat, he had begun to tranſlate the Bible into the German tongue, an undertaking of no leſs difficulty than importance, of which he was extremely fond, and for which he was well qualified: he had a competent knowledge of the original languages; a thorough acquaintance with the ſtyle and ſentiments of the inſpired writers; and though his compoſitions in Latin were rude and barbarous, he was reckoned a great maſter of the purity of his mother tongue, and could expreſs himſelf with all the elegance of which it is capable. By his own aſſiduous application, together with the aſſiſtance of Melancthon and ſeveral other of his diſciples, he finiſhed part of the New Teſtament in the year 1522; and the publication of it proved more fatal to the church of Rome, than that of all his own works. It was read with wonderful avidity and attention by perſons of every rank. They were aſtoniſhed at diſcovering how contrary the precepts of the Author of our religion are, to the inventions of thoſe prieſts who pretended to be his vicegerents; and having now in their hand the rule of faith, they thought themſelves qualified, by applying it, to judge of the eſtabliſhed opinions, and to pronounce when they were conformable to the ſtandard, or when they departed from it. The great advantages ariſing from Luther's tranſlation of the Bible, encouraged the advocates for reformation, in the other countries of Europe, to imitate his example, and to publiſh verſions of the Scriptures in their reſpective languages.

About this time, Nuremberg, Frankfort, Hamburg, and ſeveral other free cities in Germany, of the firſt rank, openly embraced the reformed religion, and by the authority of their magiſtrates aboliſhed the maſs, and the other ſuperſtitious rites of popery †. The elector of Brandenburgh, the

§ Sleid. Hiſt. 51. Seckend. 195.
† Seckend. 241. Chytræi Contin. Krantzii, 203.

dukes of Brunſwick and Lunenburgh, and prince of Anhalt, became avowed patrons of Luther's opinions, and countenanced the preaching of them among their ſubjects.

The court of Rome beheld this growing defection with great concern; and Adrian's firſt care after his arrival in Italy, had been to deliberate with the cardinals, concerning the proper means of putting a ſtop to it. He was profoundly ſkilled in ſcholaſtic theology, and having been early celebrated on that account, he ſtill retained ſuch an exceſſive admiration of the ſcience to which he was firſt indebted for his reputation and ſucceſs in life, that he conſidered Luther's invectives againſt the ſchoolmen, particularly Thomas Aquinas, as little leſs than blaſphemy. All the tenets of that doctor appeared to him ſo clear and irrefragable, that he ſuppoſed every perſon who called in queſtion or contradicted them, to be either blinded by ignorance, or to be acting in oppoſition to the conviction of his own mind: Of courſe, no pope was ever more bigotted or inflexible with regard to points of doctrine than Adrian; he not only maintained them as Leo had done, becauſe they were ancient, or becauſe it was dangerous for the church to allow of innovations, but he adhered to them with the zeal of a theologian, and with the tenaciouſneſs of a diſputant. At the ſame time his own manners being extremely ſimple, and uninfected with any of the vices which reigned in the court of Rome, he was as ſenſible of its corruptions as the reformers themſelves, and viewed them with no leſs indignation. The brief which he addreſſed to the diet of the empire aſſembled at Nuremberg [November 1522,] and the inſtructions which he gave Cheregato, the nuncio whom he ſent thither, were framed agreeably to theſe views. On the one hand, he condemned Luther's opinions with more aſperity and rancour of expreſſion than Leo had ever uſed; he ſeverely cenſured the princes of Germany for ſuffering him to ſpread his pernicious tenets, by their neglecting to execute the edict of the diet at Worms, and required them, if Luther did not inſtantly retract his er-

rors, to deſtroy him with fire as a gangrened and incurable member, in like manner as Dathan and Abiram had been cut off by Moſes, Ananias and Sapphira by the apoſtles, and John Huſs and Jerome of Prague by their anceſtors*. On the other hand, he with great candour, and in the moſt explicit terms, acknowledged the corruptions of the Roman court to be the ſource from which had flowed moſt of the evils that the church now felt or dreaded; he promiſed to exert all his authority towards reforming theſe abuſes, with as much diſpatch as the nature and inveteracy of the diſorders would admit; and he requeſted of them to give him their advice with regard to the moſt effectual means of ſuppreſſing that new hereſy which had ſprung up among them †.

The members of the diet, after praiſing the pope's pious and laudable intentions, excuſed themſelves for not executing the edict of Worms, by alleging that the prodigous increaſe of Luther's followers, as well as the averſion to the court of Rome among their other ſubjects on account of its innumerable exactions, rendered ſuch an attempt not only dangerous, but impoſſible. They affirmed that the grievances of Germany, which did not ariſe from imaginary injuries, but from impoſitions no leſs real than intolerable, as his holineſs would learn from a catalogue of them which they intended to lay before him, called now for ſome new and efficacious remedy; and in their opinion, the only remedy adequate to the diſeaſe, or which afforded them any hopes of ſeeing the church reſtored to ſoundneſs and vigour, was a general council. Such a council, therefore they adviſed him, after obtaining the emperor's conſent, to aſſemble without delay in one of the great cities in Germany, that all who had right to be preſent might deliberate with freedom, and propoſe their opinions with ſuch boldneſs, as the dangerous ſituation of religion at this juncture required ‡.

* Faſcic. Rer. expet. & fugiend. 342. † Ibid 345.
‡ Ibid. 346.

The nuncio, more artful than his maſter, and better acquainted with the political views and intereſts of the Roman court, was ſtartled at the propoſition of a council; and eaſily foreſaw how dangerous ſuch an aſſembly might prove, at a time when many openly denied the papal authority, and the reverence and ſubmiſſion yielded to it viſibly declined among all. For that reaſon he employed his utmoſt addreſs in order to prevail on the members of the diet to proceed themſelves with greater ſeverity againſt the Lutheran hereſy, and to relinquiſh their propoſal concerning a general council to be held in Germany. They, perceiving the nuncio to be more ſolicitous about the intereſt of the Roman court, than the tranquillity of the empire, or purity of the church, remained inflexible, and continued to prepare the catalogue of their grievances to be preſented to the pope§. The nuncio, that he might not be the bearer of a remonſtrance ſo diſagreeable to his court, left Nuremberg abruptly, without taking leave of the diet¶.

The ſecular princes accordingly, for the eccleſiaſtics, although they gave no oppoſition, did not think it decent to join with them, drew up the liſt (ſo famous in the German annals) of an hundred grievances, which the empire imputed to the iniquitous dominion of the papal ſee. This liſt contained grievances much of the ſame nature with that prepared under the reign of Maximilian. It would be tedious to enumerate each of them; they complained of the ſums exacted for diſpenſations, abſolutions, and indulgences; of the expence ariſing from the law-ſuits carried by appeal to Rome; of the innumerable abuſes occaſioned by reſervations, commendams, and annates; of the exemption from civil juriſdiction which the clergy had obtained; of the arts by which they brought all ſecular cauſes under the cognizance of the eccleſiaſtical judges; of the indecent and profligate lives which not a few of the clergy led; and of various other particulars, many of which have already been mention-

§ Faſcic. Rer. expet. & fugiend. 349. ¶ Ibid. 376.

ed among the circumſtances that contributed to the favourable reception, or to the quick progreſs of Luther's doctrines. In the end they concluded, that if the holy ſee did not ſpeedily deliver them from thoſe intolerable burdens, they had determined to endure them no longer, and would employ the power and authority with which God had entruſted them, in order to procure relief†.

Inſtead of ſuch ſeverities againſt Luther and his followers as the nunico had recommended, the *receſs* or edict of the diet [March 6, 1523] contained only a general injunction to all ranks of men to wait with patience for the determinations of the council which was to be aſſembled, and in the mean time not to publiſh any new opinions contrary to the eſtabliſhed doctrines of the church; together with an admonition to all preachers to abſtain from matters of controverſy in their diſcourſes to the people, and to confine themſelves to the plain and inſtructive truths of religion ‡.

The reformers derived great advantage from the tranſactions of this diet, as they afforded them the fulleſt and moſt authentic evidence that groſs corruptions prevailed in the court of Rome, and that the empire was loaded by the clergy with inſupportable burdens. With regard to the former, they had now the teſtimony of the pope himſelf, that their invectives and accuſations were not malicious or ill-founded. As to the latter, the repreſentatives of the Germanic body, in an aſſembly where the patrons of the new opinions were far from being the moſt numerous or powerful, had pointed out as the chief grievances of the empire, thoſe very practices of the Romiſh church againſt which Luther and his diſciples were accuſtomed to declaim. Accordingly, in all their controverſial writings after this period, they often appealed to Adrian's declaration, and to the hundred grievances, in confirmation of whatever they

† Faſcic. Rer. expet. & fugiend. 354.
‡ Ibid. 348.

advanced concerning the diſſolute manners, or inſatiable ambition and rapaciouſneſs, of the papal court.

At Rome, Adrian's conduct was conſidered as a proof of the moſt childiſh ſimplicity and imprudence. Men trained up amidſt the artifices and corruptions of the papal court, and accuſtomed to judge of actions not by what was juſt, but by what was uſeful, were aſtoniſhed at a pontiff, who, departing from the wiſe maxims of his predeceſſors, acknowledged diſorders which he ought to have concealed; and forgetting his own dignity, aſked advice of thoſe, to whom he was entitled to preſcribe. By ſuch an exceſs of impolitic ſincerity, they were afraid that, inſtead of reclaiming the enemies of the church, he would render them more preſumptuous, and inſtead of extinguiſhing hereſy, would weaken the foundations of the papal power, or ſtop the chief ſources from which wealth flowed into the church*. For this reaſon the cardinals and other eccleſiaſtics of greateſt eminence in the papal court induſtriouſly oppoſed all his ſchemes of reformation, and by throwing objections and difficulties in his way, endeavoured to retard or to defeat the execution of them. Adrian, amazed, on the one hand, at the obſtinacy of the Lutherans, diſguſted, on the other, with the manners and maxims of the Italians, and finding himſelf unable to correct either the one or the other, often lamented his own ſituation, and often looked back with pleaſure on that period of his life when he was only dean of Louvain, a more humble but happier ſtation, in which little was expected from him, and there was nothing to fruſtrate his good intentions†.

Clement VII. his ſucceſſor, excelled Adrian as much in the arts of government, as he was inferior to him in purity of life, or uprightneſs of intention. He was animated not only with the averſion which all popes naturally bear to a council, but having gained his own election by means very

* F. Paul, Hiſt. of Counc. p. 28. Pallavic. Hiſt. 58.
† Jovii Vit. Adr. p. 118.

uncanonical, he was afraid of an aſſembly that might ſubject it to a ſcrutiny which it could not ſtand. He determined therefore, by every poſſible means to elude the demands of the Germans, both with reſpect to the calling of a council, and reforming abuſes in the papal court, which the raſhneſs and incapacity of his predeceſſor had brought upon him. For this purpoſe he made choice of cardinal Campeggio, an artful man, often entruſted by his predeceſſors with negotiations of importance, as his nuncio to the diet of the empire aſſembled again at Nuremberg.

Campeggio, without taking any notice of what had paſſed in the laſt meeting, exhorted the diet [February], in a long diſcourſe, to execute the edict of Worms with vigour, as the only effectual means of ſuppreſſing Luther's doctrines. The diet, in return, deſired to know the pope's intentions concerning the council, and the redreſs of the hundred grievances. The former, the nuncio endeavoured to elude by general and unmeaning declarations of the pope's reſolution to purſue ſuch meaſures as would be for the greateſt good of the church. With regard to the latter, as Adrian was dead before the catalogue of grievances reached Rome, and of conſequence it had not been regularly laid before the preſent pope, Campeggio took advantage of this circumſtance to decline making any definitive anſwer to them in Clement's name; though, at the ſame time, he obſerved that their catalogue of grievances contained many particulars extremely indecent and undutiful, and that the publiſhing it by their own authority was highly diſreſpectful to the Roman ſee. In the end, he renewed his demand of their proceeding with vigour againſt Luther and his adherents. But though an ambaſſador from the emperor, who was at time very ſolicitous to gain the pope, warmly ſeconded the nuncio, with many profeſſions of his maſter's zeal for the honour and dignity of the papal ſee, the *receſs* of the diet [April 18] was conceived in terms of almoſt the ſame import with the for-

mer, without enjoining any additional ſeverity againſt Luther and his party†.

Before he left Germany, Campeggio, in order to amuſe and ſoothe the people, publiſhed certain articles for the amendment of ſome diſorders and abuſes which prevailed among the inferior clergy; but this partial reformation, which fell ſo far ſhort of the expectations of the Lutherans, and of the demands of the diet, gave no ſatisfaction, and produced little effect. The nuncio, with a cautious hand, tenderly lopped a few branches; the Germans aimed a deeper blow, and by ſtriking at the root wiſhed to exterminate the evil*.

BOOK IV.

The expulſion of the French, both out of the Milaneſe and the republic of Genoa, was conſidered by the Italians as the termination of the war between Charles and Francis; and as they began immediately to be apprehenſive of the emperor, when they ſaw no power remaining in Italy capable either to controul or oppoſe him, they longed ardently for the reeſtabliſhment of peace. Having procured the reſtoration of Sforza to his paternal dominions, which had been their chief motive for entering into confederacy with Charles, they plainly diſcovered their intention to contribute no longer towards increaſing the emperor's ſuperiority over his rival, which was already become the object of their jealouſy. The pope eſpecially, whoſe natural timidity increaſed his ſuſpicions of Charles's deſigns, endeavoured by his remonſtrances to inſpire him with moderation and incline him to peace.

But the emperor, intoxicated with ſucceſs, and urged on by his own ambition, no leſs than by Bourbon's deſire of revenge, contemned Clement's admonitions, and declared his

† Seckend. 286. Sleid. Hiſt. 66. * Seckend. 292.

reſolution of ordering his army to paſs the Alps, and to invade Provence, a part of his rival's dominions, where, as he leaſt dreaded an attack, he was leaſt prepared to reſiſt it. His moſt experienced miniſters diſſuaded him from undertaking ſuch an enterpriſe with a feeble army, and an exhauſted treaſury: but he relied ſo much on having obtained the concurrence of the king of England, and on the hopes which Bourbon, with the confidence and credulity natural to exiles, entertained of being joined by a numerous body of his partizans as ſoon as the Imperial troops ſhould enter France, that he perſiſted obſtinately in the meaſure. Henry undertook to furniſh an hundred thouſand ducats towards defraying the expence of the expedition during the firſt month, and had it in his choice either to continue the payment of that ſum monthly, or to invade Picardy before the end of July with an army capable of acting with vigour. The emperor engaged to attack Guienne at the ſame time with a conſiderable body of men; and if theſe enterpriſes proved ſucceſsful, they agreed, that Bourbon, beſides the territories which he had loſt, ſhould be put in poſſeſſion of Provence, with the title of king, and ſhould do homage to Henry as the lawful king of France, for his new dominions. Of all the parts of this extenſive but extravagant project, the invaſion of Provence was the only one which was executed. For although Bourbon, with a ſcrupulous delicacy, altogether unexpected after the part which he had acted, poſitively refuſed to acknowledge Henry's title to the crown of France, and thereby abſolved him from any obligation to promote the enterpriſe, Charles's eagerneſs to carry his own plan into execution did not in any degree abate. The army which he employed for that purpoſe amounted only to eighteen thouſand men; the command of which was given to the marquis de Peſcara, with inſtructions to pay the greateſt deference to Bourbon's advice in all his operations. Peſcara paſſed the Alps without oppoſition, and entering Provence [Aug. 19,] laid ſiege to Marſeilles. Bourbon had adviſed

him rather to march towards Lyons, in the neighbourhood of which city his territories were ſituated, and where of courſe his influence was moſt extenſive; but the emperor was ſo deſirous to get poſſeſſion of a port, which would, at all times ſecure him an eaſy entrance into France, that by his authority he over-ruled the conſtable's opinion, and directed Peſcara to make the reduction of Marſeilles his chief object§.

Francis, who foreſaw, but was unable to prevent this attempt, took the moſt proper precautions to defeat it. He laid waſte the adjacent country, in order to render it more difficult for the enemy to ſubſiſt their army; he razed the ſuburbs of the city, ſtrengthened its fortifications, and threw into it a numerous garriſon under the command of brave and experienced officers. To theſe, nine thouſand of the citizens, whom their dread of the Spaniſh yoke inſpired with contempt of danger, joined themſelves; by their united courage and induſtry, all the efforts of Peſcara's military ſkill, and of Bourbon's activity and revenge, were rendered abortive. Francis, meanwhile, had leiſure to aſſemble a powerful army under the walls of Avignon, and no ſooner began to advance towards Marſeilles, than the Imperial troops, exhauſted by the fatigues of a ſiege which had laſted forty days, weakened by diſeaſes, and almoſt deſtitute of proviſions, retired [Sept. 19] with precipitation towards Italy†.

If, during theſe operations of the army in Provence, either Charles or Henry had attacked France in the manner which they had projected, that kingdom muſt have been expoſed to the moſt imminent danger. But on this, as well as on many other occaſions, the emperor found that the extent of his revenues was not adequate to the greatneſs of his ſchemes, or the ardour of his ambition; and the want of money obliged him, though with much reluctance, to circumſcribe his plan, and to leave part of it unexecuted. Hen-

§ Guic. l. xv. 273, &c. Mem. de Bellay, p. 80.
† Guic. l. xv. 277. Ulloa Vita dell Carlo V. p. 93.

ry, diſguſted at Bourbon's refuſing to recognize his right to the crown of France; alarmed at the motions of the Scots, whom the ſolicitations of the French king had perſuaded to march towards the borders of England; and no longer incited by his miniſter, who was become extremely cool with regard to all the emperor's intereſts, took no meaſures to ſupport an enterpriſe, of which, as of all new undertakings, he had been at firſt exceſſively fond*.

If the king of France had been ſatisfied with having delivered his ſubjects from this formidable invaſion, if he had thought it enough to ſhew all Europe the facility with which the internal ſtrength of his dominions enabled him to reſiſt the invaſion of a foreign enemy, even when ſeconded by the abilities and powerful efforts of a rebellious ſubject, the campaign, notwithſtanding the loſs of the Milaneſe, would have been far from ending ingloriouſly. But Francis, animated with courage more becoming a ſoldier than a general; puſhed on by ambition, enterpriſing rather than conſiderate; and too apt to be elated with ſucceſs; was fond of every undertaking that ſeemed bold and adventurous. Such an undertaking, the ſituation of his affairs, at that juncture, naturally preſented to his view. He had under his command one of the moſt powerful and beſt appointed armies France had ever brought into the field, which he could not think of diſbanding without having employed it in any active ſervice. The Imperial troops had been obliged to retire almoſt ruined by hard duty, and diſheartened with ill ſucceſs; the Milaneſe had been left altogether without defence; it was not impoſſible to reach that country before Peſcara, with his ſhattered forces, could arrive there; or if fear ſhould add ſpeed to their retreat, they were in no condition to make head againſt his freſh and numerous troops; and Milan would now, as in former inſtances, ſubmit without reſiſtance to a bold invader. Theſe conſiderations, which were not deſtitute of plauſibility, appeared to his

* Fiddes's Life of Wolſey, Append. No. 70, 71, 72.

ſanguine temper to be of the utmoſt weight. In vain did his wiſeſt miniſters and generals repreſent to him the danger of taking the field at a ſeaſon ſo far advanced, with an army compoſed chiefly of Swiſs and Germans, to whoſe caprices he would be ſubject in all his operations, and on whoſe fidelity his ſafety muſt abſolutely depend. In vain did Louiſe of Savoy advance by haſty journies towards Provence, that ſhe might exert all her authority in diſſuading her ſon from ſuch a raſh enterpriſe. Francis diſregarded the remonſtrances of his ſubjects; and that he might ſave himſelf the pain of an interview with his mother, whoſe counſels he had determined to reject, he began his march before her arrival; appointing her, however, by way of atonement for that neglect, to be regent of the kingdom during his abſence. Bonnivet, by his perſuaſions, contributed not a little to confirm Francis in this reſolution. That favourite, who ſtrongly reſembled his maſter in all the defective parts of his character, was led, by his natural impetuoſity, warmly to approve of ſuch an enterpriſe; and being prompted beſides by his impatience to reviſit a Milaneſe lady, of whom he had been deeply enamoured during his late expedition, he is ſaid, by his flattering deſcriptions of her beauty and accompliſhments, to have inſpired Francis, who was extremely ſuſceptible of ſuch paſſions, with an equal deſire of ſeeing her‖.

The French paſſed the Alps at Mount Cenis; and as their ſucceſs depended on diſpatch, they advanced with the greateſt diligence. Peſcara, who had been obliged to take a longer and more difficult route by Monaca and Final, was ſoon informed of their intention; and being ſenſible that nothing but the preſence of his troops could ſave the Milaneſe, marched with ſuch rapidity, that he reached Alva on the ſame day that the French army arrived at Vercelli. Francis, inſtructed by Bonnivet's error in the former campaign, advanced directly towards Milan, where the unex-

‖ Oeuvr. de Brant. tom. vi. 253.

pected approach of an enemy ſo powerful occaſioned ſuch conſternation and diſorder, that although Peſcara entered the city with ſome of his beſt troops, he found that the defence of it could not be undertaken with any probability of ſucceſs; and having thrown a garriſon into the citadel, retired through one gate, while the French were admitted at another*.

Theſe briſk motions of the French monarch diſconcerted all the ſchemes of defence which the Imperialiſts had formed. Never, indeed, did generals attempt to oppoſe a formidable invaſion under ſuch circumſtances of diſadvantage. Though Charles poſſeſſed dominions more extenſive than any other prince in Europe, and had, at this time, no other army but that which was employed in Lombardy, which did not amount to ſixteen thouſand men, his prerogative in all his different ſtates was ſo limited, and his ſubjects, without whoſe conſent he could raiſe no taxes, diſcovered ſuch unwillingneſs to burden themſelves with new or extraordinary impoſitions, that even this ſmall body of troops was in want of pay, of ammunition, of proviſions, and of clothing. In ſuch a ſituation, it required all the wiſdom of Lannoy, the intrepidity of Peſcara, and the implacable reſentment of Bourbon, to preſerve them from ſinking under deſpair, and to inſpire them with reſolution to attempt, or ſagacity to diſcover, what was eſſential to their ſafety. To the efforts of their genius, and the activity of their zeal, the emperor was more indebted for the preſervation of his Italian dominions than to his own power. Lannoy, by mortgaging the revenues of Naples, procured ſome money, which was immediately applied towards providing the army with whatever was moſt neceſſary†. Peſcara, who was beloved and almoſt adored by the Spaniſh troops, exhorted them to ſhew the world, by their engaging to ſerve the emperor in that dangerous exigency, without making any immediate de-

* Mem. de Bellay, p. 81. Guic. l. xv. 278.
† Guic. l. xv. 280.

mand of pay, that they were animated with ſentiments of honour very different from thoſe of mercenary ſoldiers; to which propoſition that gallant body of men, with an unexampled generoſity, gave their conſent †. Bourbon having raiſed a conſiderable ſum by pawning his jewels, ſet out for Germany, where his influence was great, that by his preſence he might haſten the levying of troops for the Imperial ſervice ‡.

Francis by a fatal error, allowed the emperor's generals time to derive advantage from all theſe operations. Inſtead of purſuing the enemy, who retired to Lodi on the Adda, an untenable poſt, which Peſcara had reſolved to abandon on the approach of the French, he in compliance with the opinion of Bonnivet, though contrary to that of his other generals, laid ſiege to Pavia on the Teſino [Oct. 28]; a town, indeed, of great importance, the poſſeſſion of which would have opened to him all the fertile country lying on the banks of that river. But the fortifications of the place were ſtrong; it was dangerous to undertake a difficult ſiege at ſo late a ſeaſon; and the Imperial generals, ſenſible of its conſequence, had thrown into the town a garriſon compoſed of ſix thouſand veterans, under the command of Antonio de Leyva, an officer of high rank, of great experience, of a patient but enterpriſing courage, fertile in reſources, ambitious of diſtinguiſhing himſelf, and capable, for that reaſon, as well as from his having been long accuſtomed both to obey and to command, of ſuffering or performing any thing in order to procure ſucceſs.

Francis proſecuted the ſiege with obſtinacy equal to the raſhneſs with which he had undertaken it. During three months, every thing known to the engineers of that age, or that could be effected by the valour of his troops, was attempted, in order to reduce the place; while Lannoy and

† Jovii Vit. Davali, lib. xv. p. 386. Sandov. vol. i. 621. Ulloa Vita dell Carlo V. p. 94, &c. Vita dell Emper. Carlos V. per Vera y Zuniga, p. 36.

‡ Mem. de Bellay, p. 83.

Peſcara, unable to obſtruct his operations, were obliged to remain in ſuch an ignominious ſtate of inaction, that a paſquinade was publiſhed at Rome, offering a reward to any perſon who could find the Imperial army, loſt in the month of October in the mountains between France and Lombardy, and which had not been heard of ſince that time †.

Leyva, well acquainted with the difficulties under which his countrymen laboured, and the impoſſibility of their facing, in the field, ſuch a powerful army as formed the ſiege of Pavia, placed his only hopes of ſafety in his own vigilance and valour. The efforts of both were extraordinary, and in proportion to the importance of the place, with the defence of which he was entruſted. He interrupted the approaches of the French by frequent and furious ſallies. Behind the breaches made by their artillery, he erected new works, which appeared to be ſcarcely inferior in ſtrength to the original fortifications. He repulſed the beſiegers in all their aſſaults; and by his own example, brought not only the garriſon, but the inhabitants, to bear the moſt ſevere fatigues, and to encounter the greateſt dangers without murmuring. The rigour of the ſeaſon conſpired with his endeavours in retarding the progreſs of the French. Francis attempting to become maſter of the town, by diverting the courſe of the Teſino, which is its chief defence on one ſide, a ſudden inundation of the river deſtroyed, in one day, the labour of many weeks, and ſwept away all the mounds which his army had raiſed with infinite toil, as well as at great expence *.

Notwithſtanding the ſlow progreſs of the beſiegers, and the glory which Leyva acquired by his gallant defence, it was not doubted but that the town would at laſt be obliged to ſurrender. The pope, who already conſidered the French arms as ſuperior in Italy, became impatient to diſengage himſelf from his connections with the emperor, of

† Sandov. i. 608.

* Guic. l. xv. 280. Ulloa Vita. di Carlo V. p. 93.

whoſe deſigns he was extremely jealous, and to enter into terms of friendſhip with Francis. As Clement's timid and cautious temper rendered him incapable of following the bold plan which Leo had formed, of delivering Italy from the yoke of both the rivals, he returned to the more obvious and practicable ſcheme of employing the power of the one to balance and to reſtrain that of the other. For this reaſon, he did not diſſemble his ſatisfaction at ſeeing the French king recover Milan, as he hoped that the dread of ſuch a neighbour would be ſome check upon the emperor's ambition, which no power in Italy was now able to controul. He laboured hard to bring about a peace that would ſecure Francis in the poſſeſſion of his new conqueſts; and as Charles, who was always inflexible in the proſecution of his ſchemes, rejected the propoſition with diſdain, and with bitter exclamations againſt the pope, by whoſe perſuaſions, while cardinal de Medici, he had been induced to invade the Milaneſe, Clement immediately concluded a treaty of neutrality with the king of France, in which the republic of Florence was included†.

Francis having by this tranſaction, deprived the emperor of his two moſt powerful allies, and at the ſame time having ſecured a paſſage for his own troops through their territories, formed a ſcheme of attacking the kingdom of Naples, hoping either to over-run that country, which was left altogether without defence or that at leaſt ſuch an unexpected invaſion would oblige the viceroy to recal part of the Imperial army out of the Milaneſe; for this purpoſe he ordered ſix thouſand men to march under the command of John Stuart duke of Albany. But Peſcara foreſeeing that the effect of this diverſion would depend entirely upon the operations of the armies in the Milaneſe, perſuaded Lannoy to diſregard Albany's motions‡, and to bend his whole force againſt the king himſelf, ſo that Francis not only weakened his army very unſeaſonably by this great detachment, but

† Guic. l. xv. 282, 285. ‡ Ibid. 285.

incurred the reproach of engaging too raſhly in chimerical and extravagant projects.

By this time the garriſon of Pavia was reduced to extremity; their ammunition and proviſions began to fail; the Germans, of whom it was chiefly compoſed, having received no pay for ſeven months*, threatened to deliver the town into the enemy's hands, and could hardly be reſtrained from mutiny by all Leyva's addreſs and authority. The Imperial generals, who were no ſtrangers to his ſituation, ſaw the neceſſity of marching without loſs of time to his relief. [1525] This they had now in their power: twelve thouſand Germans, whom the zeal and activity of Bourbon taught to move with unuſual rapidity, had entered Lombardy under his command, and rendered the Imperial army nearly equal to that of the French, greatly diminiſhed by the abſence of the body under Albany, as well as by the fatigues of the ſiege, and the rigour of the ſeaſon. But the more their troops increaſed in number, the more ſenſibly did the Imperialiſts feel the diſtreſs ariſing from want of money. Far from having funds for paying a powerful army, they had ſcarcely what was ſufficient for defraying the charges of conducting their artillery, and of carrying their ammunition and proviſions. The abilities of the generals, however, ſupplied every defect. By their own example, as well as by magnificent promiſes in name of the emperor, they prevailed on the troops of all the different nations which compoſed their army, to take the field without pay; they engaged to lead them directly towards the enemy; and flattered them with the certain proſpect of victory, which would at once enrich them with ſuch royal ſpoils as would be an ample reward for all their ſervices. The ſoldiers, ſenſible that, by quitting the army, they would forfeit the great arrears due to them, and eager to get poſſeſſion of the promiſed treaſures, demanded a battle with all the impatience of adventurers who fight only for plunder†.

* Gold. Polit. Imperial. 875.

† Eryci Peuteani Hiſt. Ciſalpina, ap. Grævii Theſ. Antiquit. Ital. iii. p. 1170, 1179.

The Imperial generals, without ſuffering the ardour of their troops to cool, advanced immediately toward the French camp [Feb. 3.] On the firſt intelligence of their approach, Francis called a council of war, to deliberate what courſe he ought to take. All his officers of greateſt experience were unanimous in adviſing him to retire, and to decline a battle with an enemy who courted it from deſpair. The Imperialiſts, they obſerved, would either be obliged in a few weeks to diſband an army, which they were unable to pay, and which they kept together only by the hope of plunder; or the ſoldiers, enraged at the non-performance of the promiſes to which they had truſted, would riſe in ſome furious mutiny, which would allow their generals to think of nothing but their own ſafety: that, meanwhile, he might encamp in ſome ſtrong poſt, and waiting in ſafety the arrival of freſh troops from France and Switzerland, might, before the end of ſpring, take poſſeſſion of all the Milaneſe, without danger or bloodſhed. But in oppoſition to them, Bonnivet, whoſe deſtiny it was to give counſels fatal to France during the whole campaign, repreſented the ignominy that it would reflect on their ſovereign, if he ſhould abandon a ſiege which he had proſecuted ſo long, or turn his back before an enemy to whom he was ſtill ſuperior in number; and inſiſted on the neceſſity of fighting the Imperialiſts rather than relinquiſh an undertaking, on the ſucceſs of which the king's future fame depended. Unfortunately, Francis's notions of honour were delicate to an exceſs that bordered on what was romantic. Having often ſaid that he would take Pavia, or periſh in the attempt, he thought himſelf bound not to depart from that reſolution; and rather than expoſe himſelf to the ſlighteſt imputation, he choſe to forego all the advantages which were the certain conſequences of a retreat, and determined to wait for the Imperialiſts before the walls of Pavia*.

The Imperial generals found the French ſo ſtrongly en-

* Guic. l. xv. 291.

trenched, that notwithſtanding the powerful motives which urged them on, they heſitated long before they ventured to attack them; but at laſt the neceſſities of the beſieged, and the murmurs of their own ſoldiers, obliged them to put every thing to hazard. Never did armies engage with greater ardour, or with an higher opinion of the importance of the battle which they were going to fight [Feb. 24;] never were troops more ſtrongly animated with emulation, national antipathy, mutual reſentment, and all the paſſions which inſpire obſtinate bravery. On the one hand, a gallant young monarch, ſeconded by a generous nobility, and followed by ſubjects to whoſe natural impetuoſity, indignation at the oppoſition which they had encountered, added new force, contended for victory and honour. On the other ſide, troops more completely diſciplined, and conducted by generals of greater abilities, fought from neceſſity, with courage heightened by deſpair. The Imperialiſts, however, were unable to reſiſt the firſt efforts of the French valour, and their firmeſt battalions began to give way. But the fortune of the day was quickly changed. The Swiſs in the ſervice of France, unmindful of the reputation of their country for fidelity and martial glory, abandoned their poſt in a cowardly manner. Leyva, with his garriſon, ſallied out and attacked the rear of the French, during the heat of the action, with ſuch fury as threw them into confuſion; and Peſcara falling on their cavalry with the Imperial horſe, among whom he had prudently intermingled a conſiderable number of Spaniſh foot, armed with the heavy muſkets then in uſe, broke this formidable body by an unuſual method of attack, againſt which they were wholly unprovided. The rout became univerſal; and reſiſtance ceaſed in almoſt every part, but where the king was in perſon, who fought now, not for fame or victory, but for ſafety. Though wounded in ſeveral places, and thrown from his horſe, which was killed under him, Francis defended himſelf on foot with an heroic courage. Many of his braveſt officers gathering round him,

and endeavouring to ſave his life at the expence of their own, fell at his feet. Among theſe was Bonnivet, the author of this great calamity, who alone died unlamented. The king, exhauſted with fatigue, and ſcarcely capable of further reſiſtance, was left almoſt alone, expoſed to the fury of ſome Spaniſh ſoldiers, ſtrangers to his rank, and enraged at his obſtinacy. At that moment came up Pomperant, a French gentleman, who had entered together with Bourbon into the emperor's ſervice, and placing himſelf by the ſide of the monarch againſt whom he had rebelled, aſſiſted in protecting him from the violence of the ſoldiers; at the ſame time beſeeching him to ſurrender to Bourbon, who was not far diſtant. Imminent as the danger was which now ſurrounded Francis, he rejected with indignation the thoughts of an action which would have afforded ſuch matter of triumph to his traitorous ſubject; and calling for Lannoy, who happened likewiſe to be near at hand, gave up his ſword to him; which he, kneeling to kiſs the king's hand, received with profound reſpect; and taking his own ſword from his ſide, preſented it to him, ſaying, That it did not become ſo great a monarch to remain diſarmed in the preſence of one of the emperor's ſubjects*.

Ten thouſand men fell on this day, one of the moſt fatal France had ever ſeen. Among theſe were many noblemen of the higheſt diſtinction, who choſe rather to periſh than to turn their backs with diſhonour. Not a few were taken priſoners, of whom the moſt illuſtrious was Henry d'Albret, the unfortunate king of Navarre. A ſmall body of the rear-guard made its eſcape, under the command of the duke of Alençon; the feeble garriſon of Milan, on the firſt news of the defeat, retired without being purſued, by another road; and in two weeks after the battle, not a Frenchman remained in Italy.

* Guic. l. xv. 292. Oeuv. de Brant. vi. 355. Mem. de Bellay, p. 90. Sandov. Hiſt. i. 638, &c. P. Mart. Ep. 805, 810. Ruſcelli Lettere de Principi, ii. p. 70. Ulloa Vita del Carlo V. p. 98.

Lannoy, though he treated Francis with all the outward marks of honour due to his rank and character, guarded him with the utmoſt attention. He was ſolicitous, not only to prevent any poſſibility of his eſcaping, but afraid that his own troops might ſeize his perſon, and detain it as the beſt ſecurity for the payment of their arrears. In order to provide againſt both theſe dangers, he conducted Francis the day after the battle, to the ſtrong caſtle of Pizzichitonè near Cremona, committing him to the cuſtody of Don Ferdinand Alarçon, general of the Spaniſh infantry, an officer of great bravery and of ſtrict honour, but remarkable for that ſevere and ſcrupulous vigilance which ſuch a truſt required.

Francis, who formed a judgment of the emperor's diſpoſitions by his own, was extremely deſirous that Charles ſhould be informed of his ſituation, fondly hoping that, from his generoſity or ſympathy, he ſhould obtain ſpeedy relief. The Imperial generals were no leſs impatient to give their ſovereign an early account of the deciſive victory which they had gained, and to receive his inſtructions with regard to their future conduct. As the moſt certain and expeditious method of conveying intelligence to Spain, at that ſeaſon of the year, was by land, Francis gave the commendador Pennaloſa, who was charged with Lannoy's diſpatches, a paſſport to travel through France.

Charles received the account of this ſignal and unexpected ſucceſs that had crowned his arms, with a moderation, which, if it had been real, would have done him more honour than the greateſt victory. Without uttering one word expreſſive of exultation, or of intemperate joy, he retired immediately into his chapel [Mar. 10,] and having ſpent an hour in offering up his thankſgivings to Heaven, returned to the preſence-chamber, which by that time was filled with grandees and foreign ambaſſadors, aſſembled in order to congratulate him. He accepted of their compliments with a modeſt deportment; he lamented the misfortune of the captive king, as a ſtriking example of the ſad reverſe of fortune,

to which the moſt powerful monarchs are ſubject; he forbad any public rejoicings, as indecent in a war carried on among Chriſtians, reſerving them until he ſhould obtain a victory equally illuſtrious over the Infidels; and ſeemed to take pleaſure in the advantage which he had gained, only as it would prove the occaſion of reſtoring peace to Chriſtendom†.

Charles, however, had already begun to form ſchemes in his own mind, which little ſuited ſuch external appearances. Ambition, not generoſity, was the ruling paſſion in his mind; and the victory at Pavia opened ſuch new and unbounded proſpects of gratifying it, as allured him with irreſiſtible force: but it being no eaſy matter to execute the vaſt deſigns which he meditated, he thought it neceſſary, while proper meaſures were taking for that purpoſe, to affect the greateſt moderation, hoping under that veil to conceal his real intentions from the other princes of Europe.

Meanwhile, France was filled with conſternation. The king himſelf had early tranſmitted an account of the rout of Pavia, in a letter to his mother, delivered by Pennaloſa, which contained only theſe words, "Madam, all is loſt, except our honour." The officers who made their eſcape, when they arrived from Italy, brought ſuch a melancholy detail of particulars as made all ranks of men ſenſibly feel the greatneſs and extent of the calamity. France, without its ſovereign, without money in her treaſury, without an army, without generals to command it, and encompaſſed on all ſides by a victorious and active enemy, ſeemed to be on the very brink of deſtruction. But on that occaſion the great abilities of Louiſe the regent ſaved the kingdom, which the violence of her paſſions had more than once expoſed to the greateſt danger. Inſtead of giving herſelf up to ſuch lamentations as were natural to a woman ſo remarkable for her maternal tenderneſs, ſhe diſcovered all the foreſight, and exerted all the activity of a conſummate politician.

† Sandov. Hiſt. i. 641. Ulloa Vita dell Carlo V. p. 110.

She aſſembled the nobles at Lyons, and animated them by her example no leſs than by her words, with ſuch zeal in defence of their country, as its preſent ſituation required. She collected the remains of the army which had ſerved in Italy, ranſomed the priſoners, paid the arrears, and put them in a condition to take the field. She levied new troops, provided for the ſecurity of the frontiers, and raiſed ſums ſufficient for defraying theſe extraordinary expences. Her chief care, however, was to appeaſe the reſentment, or to gain the friendſhip of the king of England; and from that quarter, the firſt ray of comfort broke in upon the French.

Though Henry, in entering into alliances with Charles or Francis, ſeldom followed any regular or concerted plan of policy, but was influenced chiefly by the caprice of temporary paſſions, ſuch occurrences often happened as recalled his attention towards that equal balance of power which it was neceſſary to keep between the two contending potentates, the preſervation of which he always boaſted to be his peculiar office. He had expected that his union with the emperor might afford him an opportunity of recovering ſome part of thoſe territories in France which had belonged to his anceſtors, and for the ſake of ſuch an acquiſition he did not ſcruple to give his aſſiſtance towards raiſing Charles to a conſiderable pre-eminence above Francis. He had never dreamt, however, of any event ſo deciſive and ſo fatal as the victory at Pavia, which ſeemed not only to have broken, but to have annihilated the power of one of the rivals; ſo that the proſpect of the ſudden and entire revolution which this would occaſion in the political ſyſtem, filled him with the moſt diſquieting apprehenſions. He ſaw all Europe in danger of being over-run by an ambitious prince, to whoſe power there now remained no counterpoiſe; and though he himſelf might at firſt be admitted, in quality of an ally, to ſome ſhare in the ſpoils of the captive monarch, it was eaſy to diſcern, that with regard to the manner of making the partition, as well as his ſecurity for keeping poſſeſſion of

what ſhould be allotted him, he muſt abſolutely depend upon the will of a confederate, to whoſe forces his own bore no proportion. He was ſenſible, that if Charles were permitted to add any conſiderable part of France to the vaſt dominions of which he was already maſter, his neighbourhood would be much more formidable to England than that of the ancient French kings; while, at the ſame time, the proper balance on the continent, to which England owed both its ſafety and importance, would be entirely loſt. Concern for the ſituation of the unhappy monarch co-operated with theſe political conſiderations; his gallant behaviour in the battle of Pavia had excited an high degree of admiration, which never fails of augmenting ſympathy; and Henry, naturally ſuſceptible of generous ſentiments, was fond of appearing as the deliverer of a vanquiſhed enemy from a ſtate of captivity. The paſſions of the Engliſh miniſter ſeconded the inclinations of the monarch. Wolſey, who had not forgotten the diſappointment of his hopes in two ſucceſſive conclaves, which he imputed chiefly to the emperor, thought this a proper opportunity of taking revenge; and Louiſe, courting the friendſhip of England with ſuch flattering ſubmiſſions as were no leſs agreeable to the king than to the cardinal, Henry gave her ſecret aſſurances that he would not lend his aid towards oppreſſing France, in its preſent helpleſs ſtate, and obliged her to promiſe that ſhe would not conſent to diſmember the kingdom, even in order to procure her ſon's liberty§.

But as Henry's connections with the emperor made it neceſſary to act in ſuch a manner as to ſave appearances, he ordered public rejoicings to be made in his dominions for the ſucceſs of the Imperial arms; and, as if he had been eager to ſeize the preſent opportunity of ruining the French monarchy, he ſent ambaſſadors to Madrid, to congratulate with Charles upon his victory; to put him in mind, that he, as his ally, engaged in one common cauſe, was entitled to par-

§ Mem. de Bellay, 94. Guic. l. xvi. 318. Herbert.

take in the fruits of it; and to require that, in compliance with the terms of their confederacy, he would invade Guienne with a powerful army, in order to give him poſſeſſion of that province. At the ſame time, he offered to ſend the princeſs Mary into Spain or the Low Countries, that ſhe might be educated under the emperor's direction, until the concluſion of the marriage agreed on between them; and in return for that mark of his confidence, he inſiſted that Francis ſhould be delivered to him, in conſequence of that article in the treaty of Bruges, whereby each of the contracting parties was bound to ſurrender all uſurpers to him whoſe rights they had invaded. It was impoſſible that Henry could expect that the emperor would liſten to theſe extravagant demands, which it was neither his intereſt, nor in his power to grant. They appear evidently to have been made with no other intention than to furniſh him with a decent pretext for entering into ſuch engagements with France as the juncture required*.

It was among the Italian ſtates, however, that the victory of Pavia occaſioned the greateſt alarm and terror. That balance of power on which they relied for their ſecurity, and which it had been the conſtant object of all their negotiations and refinements to maintain, was deſtroyed in a moment. They were expoſed by their ſituation to feel the firſt effects of the uncontrouled authority which Charles had acquired. They obſerved many ſymptoms of a boundleſs ambition in that young prince, and were ſenſible that, as emperor or king of Naples, he might not only form dangerous pretenſions upon each of their territories, but might invade them with great advantage. They deliberated, therefore, with great ſolicitude concerning the means of raiſing ſuch a force as might obſtruct his progreſs†. But their conſultations, conducted with little union, and executed with leſs

* Herbert, p. 64.

† Guic. l. xvi 300. Ruſcelli Lettere de Princ. ii. 74, 76, &c. Thuani Hiſt. lib. i. c. 11.

vigour, had no effect. Clement, inſtead of purſuing the meaſures which he had concerted with the Venetians for ſecuring the liberty of Italy, was ſo intimidated by Lannoy's threats, or overcome by his promiſes, that he entered into a ſeparate treaty [April 1,] binding himſelf to advance a conſiderable ſum to the emperor, in return for certain emoluments which he was to receive from him. The money was inſtantly paid; but Charles afterwards refuſed to ratify the treaty; and the pope remained expoſed at once to infamy and to ridicule; to the former, becauſe he had deſerted the public cauſe for his private intereſt; to the latter, becauſe he had been a loſer by that unworthy action§.

How diſhonourable ſoever the artifice might be which was employed in order to defraud the pope of this ſum, it came very ſeaſonably into the viceroy's hands, and put it in his power to extricate himſelf out of an imminent danger. Soon after the defeat of the French army, the German troops, which had defended Pavia with ſuch meritorious courage and perſeverance, growing inſolent upon the fame that they had acquired, and impatient of relying any longer on fruitleſs promiſes, with which they had been ſo often amuſed, rendered themſelves maſters of the town, with a reſolution to keep poſſeſſion of it as a ſecurity for the payment of their arrears; and the reſt of the army diſcovered a much ſtronger inclination to aſſiſt, than to puniſh the mutineers. By dividing among them the money exacted from the pope, Lannoy quieted the tumultuous Germans; but though this ſatisfied their preſent demands, he had ſo little proſpect of being able to pay them or his other forces regularly for the future, and was under ſuch continual apprehenſions of their ſeizing the perſon of the captive king, that, not long after, he was obliged to diſmiſs all the Germans and Italians in the Imperial ſervice‖. Thus, from a circumſtance that now ap-

§ Guic. lib. xvi. 305. Mauroceni Hiſtor. Venet. ap. Iſtorichi dell cose Venez. V. 131, 136.

‖ Guic. l. xvi. p. 302.

pears very ſingular, but ariſing naturally from the conſtitution of moſt European governments in the ſixteenth century, while Charles was ſuſpected by all his neighbours of aiming at univerſal monarchy, and while he was really forming vaſt projects of this kind, his revenues were ſo limited, that he could not keep on foot his victorious army, though it did not exceed twenty-four thouſand men.

During theſe tranſactions, Charles, whoſe pretenſions to moderation and diſintereſtedneſs were ſoon forgotten, deliberated, with the utmoſt ſolicitude, how he might derive the greateſt advantages from the misfortune of his adverſary. Some of his counſellors adviſed him to treat Francis with the magnanimity that became a victorious prince, and, inſtead of taking advantage of his ſituation, to impoſe rigorous conditions, to diſmiſs him on ſuch equal terms, as would bind him for ever to his intereſt by the ties of gratitude and affection, more forcible as well as more permanent than any which could be formed by extorted oaths and involuntary ſtipulations. Such an exertion of generoſity is not, perhaps, to be expected in the conduct of political affairs, and it was far too refined for that prince to whom it was propoſed. The more obvious, but leſs ſplendid ſcheme, of endeavouring to make the utmoſt of Francis's calamity, had a greater number in the council to recommend it, and ſuited better with the emperor's genius. But though Charles adopted this plan, he ſeems not to have executed it in the moſt proper manner. Inſtead of making one great effort to penetrate into France with all the forces of Spain and the Low Countries; inſtead of cruſhing the Italian ſtates before they recovered from the conſternation which the ſucceſs of his arms had occaſioned, he had recourſe to the artifices of intrigue and negotiation. This proceeded partly from neceſſity, partly from the natural diſpoſition of his mind. The ſituation of his finances at that time rendered it extremely difficult to carry on any extraordinary armament; and he himſelf having never appeared at the head of his armies, the

command of which he had hitherto committed to his generals, was averſe to bold and martial counſels, and truſted more to the arts with which he was acquainted. He laid beſides, too much ſtreſs upon the victory of Pavia, as if by that event the ſtrength of France had been annihilated, its reſources exhauſted, and the kingdom itſelf, no leſs than the perſon of its monarch, had been ſubjected to his power.

Full of this opinion, he determined to ſet the higheſt price upon Francis's freedom, and having ordered the count de Roeux to viſit the captive king in his name, he inſtructed him to propoſe the following articles as the conditions on which he would grant him his liberty: that he ſhould reſtore Burgundy to the emperor, from whoſe anceſtors it had been unjuſtly wreſted; that he ſhould ſurrender Provence and Dauphinè, that they might be erected into an independent kingdom for the conſtable Bourbon; that he ſhould make full ſatisfaction to the king of England for all his claims, and finally renounce the pretenſions of France to Naples, Milan, or any other territory in Italy. When Francis, who had hitherto flattered himſelf, that he ſhould be treated by the emperor with the generoſity becoming one great prince towards another, heard theſe rigorous conditions, he was ſo tranſported with indignation, that, drawing his dagger haſtily, he cried out, "'Twere better that a king ſhould die thus." Alarçon, alarmed at his vehemence, laid hold on his hand; but though he ſoon recovered greater compoſure, he ſtill declared, in the moſt ſolemn manner, that he would rather remain a priſoner during life, than purchaſe liberty by ſuch ignominious conceſſions†.

This mortifying diſcovery of the emperor's intentions greatly augmented Francis's chagrin and impatience under his confinement, and muſt have driven him to abſolute deſpair, if he had not laid hold of the only thing which could ſtill adminiſter any comfort to him. He perſuaded himſelf, that the conditions which Roeux had propoſed

† Mem. de Bellay, 94. Ferreras Hiſt. ix. 43.

did not flow originally from Charles himſelf, but were dictated by the rigorous policy of his Spaniſh council; and that therefore he might hope, in one perſonal interview with him, to do more towards haſtening his own deliverance, than could be effected by long negotiations paſſing through the ſubordinate hands of his miniſters. Relying on this ſuppoſition, which proceeded from too favourable an opinion of the emperor's character, he offered to viſit him in Spain, and was willing to be carried thither as a ſpectacle to that haughty nation. Lannoy employed all his addreſs to confirm him in theſe ſentiments; and concerted with him in ſecret the manner of executing this reſolution. Francis was ſo eager on a ſcheme which ſeemed to open ſome proſpect of liberty, that he furniſhed the galleys neceſſary for conveying him to Spain, Charles being at that time unable to fit out a ſquadron for that purpoſe. The viceroy, without communicating his intentions either to Bourbon or Peſcara, conducted his priſoner towards Genoa, under pretence of tranſporting him by ſea to Naples; though ſoon after they ſet ſail, he ordered the pilots to ſteer directly for Spain; but the wind happening to carry them near the French coaſt, the unfortunate monarch had a full proſpect of his own dominions, towards which he caſt many a ſorrowful and deſiring look. They landed, however, in a few days at Barcelona, and ſoon after Francis was lodged [Aug. 24], by the emperor's command, in the Alcazar of Madrid, under the care of the vigilant Alarçon, who guarded him with as much circumſpection as ever*.

A few days after Francis's arrival at Madrid, and when he began to be ſenſible of his having relied without foundation on the emperor's generoſity, Henry VIII. concluded a treaty with the regent of France, which afforded him ſome hope of liberty from another quarter. Henry's extravagant demands had been received at Madrid with that neglect which they deſerved, and which he probably expected.

* Mem. de Bellay, 95. P. Mart. Ep. ult. Guic. lib. xvi. 323.

Charles, intoxicated with proſperity, no longer courted him in that reſpectful and ſubmiſſive manner which pleaſed his haughty temper. Wolſey, no leſs haughty than his maſter, was highly irritated at the emperor's diſcontinuing his wonted careſſes and profeſſions of friendſhip to himſelf. Theſe ſlight offences, added to the weighty conſiderations formerly mentioned, induced Henry to enter into a defenſive alliance with Louiſe, in which all the differences between him and her ſon were adjuſted; at the ſame time he engaged that he would employ his beſt offices in order to procure the deliverance of his new ally from a ſtate of captivity†.

While the open defection of ſuch a powerful confederate affected Charles with deep concern, a ſecret conſpiracy was carrying on in Italy, which threatened him with conſequences ſtill more fatal. The reſtleſs and intriguing genius of Moronè, chancellor of Milan, gave riſe to this. His revenge had been amply gratified by the expulſion of the French out of Italy, and his vanity no leſs ſoothed by the re-eſtabliſhment of Sforza, to whoſe intereſt he had attached himſelf in the dutchy of Milan. The delays, however, and evaſions of the Imperial court, in granting Sforza the inveſtiture of his new acquired territories, had long alarmed Moronè; theſe were repeated ſo often, and with ſuch apparent artifice, as became a full proof to his ſuſpicious mind that the emperor intended to ſtrip his maſter of that rich country which he had conquered in his name. Though Charles, in order to quiet the pope and Venetians, no leſs jealous of his deſigns than Moronè, gave Sforza, at laſt, the inveſtiture which had been ſo long deſired; the charter was clogged with ſo many reſervations, and ſubjected him to ſuch grievous burdens, as rendered the duke of Milan a dependent on the emperor, rather than a vaſſal of the empire, and afforded him hardly any other ſecurity for his poſſeſſions than the good pleaſure of an ambitious ſuperior. Such an acceſſion of power as would have accrued from the addition of the Milaneſe to the kingdom of

† Herbert. Fiddes's Life of Wolſey, 337.

Naples, was conſidered by Moronè as fatal to the liberties of Italy, no leſs than to his own importance. Full of this idea he began to revolve in his mind the poſſibility of reſcuing Italy from the yoke of foreigners; the darling ſcheme, as has been already obſerved, of the Italian politicians in that age, and which it was the great object of their ambition to accompliſh. If to the glory of having been the chief inſtrument of driving the French out of Milan, he could add that of delivering Naples from the dominion of the Spaniards, he thought that nothing would be wanting to complete his fame. His fertile genius ſoon ſuggeſted to him a project for that purpoſe; a difficult, indeed, and daring one, but for that very reaſon more agreeable to his bold and enterpriſing temper.

Bourbon and Peſcara were equally enraged at Lannoy's carrying the French king into Spain without their knowledge. The former, being afraid that the two monarchs might, in his abſence, conclude ſome treaty, in which his intereſts would be entirely ſacrificed, haſtened to Madrid, in order to guard againſt that danger. The latter, on whom the command of the army now devolved, was obliged to remain in Italy; but in every company, he gave vent to his indignation againſt the viceroy, in expreſſions full of rancour and contempt; he accuſed him, in a letter to the emperor, of cowardice in the time of danger, and of inſolence after victory, towards the obtaining of which he had contributed nothing either by his valour or his conduct; nor did he abſtain from bitter complaints againſt the emperor himſelf, who had not diſcovered, as he imagined, a ſufficient ſenſe of his merit, nor beſtowed any adequate reward on his ſervices. It was on this diſguſt of Peſcara, that Moronè founded his whole ſyſtem. He knew the boundleſs ambition of his nature, the great extent of his abilities in peace as well as war, and the intrepidity of his mind, capable alike of undertaking and of executing the moſt deſperate deſigns. The cantonment of the Spaniſh troops on the frontier of the Milan-

eſe gave occaſion to many interviews between him and Moronè, in which the latter took care frequently to turn the converſation to the tranſactions ſubſequent to the battle of Pavia, a ſubject upon which the marquis always entered willingly and with paſſion; and Moronè obſerving his reſentment to be uniformly violent, artfully pointed out and aggravated every circumſtance that could increaſe its fury. He painted, in the ſtrongeſt colours, the emperor's want of diſcernment, as well as of gratitude, in preferring Lannoy to him, and in allowing that preſumptuous Fleming to diſpoſe of the captive king, without conſulting the man to whoſe bravery and wiſdom Charles was indebted for the glory of having a formidable rival in his power. Having warmed him by ſuch diſcourſes, he then began to inſinuate, that now was the time to be avenged for theſe inſults, and to acquire immortal renown as the deliverer of his country from the oppreſſion of ſtrangers; that the ſtates of Italy, weary of the ignominious and intolerable dominion of barbarians, were at laſt ready to combine in order to vindicate their own independence; that their eyes were fixed on him as the only leader whoſe genius and good fortune could enſure the happy ſucceſs of that noble enterpriſe; that the attempt was no leſs practicable than glorious, it being in his power ſo to diſperſe the Spaniſh infantry, the only body of the emperor's troops that remained in Italy, through the villages of the Milaneſe, that, in one night, they might be deſtroyed by the people, who having ſuffered much by their exactions and inſolence, would gladly undertake this ſervice; that he might then, without oppoſition, take poſſeſſion of the throne of Naples, the ſtation deſtined for him, and a reward not unworthy the reſtorer of liberty to Italy; that the pope, of whom that kingdom held, and whoſe predeceſſors had diſpoſed of it on many former occaſions, would willingly grant him the right of inveſtiture; that the Venetians, the Florentines, the duke of Milan, to whom he had communicated the ſcheme, together with the French, would be the gua-

rantees of his right; that the Neapolitans would naturally prefer the government of one of their countrymen, whom they loved and admired, to that odious dominion of ſtrangers, to which they had been ſo long ſubjected; and that the emperor, aſtoniſhed at a blow ſo unexpected, would find that he had neither troops nor money to reſiſt ſuch a powerful confederacy†.

Peſcara, amazed at the boldneſs and extent of the ſcheme, liſtened attentively to Moronè, but with the countenance of a man loſt in profound and anxious thought. On the one hand, the infamy of betraying his ſovereign, under whom he bore ſuch high command, deterred him from the attempt; on the other, the proſpect of obtaining a crown allured him to venture upon it. After continuing a ſhort ſpace in ſuſpenſe, the leaſt commendable motives, as is uſual after ſuch deliberations, prevailed, and ambition triumphed over honour. In order, however, to throw a colour of decency on his conduct, he inſiſted that ſome learned caſuiſts ſhould give their opinion, "Whether it was lawful for a ſubject to take arms againſt his immediate ſovereign, in obedience to the lord paramount of whom the kingdom itſelf was held?" Such a reſolution of the caſe as he expected was ſoon obtained from the divines and civilians both of Rome and Milan; the negotiation went forward; and meaſures ſeemed to be taking with great ſpirit for the ſpeedy execution of the deſign.

During this interval, Peſcara, either ſhocked at the treachery of the action that he was going to commit, or deſpairing of its ſucceſs, began to entertain thoughts of abandoning the engagements which he had come under. The indiſpoſition of Sforza, who happened at that time to be taken ill of a diſtemper which was thought mortal, confirmed his reſolution, and determined him to make known the whole conſpiracy to the emperor, deemed it more prudent

† Guic. lib. xvi. 325. Jovii Vita Davali, p. 417. Oeuv. de Brantome, iv. 171. Ruſcelli Lettere de Princ. ii. 91. Thuani Hiſt. lib. i. c. 11. P. Heuter. Rer. Auſtr. lib. ix. c. 3. p. 207.

to expect the dutchy of Milan from him as the reward of this diſcovery, than to aim at a kingdom to be purchaſed by a ſeries of crimes. This reſolution, however, proved the ſource of actions hardly leſs criminal and ignominious. The emperor, who had already received full information concerning the conſpiracy from other hands, ſeemed to be highly pleaſed with Peſcara's fidelity, and commanded him to continue his intrigues for ſome time with the pope and Sforza, both that he might diſcover their intentions more fully, and that he might be able to convict them of the crime with greater certainty. Peſcara, conſcious of guilt, as well as ſenſible how ſuſpicious his long ſilence muſt have appeared at Madrid, durſt not decline that diſhonourable office; and was obliged to act the meaneſt and moſt diſgraceful of all parts, that of ſeducing with a purpoſe to betray. Conſidering the abilities of the perſons with whom he had to deal, the part was ſcarcely leſs difficult than baſe; but he acted it with ſuch addreſs, as to deceive even the penetrating eye of Moronè, who relying with full confidence on his ſincerity, viſited him at Novara, in order to put the laſt hand to their machinations. Peſcara received him in an apartment where Antonio de Leyva was placed behind the tapeſtry, that he might overhear and bear witneſs to their converſation; as Moronè was about to take leave, that officer ſuddenly appeared, and to his aſtoniſhment arreſted him priſoner in the emperor's name. He was conducted to the caſtle of Pavia; and Peſcara, who had ſo lately been his accomplice, had now the aſſurance to interrogate him as his judge. At the ſame time, the emperor declared Sforza to have forfeited all right to the dutchy of Milan, by his engaging in a conſpiracy againſt the ſovereign of whom he held; Peſcara, by his command, ſeized on every place in the Milaneſe, except the caſtles of Cremona and Milan, which the unfortunate duke attempting to defend, were cloſely blockaded by the Imperial troops *.

* Guic. lib. xvi. 329. Jovii Hiſt. 319. Capella, lib. v. p. 200.

But though this unſucceſsful conſpiracy, inſtead of ſtripping the emperor of what he already poſſeſſed in Italy, contributed to extend his dominions in that country, it ſhewed him the neceſſity of coming to ſome agreement with the French king, unleſs he choſe to draw on himſelf a confederacy of all Europe, which the progreſs of his arms and his ambition, now as undiſguiſed as it was boundleſs, filled with general alarm. He had not hitherto treated Francis with the generoſity which that monarch expected, and hardly with the decency due to his ſtation. Inſtead of diſplaying the ſentiments becoming a great prince, Charles, by his mode of treating Francis, ſeems to have acted with the mercenary art of a corſair, who, by the rigorous uſage of his priſoners, endeavours to draw from them an higher price for their ranſom. The captive king was confined in an old caſtle, under a keeper whoſe formal auſterity of manners rendered his vigilance ſtill more diſguſting. He was allowed no exerciſe but that of riding on a mule, ſurrounded with armed guards on horſeback. Charles, on pretence of its being neceſſary to attend the Cortes aſſembled in Toledo, had gone to reſide in that city, and ſuffered ſeveral weeks to elapſe without viſiting Francis, though he ſolicited an interview with the moſt preſſing and ſubmiſſive importunity. So many indignities made a deep impreſſion on an high-ſpirited prince; he began to loſe all reliſh for his uſual amuſements; his natural gaiety of temper forſook him; and after languiſhing for ſome time, he was ſeized with a dangerous fever, during the violence of which he complained conſtantly of the unexpected and unprincely rigour with which he had been treated, often exclaiming, that now the emperor would have the ſatisfaction of his dying a priſoner in his hands, without having once deigned to ſee his face. The phyſicians, at laſt, deſpaired of his life, and informed the emperor that they ſaw no hope of his recovery, unleſs he were gratified with regard to that point on which he ſeemed to be ſo ſtrongly bent. Charles, ſolicitous to preſerve a life with

which all his proſpects of farther advantage from the victory of Pavia muſt have terminated, immediately conſulted his miniſters concerning the courſe to be taken. In vain did the chancellor Gattinara, the moſt able among them, repreſent to him the indecency of his viſiting Francis, if he did not intend to ſet him at liberty immediately upon equal terms; in vain did he point out the infamy to which he would be expoſed, if avarice or ambition ſhould prevail on him to give the captive monarch this mark of attention and ſympathy, for which humanity and generoſity had pleaded ſo long without effect. The emperor, leſs delicate, or leſs ſolicitous about reputation than his miniſter, ſet out for Madrid to viſit his priſoner [Sept. 28]. The interview was ſhort; Francis being too weak to bear a long converſation, Charles accoſted him in terms full of affection and reſpect, and gave him ſuch promiſes of ſpeedy deliverance and princely treatment, as would have reflected the greateſt honour upon him if they had flowed from another ſource. Francis graſped at them with the eagerneſs natural in his ſituation; and cheered with this gleam of hope, began to revive from that moment, recovering rapidly his wonted health *.

He had ſoon the mortification to find, that his confidence in the emperor was not better founded than formerly. Charles returned inſtantly to Toledo; all negotiations were carried on by his miniſters; and Francis was kept in as ſtrict cuſtody as ever. A new indignity, and that very galling, was added to all thoſe he had already ſuffered. Bourbon arriving in Spain about this time, Charles, who had ſo long refuſed to viſit the king of France, received his rebellious ſubject with the moſt ſtudied reſpect [Nov. 15]. He met him without the gates of Toledo, embraced him with the greateſt affection, and placing him on his left hand, conducted him to his apartment. Theſe marks of honour to him, were ſo many inſults to the unfortunate monarch; which he felt in a very ſenſible manner. It afforded him

* Guic. l. xvi. 339. Sandov. Hiſt. i. 665.

ſome conſolation, however, to obſerve, that the ſentiments of the Spaniards differed widely from thoſe of their ſovereign. That generous people deteſted Bourbon's crime. Notwithſtanding his great talents and important ſervices, they ſhunned all intercourſe with him, to ſuch a degree, that Charles having deſired the marquis de Villena to permit Bourbon to reſide in his palace while the court remained in Toledo, he politely replied, "That he could not refuſe gratifying his ſovereign in that requeſt;" but added, with a Caſtilian dignity of mind, that the emperor muſt not be ſurpriſed if, the moment the conſtable departed, he ſhould burn to the ground a houſe which, having been polluted by the preſence of a traitor, became an unfit habitation for a man of honour†.

Charles himſelf, nevertheleſs, ſeemed to have it much at heart to reward Bourbon's ſervices in a ſignal manner. But as he inſiſted, in the firſt place, on the accompliſhment of the emperor's promiſe of giving him in marriage his ſiſter Eleanora, queen-dowager of Portugal, the honour of which alliance had been one of his chief inducements to rebel againſt his lawful ſovereign; as Francis, in order to prevent ſuch a dangerous union, had offered, before he left Italy, to marry that princeſs; and as Eleanora herſelf diſcovered an inclination rather to match with a powerful monarch, than with his exiled ſubject; all theſe interfering circumſtances created great embarraſſment to Charles, and left him hardly any hope of extricating himſelf with decency. But the death of Peſcara, who, at the age of thirty-ſix, left behind him the reputation of being one of the greateſt generals and ableſt politicians of that century, happened opportunely at this juncture [December] for his relief. By that event, the command of the army in Italy became vacant, and Charles, always fertile in reſources, perſuaded Bourbon, who was in no condition to diſpute his will, to accept the office of general in chief there, together with a grant of the dut-

* Guic. l. xvi. 335.

chy of Milan forfeited by Sforza; and in return for theſe to relinquiſh all hopes of marrying the queen of Portugal*.

The chief obſtacle that ſtood in the way of Francis's liberty was the emperor's continuing to inſiſt ſo peremptorily on the reſtitution of Burgundy, as a preliminary to that event. Francis often declared, that he would never conſent to diſmember his kingdom; and that, even if he ſhould ſo far forget the duties of a monarch, as to come to ſuch a reſolution, the fundamental laws of the nation would prevent its taking effect. On his part he was willing to make an abſolute ceſſion to the emperor of all his pretenſions in Italy and the Low Countries; he promiſed to reſtore to Bourbon all his lands which had been confiſcated; he renewed his propoſal of marrying the emperor's ſiſter, the queen-dowager of Portugal; and engaged to pay a great ſum by way of ranſom for his own perſon. But all mutual eſteem and confidence between the two monarchs were now entirely loſt; there appeared, on the one hand, a rapacious ambition labouring to avail itſelf of every favourable circumſtance; on the other, ſuſpicion and reſentment, ſtanding perpetually on their guard; ſo that the proſpect of bringing their negotiations to an iſſue ſeemed to be far diſtant. The dutcheſs of Alençon, the French king's ſiſter, whom Charles permitted to viſit her brother in his confinement, employed all her addreſs, in order to procure his liberty on more reaſonable terms. Henry of England interpoſed his good offices to the ſame purpoſe; but both with ſo little ſucceſs, that Francis in deſpair took ſuddenly the reſolution of reſigning his crown, with all its rights and prerogatives, to his ſon the dauphin, determined rather to end his days in priſon, than to purchaſe his freedom by conceſſions unworthy of a king. The deed for this purpoſe he ſigned with legal formality in Madrid, empowering his ſiſter to carry it into France, that it might be regiſtered in all the parliaments of the kingdom; and at the ſame time intimating his intention to the emperor, he

* Sandov. Hiſt. i. 676. Oeuv. de Brant. iv. 249.

deſired him to name the place of his confinement, and to aſſign him a proper number of attendants during the remainder of his days‡.

This reſolution of the French king had great effect; Charles began to be ſenſible, that by puſhing rigour to exceſs he might defeat his own meaſures; and inſtead of the vaſt advantages which he hoped to draw from ranſoming a powerful monarch, he might at laſt find in his hands a prince without dominions or revenues. About the ſame time, one of the king of Navarre's domeſtics happened, by an extraordinary exertion of fidelity, courage, and addreſs, to procure his maſter an opportunity of eſcaping from the priſon in which he had been confined ever ſince the battle of Pavia. This convinced the emperor, that the moſt vigilant attention of his officers might be eluded by the ingenuity or boldneſs of Francis or his attendants, and one unlucky hour might deprive him of all the advantages which he had been ſo ſolicitous to obtain. By theſe conſiderations, he was induced to abate ſomewhat of his former demands. On the other hand, Francis's impatience under confinement daily increaſed; and having received certain intelligence of a powerful league forming againſt his rival in Italy, he grew more compliant with regard to conceſſions, truſting that, if he could once obtain his liberty, he would ſoon be in a condition to reſume whatever he had yielded.

1526.] Such being the views and ſentiments of the two monarchs, the treaty which procured Francis his liberty was ſigned at Madrid, on the fourteenth of January one thouſand five hundred and twenty-ſix. The article with regard to Burgundy, which had hitherto created the greateſt difficulty, was compromiſed, Francis engaging to reſtore that dutchy with all its dependencies in full ſovereignty to the emperor; and Charles conſenting, that this reſtitution ſhould not be made until the king was ſet at liberty; in order to ſecure

‡ This paper is publiſhed in Memoires Hiſtoriques, &c. par M. l'Abbe Raynal, tom. ii. p. 151.

the performance of this, as well as the other conditions in the treaty, Francis agreed that at the ſame inſtant when he himſelf ſhould be releaſed, he would deliver as hoſtages to the emperor, his eldeſt ſon the dauphin, his ſecond ſon the duke of Orleans, or in lieu of the latter, twelve of his principal, nobility, to be named by Charles. The other articles ſwelled to a great number, and, though not of ſuch importance, were extremely rigorous. Among theſe the moſt remarkable were, that Francis ſhould renounce all his pretenſions in Italy; that he ſhould diſclaim any title which he had to the ſovereignty of Flanders and Artois; that, within ſix weeks after his releaſe, he ſhould reſtore to Bourbon, and his adherents, all their goods, moveable and immoveable, and make them full reparation for the damages which they had ſuſtained by the confiſcation of them; that he ſhould uſe his intereſt with Henry d'Albret to relinquiſh his pretenſions to the crown of Navarre, and ſhould not for the future aſſiſt him in any attempt to recover it; that there ſhould be eſtabliſhed between the emperor and Francis a league of perpetual friendſhip and confederacy, with a promiſe of mutual aſſiſtance in every caſe of neceſſity; that, in corrobation of this union, Francis ſhould marry the emperor's ſiſter, the queen-dowager of Portugal; that Francis ſhould cauſe all the articles of this treaty to be ratified by the ſtates, and regiſtered in the parliaments of his kingdom; that, upon the emperor's receiving this ratification, the hoſtages ſhould be ſet at liberty; but in their place, the duke of Angouleme, the king's third ſon, ſhould be delivered to Charles, that, in order to manifeſt, as well as to ſtrengthen the amity between the two monarchs, he might be educated at the Imperial court; and that if Francis did not, within the time limited, fulfil the ſtipulations in the treaty, he ſhould promiſe, upon his honour and oath, to return into Spain, and to ſurrender himſelf again a priſoner to the emperor*.

* Recueil des Trait. tom. ii. 112. Ulloa Vita dell Carlo V. p. 102, &c.

By this treaty, Charles flattered himſelf that he had not only effectually humbled his rival, but that he had taken ſuch precautions as would for ever prevent his re-attaining any formidable degree of power. The opinion, which the wiſeſt politicians formed concerning it, was very different; they could not perſuade themſelves that Francis, after obtaining his liberty, would execute articles againſt which he had ſtruggled ſo long, and to which, notwithſtanding all that he felt during a long and rigorous confinement, he had conſented with the utmoſt reluctance. Ambition and reſentment, they knew, would conſpire in prompting him to violate the hard conditions to which he had been conſtrained to ſubmit; nor would arguments and caſuiſtry be wanting to repreſent that which was ſo manifeſtly advantageous, to be neceſſary and juſt. If one part of Francis's conduct had been known at that time, this opinion might have been founded, not in conjecture, but in certainty. A few hours before he ſigned the treaty, he aſſembled ſuch of his counſellors as were then in Madrid, and having exacted from them a ſolemn oath of ſecrecy, he made a long enumeration in their preſence of the diſhonourable arts, as well as unprincely rigour, which the emperor had employed in order to enſnare or intimidate him. For that reaſon, he took a formal proteſt in the hands of notaries, that his conſent to the treaty ſhould be conſidered as an involuntary deed, and be deemed null and void†. By this diſingenuous artifice for which even the treatment that he had met with was no apology, Francis endeavoured to ſatisfy his honour and conſcience in ſigning the treaty, and to provide at the ſame time a pretext on which to break it.

Great, meanwhile were the outward demonſtrations of love and confidence between the two monarchs; they appeared often together in public; they frequently had long conferences in private; they travelled in the ſame litter, and joined in the ſame amuſements. But amidſt theſe ſigns of peace

† Recueil des Trait. tom. ii. p. 107.

and friendſhip, the emperor ſtill harboured ſuſpicion in his mind. Though the ceremonies of the marriage between Francis and the queen of Portugal were performed ſoon after the concluſion of the treaty, Charles would not permit him to conſummate it until the return of the ratification from France. Even then Francis was not allowed to be at full liberty; his guards were ſtill continued; though careſſed as a brother-in-law, he was ſtill watched like a priſoner; and it was obvious to attentive obſervers, that an union, in the very beginning of which there might be diſcerned ſuch ſymptoms of jealouſy and diſtruſt, could not be cordial, or of long continuance‡.

About a month after the ſigning of the treaty, the regent's ratification of it was brought from France; and that wiſe princeſs, preferring, on this occaſion, the public good to domeſtic affection, informed her ſon, that, inſtead of the twelve noblemen named in the treaty, ſhe had ſent the duke of Orleans along with his brother the dauphin to the frontier, as the kingdom could ſuffer nothing by the abſence of a child, but muſt be left almoſt incapable of defence, if deprived of its ableſt ſtateſmen and moſt experienced generals, whom Charles had artfully included in his nomination. At laſt Francis took leave of the emperor, whoſe ſuſpicion of the king's ſincerity increaſing, as the time of putting it to the proof approached, he endeavoured to bind him ſtill faſter by exacting new promiſes, which, after thoſe he had already made, the French monarch was not ſlow to grant. He ſet out from Madrid, a place which the remembrance of many afflicting circumſtances rendered peculiarly odious to him, with the joy natural on ſuch an occaſion, and began the long-wiſhed-for journey towards his own dominions. He was eſcorted by a body of horſe under the command of Alarçon, who, as the king drew near the frontiers of France, guarded him with more ſcrupulous exactneſs than ever. When he arrived at the river Andaye, which ſeparates the two king-

‡ Guic. l. xvi. 353.

doms, Lautrec appeared on the oppoſite bank with a guard of horſe equal in number to Alarçon's. An empty bark was mooted in the middle of the ſtream; the attendants drew up in order on the oppoſite banks; at the ſame inſtant, Lannoy with eight gentlemen put off from the Spaniſh, and Lautrec with the ſame number from the French ſide of the river; the former had the king in his boat; the latter, the dauphin and duke of Orleans; they met in the empty veſſel; the exchange was made in a moment: Francis, after a ſhort embrace of his children, leaped into Lautrec's boat, and reached the French ſhore. He mounted at that inſtant a Turkiſh horſe, waved his hand over his head, and with a joyful voice crying aloud ſeveral times, "I am yet a king," galloped full ſpeed to St. John de Luz, and from thence to Bayonne. This event, no leſs impatiently deſired by the French nation than by their monarch, happened on the eighteenth of March, a year and twenty-two days after the fatal battle of Pavia*.

Soon after the emperor had taken leave of Francis, and permitted him to begin his journey towards his own dominions, he ſet out for Seville, in order to ſolemnize his marriage with Iſabella, the daughter of Emanuel, the late king of Portugal, and the ſiſter of John III. who had ſucceeded him in the throne of that kingdom. Iſabella was a princeſs of uncommon beauty and accompliſhments; and as the Cortes, both in Caſtile and Aragon, had warmly ſolicited their ſovereign to marry, the choice of a wife, ſo nearly allied to the royal blood of both kingdoms, was extremely acceptable to his ſubjects. The Portugueſe, fond of this new connection with the firſt monarch in Chriſtendom, granted him an extraordinary dowry with Iſabella, amounting to nine hundred thouſand crowns, a ſum which, from the ſituation of his affairs at this juncture, was of no ſmall conſequence to the emperor. The marriage was celebrated [March 12] with that ſplendour and gaiety which became a great and youth-

* Sandov. Hiſt. i. 735. Guic. l. xvi. 355.

ful prince. Charles lived with Iſabella in perfect harmony, and treated her on all occaſions with much diſtinction and regard *.

During theſe tranſactions, Charles could hardly give any attention to the affairs of Germany, though it was torn in pieces by commotions, which threatened the moſt dangerous conſequences. By the feudal inſtitutions, which ſtill ſubſiſted almoſt unimpaired in the empire, the property of lands was veſted in the princes and free barons. Their vaſſals held of them by the ſtricteſt and moſt limited tenures; while the great body of the people was kept in a ſtate but little removed from abſolute ſervitude. In ſome places of Germany, people of the loweſt claſs were ſo entirely in the power of their maſters, as to be ſubject to perſonal and domeſtic ſlavery, the moſt rigorous form of that wretched ſtate. In other provinces, particularly in Bohemia and Luſatia, the peaſants were bound to remain on the lands to which they belonged, and making part of the eſtate, were transferred like any other property from one hand to another. Even in Suabia, and the countries on the banks of the Rhine, where their condition was moſt tolerable, the peaſants not only paid the full rent of their farms to the landlord, but if they choſe either to change the place of their abode, or to follow a new profeſſion, before they could accompliſh what they deſired, they were obliged to purchaſe this privilege at a certain price. Beſides this, all grants of lands to peaſants expired at their death, without deſcending to their poſterity. Upon that event, the landlord had a right to the beſt of their cattle, as well as of their furniture; and their heirs, in order to obtain a renewal of the grant, were obliged to pay large ſums by way of fine. Theſe exactions, though grievous, were born with patience, becauſe they were cuſtomary and ancient: but when the progreſs of elegance and luxury, as well as the changes introduced into the art of war, came

* Ulloa Vita di Carlo V. p. 106. Belcarius Com. Rer. Gallic. p. 565. Spalatinus ap. Struv. Corp. Hiſt. Germ. ii. 1081.

to increaſe the expence of government, and made it neceſſary for princes to levy occaſional or ſtated taxes on their ſubjects, ſuch impoſitions being new, appeared intolerable; and in Germany, theſe duties being laid chiefly upon beer, wine, and other neceſſaries of life, affected the common people in the moſt ſenſible manner. The addition of ſuch a load to their former burdens, drove them to deſpair. It was to the valour inſpired by reſentment againſt impoſitions of this kind that the Swiſs owed the acquiſition of their liberty in the fourteenth century. The ſame cauſe had excited the peaſants in ſeveral other provinces of Germany to rebel againſt their ſuperiors towards the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the ſixteenth centuries: and though theſe inſurrections were not attended with like ſucceſs, they could not, however, be quelled without much difficulty and bloodſhed †.

By theſe checks, the ſpirit of the peaſants was overawed rather than ſubdued; and their grievances multiplying continually, they ran to arms, in the year one thouſand five hundred and twenty ſix, with the moſt frantic rage. Their firſt appearance was near Ulm in Suabia. The peaſants in the adjacent country flocked to their ſtandard with the ardour and impatience natural to men, who having groaned long under oppreſſion, beheld at laſt ſome proſpect of deliverance; and the contagion ſpreading from province to province, reached almoſt every part of Germany. Wherever they came, they plundered the monaſteries; waſted the lands of their ſuperiors; razed their caſtles, and maſſacred without mercy all perſons of noble birth, who were ſo unhappy as to fall into their hands *. Having intimidated their oppreſſors, as they imagined, by the violence of theſe proceedings, they began to conſider what would be the moſt proper and effectual method of ſecuring themſelves for the future from their

† Seckend. lib. ii. p. 2, 6.

* Petr. Crinitus de bello Ruſticano, ap. Freher. Script. Rer. Germ. Argent. 1717, vol. iii. p. 243.

tyrannical exactions. With this view, they drew up and publiſhed a memorial, containing all their demands, and declared, that while arms were in their hands, they would either perſuade or oblige the nobles to give them full ſatisfaction with regard to theſe. The chief articles were, that they might have liberty to chooſe their own paſtors; that they might be freed from the payment of all tithes except thoſe of corn; that they might no longer be conſidered as the ſlaves or bondmen of their ſuperiors; that the liberty of hunting and fiſhing might be common; that the great foreſts might not be regarded as private property, but be open for the uſe of all; that they might be delivered from the unuſual burden of taxes under which they laboured; that the adminiſtration of juſtice might be rendered leſs rigorous and more impartial; that the encroachments of the nobles upon meadows and commons might be reſtrained*.

Many of theſe demands were extremely reaſonable; and being urged by ſuch formidable numbers, ſhould have met with ſome redreſs. But thoſe unwieldy bodies, aſſembled in different places, had neither union, nor conduct, nor vigour. Being led by perſons of the loweſt rank, without ſkill in war, or knowledge of what was neceſſary for accompliſhing their deſigns; all their exploits were diſtinguiſhed only by a brutal and unmeaning fury. To oppoſe this, the princes and nobles of Suabia, and the Lower Rhine raiſed ſuch of their vaſſals as ſtill continued faithful, and attacking ſome of the mutineers with open force, and others by ſurpriſe, cut to pieces or diſperſed all who infeſted thoſe provinces; ſo that the peaſants after ruining the open country, and loſing upwards of twenty thouſand of their aſſociates in the field, were obliged to return to their habitations with leſs hope than ever of relief from their grievances†.

Theſe commotions happened at firſt in provinces of Ger-

* Sleid. Hiſt. p. 90.

† Seckend. lib. ii. p. 10. Petr. Gnodalius de Ruſticanorum Tumultu in Germania, Scard. ap. Script. vol. ii. p. 131, &c.

many where Luther's opinions had made little progreſs; and being excited wholly by political cauſes, had no connection with the diſputed points in religion. But the frenzy reaching at laſt thoſe countries in which the reformation was eſtabliſhed, derived new ſtrength from circumſtances peculiar to them, and roſe to a ſtill greater pitch of extravagance. The reformation wherever it was received, increaſed that bold and innovating ſpirit to which it owed its birth. Men who had the courage to overturn a ſyſtem ſupported by every thing which can command reſpect or reverence, were not to be overawed by any authority, how great or venerable ſoever. After having been accuſtomed to conſider themſelves as judges of the moſt important doctrines in religion, to examine theſe freely, and to reject, without ſcruple, what appeared to them erroneous, it was natural for them to turn the ſame daring and inquiſitive eye towards government, and to think of rectifying whatever diſorders or imperfections were diſcovered there. As religious abuſes had been reformed in ſeveral places without the permiſſion of the magiſtrate, it was an eaſy tranſition to attempt the redreſs of political grievances in the ſame manner.

No ſooner, then, did the ſpirit of revolt break out in Thuringia, a province ſubject to the elector of Saxony, the inhabitants of which were moſtly converts to Lutheraniſm, than it aſſumed a new and more dangerous form. Thomas Muncer, one of Luther's diſciples, having eſtabliſhed himſelf in that country, had acquired a wonderful aſcendant over the minds of the people. He propagated among them the wildeſt and moſt enthuſiaſtic notions, but ſuch as tended manifeſtly to inſpire them with boldneſs, and lead them to ſedition. "Luther, he told them, had done more hurt than ſervice to religion. He had, indeed, reſcued the church from the yoke of popery, but his doctrines encouraged, and his life ſet an example of, the utmoſt licentiouſneſs of manners. In order to avoid vice, (ſays he,) men muſt practiſe perpetual mortification. They muſt put on a grave coun-

tenance, ſpeak little, wear a plain garb, and be ſerious in their whole deportment. Such as prepare their hearts in this manner, may expect that the Supreme Being will direct all their ſteps, and by ſome viſible ſign diſcover his will to them; if that illumination be at any time withheld, we may expoſtulate with the Almighty, who deals with us ſo harſhly, and remind him of his promiſes. This expoſtulation and anger will be highly acceptable to God, and will at laſt prevail on him to guide us with the ſame unerring hand which conducted the patriarchs of old. Let us beware, however, of offending him by our arrogance; but as all men are equal in his eye, let them return to that condition of equality in which he formed them, and having all things in common, let them live together like brethren, without any marks of ſubordination or pre-eminence†."

Extravagant as theſe tenets were, they flattered ſo many paſſions in the human heart, as to make a deep impreſſion. To aim at nothing more than abridging the power of the nobility, was now conſidered as a trifling and partial reformation, not worth the contending for; it was propoſed to level every diſtinction among mankind, and by aboliſhing property, to reduce them to their natural ſtate of equality, in which all ſhould receive their ſubſiſtence from one common ſtock. Muncer aſſured them, that the deſign was approved of by Heaven, and that the Almighty had in a dream aſcertained him of its ſucceſs. The peaſants ſet about the execution of it, not only with the rage which animated thoſe of their order in other parts of Germany, but with the ardour which enthuſiaſm inſpires. They depoſed the magiſtrates in all the cities of which they were maſters, ſeized the lands of the nobles, and obliged ſuch of them as they got into their hands to put on the dreſs commonly worn by peaſants, and inſtead of their former titles, to be ſatisfied with the appellation given to people in the loweſt claſs of life. Great numbers engaged in this wild undertaking; but Muncer,

† Seckend. lib. ii. p. 13. Sleid. Hiſt. p. 83.

their leader and their prophet, was deſtitute of the abilities neceſſary for conducting it. He had all the extravagance, but not the courage, which enthuſiaſts uſually poſſeſs. It was with difficulty he could be perſuaded to take the field; and though he ſoon drew together eight thouſand men, he ſuffered himſelf to be ſurrounded by a body of cavalry, under the command of the elector of Saxony, the landgrave of Heſſe, and duke of Brunſwick. Theſe princes, unwilling to ſhed the blood of their deluded ſubjects, ſent a young nobleman to their camp, with the offer of a general pardon, if they would immediately lay down their arms, and deliver up the authors of the ſedition. Muncer, alarmed at this, began to harangue his followers with his uſual vehemence, exhorting them not to truſt theſe deceitful promiſes of their oppreſſors, nor to deſert the cauſe of God, and of Chriſtian liberty.

But the ſenſe of preſent danger making a deeper impreſſion on the peaſants than his eloquence, confuſion and terror were viſible in every face, when a rainbow, which was the emblem that the mutineers had painted on their colours, happening to appear in the clouds, Muncer, with admirable preſence of mind, laid hold of that incident, and ſuddenly raiſing his eyes and hands towards heaven, "Behold," cries he, with an elevated voice, "the ſign which God has given. There is the pledge of your ſafety, and a token that the wicked ſhall be deſtroyed." The fanatical multitude ſet up inſtantly a great ſhout, as if victory had been certain; and paſſing in a moment from one extreme to another, maſſacred the unfortunate nobleman who had come with the offer of pardon, and demanded to be led towards the enemy. The princes, enraged at this ſhocking violation of the laws of war, advanced with no leſs impetuoſity, and began the attack [May 15]; but the behaviour of the peaſants in the combat was not ſuch as might have been expected either from their ferocity or confidence of ſucceſs; an undiſciplined rabble was no equal match for well-trained troops; above five thouſand were ſlain in the field, almoſt without making re-

ſiſtance; the reſt fled, and among the foremoſt Muncer their general. He was taken next day, and being condemned to ſuch puniſhments as his crimes had deſerved, he ſuffered them with a poor and daſtardly ſpirit. His death put an end to the inſurrections of the peaſants, which had filled Germany with ſuch terror*; but the enthuſiaſtic notions which he had ſcattered were not extirpated, and produced, not long after, effects more memorable, as well as more extravagant.

During theſe commotions, Luther acted with exemplary prudence and moderation; like a common parent, ſolicitous about the welfare of both parties, without ſparing the faults or errors of either. On the one hand, he addreſſed a monitory diſcourſe to the nobles, exhorting them to treat their dependents with greater humanity and indulgence. On the other, he ſeverely cenſured the ſeditious ſpirit of the peaſants, adviſing them not to murmur at hardſhips inſeparable from their condition, nor to ſeek for redreſs by any but legal means †.

Luther's famous marriage with Catharine a Boria, a nun of a noble family, who, having thrown off the veil, had fled from the cloiſter, happened this year, and was far from meeting with the ſame approbation. Even his moſt devoted followers thought this ſtep indecent, at a time when his country was involved in ſo many calamities; while his enemies never mentioned it with any ſofter appellation than that of inceſtuous or profane. Luther himſelf was ſenſible of the impreſſion which it had made to his diſadvantage; but being ſatisfied with his own conduct, he bore the cenſure of his friends, and the reproaches of his adverſaries, with his uſual fortitude §.

This year the reformation loſt its firſt protector, Frederic, elector of Saxony; but the blow was the leſs ſenſibly felt, as he was ſucceeded by his brother John [May 5], a more

* Sleid. Hiſt. p. 84. Seckend. lib. ii. p. 12. Gnodalius Tumult. Ruſtican. 155.

† Sleid. Hiſt. p. 87. § Seckend. lib. ii. p. 15.

avowed and zealous, though leſs able patron of Luther and his doctrines.

Another event happened about the ſame time, which, as it occaſioned a conſiderable change in the ſtate of Germany, muſt be traced back to its ſource. While the frenzy of the Cruſades poſſeſſed all Europe during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, ſeveral orders of religious knighthood were founded in defence of the Chriſtian faith againſt heathens and infidels. Among theſe the Teutonic order in Germany was one of the moſt illuſtrious, the knights of which diſtinguiſhed themſelves greatly in all the enterpriſes carried on in the Holy Land. Being driven at laſt from their ſettlements in the eaſt, they were obliged to return to their native country. Their zeal and valour were too impetuous to remain long inactive. They invaded, on very ſlight pretences, the province of Pruſſia, the inhabitants of which were ſtill idolaters; and having completed the conqueſt of it about the middle of the thirteenth century, held it many years as a fief depending on the crown of Poland. Fierce conteſts aroſe during this period, between the grand maſters of the order and the kings of Poland; the former ſtruggling for independence, while the latter aſſerted their right of ſovereignty with great firmneſs. Albert, a prince of the houſe of Brandenburgh, who was elected grand maſter in the year one thouſand five hundred and eleven, engaging keenly in this quarrel, maintained a long war with Sigiſmund king of Poland; but having become an early convert to Luther's doctrines, this gradually leſſened his zeal for the intereſts of his fraternity, ſo that he took the opportunity of the confuſions in the empire, and the abſence of the emperor, to conclude a treaty with Sigiſmund, greatly to his own private emolument. By it, that part of Pruſſia which belonged to the Teutonic order, was erected into a ſecular and hereditary dutchy, and the inveſtiture of it granted to Albert, who, in return, bound himſelf to do homage for it to the kings of Poland as their vaſſal. Immediately after this he

made public profeſſion of the reformed religion, and married a princeſs of Denmark. The Teutonic knights exclaimed ſo loudly againſt the treachery of their grand maſter, that he was put under the ban of the empire; but he ſtill kept poſſeſſion of the province which he had uſurped, and tranſmitted it to his poſterity. In proceſs of time, this rich inheritance fell to the electoral branch of the family, all dependence on the crown of Poland was ſhaken off, and the margraves of Brandenburgh, having aſſumed the title of kings of Pruſſia, have not only riſen to an equality with the firſt princes in Germany, but take their rank among the great monarchs of Europe*.

Upon the return of the French king to his dominions, the eyes of all the powers in Europe were fixed upon him, that, by obſerving his firſt motions, they might form a judgment concerning his ſubſequent conduct. They were not held long in ſuſpence. Francis, as ſoon as he arrived at Bayonne, wrote to the king of England, thanking him for the zeal and affection wherewith he had interpoſed in his favour, to which he acknowledged that he owed the recovery of his liberty. Next day the emperor's ambaſſadors demanded audience, and, in their maſter's name, required him to iſſue ſuch orders as were neceſſary for carrying the treaty of Madrid into immediate and full execution; he coldly anſwered, that though, for his own part, he determined religiouſly to perform all that he had promiſed, the treaty contained ſo many articles relative not to himſelf alone, but affecting the intereſts of the French monarchy, that he could not take any farther ſtep without conſulting the ſtates of his kingdom, and that ſome time would be neceſſary, in order to reconcile their minds to the hard conditions which he had conſented to ratify†. This reply was conſidered as no obſcure diſcovery of his being reſolved to elude the treaty; and the com-

* Sleid. Hiſt. p. 98. Pfeffel Abregé de l'Hiſt. de Droit Publ. p. 605, &c.

† Mem. de Bellay, p. 97.

pliment paid to Henry appeared a very proper ſtep towards ſecuring the aſſiſtance of that monarch in the war with the emperor, to which ſuch a reſolution would certainly give riſe. Theſe circumſtances, added to the explicit declarations which Francis made in ſecret to the ambaſſadors from ſeveral of the Italian powers, fully ſatisfied them that their conjectures with regard to his conduct had been juſt, and that, inſtead of intending to execute an unreaſonable treaty, he was eager to ſeize the firſt opportunity of revenging thoſe injuries which had compelled him to feign an approbation of it. Even the doubts, and fears, and ſcruples, which uſed, on other occaſions, to hold Clement in a ſtate of uncertainty, were diſſipated by Francis's ſeeming impatience to break through all his engagements with the emperor. The ſituation, indeed, of affairs in Italy at that time, did not allow the pope to heſitate long. Sforza was ſtill beſieged by the Imperialiſts in the caſtle of Milan. That feeble prince, deprived now of Moronè's advice, and unprovided with every thing neceſſary for defence, found means to inform Clement and the Venetians, that he muſt ſoon ſurrender if they did not come to his relief. The Imperial troops, as they had received no pay ſince the battle of Pavia, lived at diſcretion in the Milaneſe, levying ſuch exorbitant contributions in that dutchy, as amounted, if we may rely on Guicciardini's calculation, to no leſs a ſum than five thouſand ducats a-day*; nor was it to be doubted but that the ſoldiers, as ſoon as the caſtle ſhould ſubmit, would chooſe to leave a ruined country which hardly afforded them ſubſiſtence, that they might take poſſeſſion of more comfortable quarters in the fertile and untouched territories of the pope and Venetians. The aſſiſtance of the French king was the only thing which could either ſave Sforza, or enable them to protect their own dominions from the inſults of the Imperial troops.

For theſe reaſons, the pope, the Venetians, and duke of Milan, were equally impatient to come to an agreement with

* Guic. l. xvii. 360.

Francis, who, on his part, was no leſs deſirous of acquiring ſuch a conſiderable acceſſion both of ſtrength and reputation as ſuch a confederacy would bring along with it. The chief objects of this alliance, which was concluded at Cognac on the twenty-ſecond of May, though kept ſecret for ſome time, were to oblige the emperor to ſet at liberty the French king's ſons, upon payment of a reaſonable ranſom; and to re-eſtabliſh Sforza in the quiet poſſeſſion of the Milaneſe. If Charles ſhould refuſe either of theſe, the contracting parties bound themſelves to bring into the field an army of thirty-five thouſand men, with which, after driving the Spaniards out of the Milaneſe, they would attack the kingdom of Naples. The king of England was declared protector of this league, which they dignified with the name of *Holy*, becauſe the pope was at the head of it; and in order to allure Henry more effectually, a principality in the kingdom of Naples, of thirty thouſand ducats yearly revenue, was to be ſettled on him; and lands to the value of ten thouſand ducats on Wolſey his favourite*.

No ſooner was this league concluded, than Clement, by the plenitude of his papal power, abſolved Francis from the oath which he had taken to obſerve the treaty of Madrid†. This right, how pernicious ſoever in its effects, and deſtructive of that integrity which is the baſis of all tranſactions among men, was the natural conſequences of the powers which the popes arrogated as the infallible vicegerents of Chriſt upon earth. But as, in virtue of this pretended prerogative, they had often diſpenſed with obligations which were held ſacred, the intereſt of ſome men, and the credulity of others, led them to imagine, that the deciſions of a ſovereign pontiff authoriſed or juſtified actions which would, otherwiſe, have been criminal and impious.

The diſcovery of Francis's intention to elude the treaty

* P. Heuter. Rer. Auſtr. lib. ix. c. 3. p. 217. Recueil des Trait. ii. 124.

† Goldaſt. Polit. Imperial. p. 1002. Pallav. Hiſt. p. 70.

of Madrid, filled the emperor with a variety of diſquieting thoughts. He had treated an unfortunate prince in the moſt ungenerous manner; he had diſplayed an inſatiable ambition in all his negotiations with his priſoner; he knew what cenſures the former had drawn upon him, and what apprehenſions the latter had excited in every court of Europe; nor had he reaped from the meaſures which he purſued, any of thoſe advantages which politicians are apt to conſider as an excuſe for the moſt criminal conduct, and a compenſation for the ſevereſt reproaches. Francis was now out of his hands, and not one of all the mighty conſequences, which he had expected from the treaty that ſet him at liberty, was likely to take place. His raſhneſs in relying ſo far on his own judgment as to truſt to the ſincerity of the French king, in oppoſition to the ſentiments of his wiſeſt miniſters, was now apparent; and he eaſily conjectured, that the ſame confederacy, the dread of which had induced him to ſet Francis at liberty, would now be formed againſt him with that gallant and incenſed monarch at its head. Self-condemnation and ſhame, on account of what was paſt, with anxious apprehenſions concerning what might happen, were the neceſſary reſult of theſe reflections on his own conduct and ſituation. Charles, however, was naturally firm and inflexible in all his meaſures. To have receded ſuddenly from any article in the treaty of Madrid, would have been a plain confeſſion of imprudence, and a palpable ſymptom of fear; he determined, therefore, that it was moſt ſuitable to his dignity, to inſiſt, whatever might be the conſequences, on the ſtrict execution of the treaty, and particularly not to accept of any thing which might be offered as an equivalent for the reſtitution of Burgundy*.

In conſequence of this reſolution, he appointed Lannoy and Alarçon to repair, as his ambaſſadors, to the court of France, and formally to ſummon the king, either to execute the treaty with the ſincerity that became him, or to return

* Guic. l. xvii. 366.

according to his oath, a priſoner to Madrid. Inſtead of giving them an immediate anſwer, Francis admitted the deputies of the ſtates of Burgundy to an audience in their preſence. They humbly repreſented to him, that he had exceeded the powers veſted in a king of France, when he conſented to alienate their country from the crown, the domains of which he was bound by his coronation oath to preſerve entire and unimpaired. Francis, in return thanked them for their attachment to his crown, and intreated them, though very faintly, to remember the obligations which he lay under to fulfil his engagements with the emperor. The deputies, aſſuming an higher tone, declared, that they would not obey commands which they conſidered as illegal; and, if he ſhould abandon them to the enemies of France, they had reſolved to defend themſelves to the beſt of their power, with a firm purpoſe rather to periſh than ſubmit to a foreign dominion. Upon which Francis, turning towards the Imperial ambaſſadors, repreſented to them the impoſſibility of performing what he had undertaken, and offered, in lieu of Burgundy, to pay the emperor two millions of crowns. The viceroy and Alarçon, who eaſily perceived, that the ſcene to which they had been witneſſes, was concerted between the king and his ſubjects in order to impoſe upon them, ſignified to him their maſter's fixed reſolution not to depart in the ſmalleſt point from the terms of the treaty, and withdrew †. Before they left the kingdom, they had the mortification to hear the holy league againſt the emperor publiſhed with great ſolemnity [June 11].

Charles no ſooner received an account of this confederacy than he exclaimed, in the moſt public manner, and in the harſheſt terms, againſt Francis, as a prince void of faith and of honour. He complained no leſs of Clement, whom he ſolicited in vain to abandon his new allies; he accuſed him of ingratitude; he taxed him with an ambition unbecoming his character; he threatened him not only with all the ven-

† Belcar. Comment. de Reb. Gal. 573. Mem. de Bellay, 97.

geance which the power of an emperor can inflict, but, by appealing to a general council, called up before his eyes all the terrors ariſing from the authority of thoſe aſſemblies ſo formidable to the papal ſee. It was neceſſary, however, to oppoſe ſomething elſe than reproaches and threats to the powerful combination formed againſt him; and the emperor, prompted by ſo many paſſions, did not fail to exert himſelf with unuſual vigour, in order to ſend ſupplies, not only of men, but of money, which were ſtill more needed, into Italy.

On the other hand, the efforts of the confederates bore no proportion to that animoſity againſt the emperor, with which they ſeemed to enter into the holy league. Francis, it was thought, would have infuſed ſpirit and vigour into the whole body. He had his loſt honour to repair, many injuries to revenge, and the ſtation among the princes of Europe, from which he had fallen, to recover. From all theſe powerful incitements, added to the natural impetuoſity of his temper, a war more fierce and bloody than any that he had hitherto made upon his rival, was expected. But Francis had gone through ſuch a ſcene of diſtreſs, and the impreſſion it had made was ſtill ſo freſh in his memory, that he was become diffident of himſelf, diſtruſtful of fortune, and deſirous of tranquillity. To procure the releaſe of his ſons, and to avoid the reſtitution of Burgundy by paying ſome reaſonable equivalent, were his chiefs objects; and for the ſake of theſe, he would willingly have ſacrificed Sforza, and the liberties of Italy, to the emperor. He flattered himſelf, that the dread of the confederacy which he had formed would of itſelf induce Charles to liſten to what was equitable; and was afraid of employing any conſiderable force for the relief of the Milaneſe, leſt his allies, whom he had often found to be more attentive to their own intereſt than punctual in fulfilling their engagements, ſhould abandon him as ſoon as the Imperialiſts, were driven out of that country, and deprive his negotiations with the emperor of that

weight, which they derived from his being at the head of a powerful league. In the mean time the caſtle of Milan was preſſed more cloſely than ever, and Sforza was now reduced to the laſt extremity. The pope and Venetians, truſting to Francis's concurrence, commanded their troops to take the field, in order to relieve him; and an army more than ſufficient for that ſervice was ſoon formed. The Milaneſe, paſſionately attached to their unfortunate duke, and no leſs exaſperated againſt the Imperialiſts, who had oppreſſed them ſo cruelly, were ready to aid the confederates in all their enterpriſes. But the duke d'Urbino, their general, naturally ſlow and indeciſive, and reſtrained, beſides, by his ancient enmity to the family of Medici, from taking any ſtep that might aggrandize or add reputation to the pope *, loſt ſome opportunities of attacking the Imperialiſts and raiſing the ſiege, and refuſed to improve others. Theſe delays gave Bourbon time to bring up a reinforcement of freſh troops and a ſupply of money. He immediately took the command of the army [July 24], and puſhed on the ſiege with ſuch vigour, as quickly obliged Sforza to ſurrender, who retiring to Lodi, which the confederates had ſurpriſed, left Bourbon in full poſſeſſion of the reſt of the dutchy, the inveſtiture of which the emperor had promiſed to grant him †.

The Italians began now to perceive the game which Francis had played, and to be ſenſible that, notwithſtanding all their addreſs, and refinements in negotiation, which they boaſted of as talents peculiarly their own, they had for once been over-reached in thoſe very arts by a *tramontane* prince. He had hitherto thrown almoſt the whole burden of the war upon them, taking advantage of their efforts, in order to enforce the propoſals which he often renewed at the court of Madrid for obtaining the liberty of his ſons. The pope and Venetians expoſtulated and complained ‡; but as

* Guic. lib. xvii. 382. † Ibid. 376, &c.
‡ Ruſcelli Lettere de Principi, ii. 157, &c. 159, 160—166.

they were not able to rouſe Francis from his inactivity, their own zeal and vigour gradually abated, and Clement, having already gone farther than his timidity uſually permitted him, began to accuſe himſelf of raſhneſs, and to relapſe into his natural ſtate of doubt and uncertainty.

All the emperor's motions depending on himſelf alone, were more briſk and better concerted. The narrowneſs of his revenues, indeed, did not allow him to make any ſudden or great effort in the field, but he abundantly ſupplied that defect by his intrigues and negotiations. The family of Colonna, the moſt powerful of all the Roman barons, had adhered uniformly to the Ghibeline or Imperial faction, during thoſe fierce contentions between the popes and emperors, which, for ſeveral ages, filled Italy and Germany with diſcord and bloodſhed. Though the cauſes which at firſt gave birth to theſe deſtructive factions exiſted no longer, and the rage with which they had been animated was in a great meaſure ſpent, the Colonnas ſtill retained their attachment to the Imperial intereſt, and by placing themſelves under the protection of the emperors, ſecured the quiet poſſeſſion of their own territories and privileges. The cardinal Pompeo Colonna, a man of a turbulent and ambitious temper, at that time the head of the family, had long been Clement's rival, to whoſe influence in the laſt conclave he imputed the diſappointment of all his ſchemes for attaining the papal dignity, of which, from his known connection with the emperor, he thought himſelf ſecure. To an aſpiring mind, this was an injury too great to be forgiven; and though he had diſſembled his reſentment ſo far as to vote for Clement at his election, and to accept of great offices in his court, he waited with the utmoſt impatience for an opportunity of being revenged. Don Hugo de Moncada, the Imperial ambaſſador at Rome, who was no ſtranger to theſe ſentiments, eaſily perſuaded him, that now was the time, while all the papal troops were employed in Lombardy, to attempt ſomething, which would at once revenge his own wrongs, and be of

eſſential ſervice to the emperor his patron. The pope, however, whoſe timidity rendered him quick-ſighted, was ſo attentive to the operations, and began to be alarmed ſo early, that he might have drawn together troops ſufficient to have diſconcerted all Colonna's meaſures. But Moncada amuſed him ſo artfully with negotiations, promiſes, and falſe intelligence, that he lulled aſleep all his ſuſpicions, and prevented his taking any of the precautions neceſſary for his ſafety; and to the diſgrace of a prince poſſeſſed of great power, as well as renowned for political wiſdom, Colonna at the head of three thouſand men, ſeized one of the gates of his capital, while he, imagining himſelf to be in perfect ſecurity, was altogether unprepared for reſiſting ſuch a feeble enemy. The inhabitants of Rome permitted Colonna's troops, from whom they apprehended no injury, to advance without oppoſition [Sept. 29]; the pope's guards were diſperſed in a moment; and Clement himſelf, terrified at the danger, aſhamed of his own credulity, and deſerted by almoſt every perſon, fled with precipitation into the caſtle of St. Angelo, which was immediately inveſted. The palace of the Vatican, the church of St. Peter, and the houſes of the pope's miniſters and ſervants, were plundered in the moſt licentious manner; the reſt of the city was left unmoleſted. Clement, deſtitute of every thing neceſſary either for ſubſiſtence or defence, was ſoon obliged to demand a capitulation; and Moncada, being admitted into the caſtle, preſcribed to him, with all the haughtineſs of a conqueror, conditions which it was not in his power to reject. The chief of theſe was, That Clement ſhould not only grant a full pardon to the Colonnas, but receive them into favour, and immediately withdraw all the troops in his pay from the army of the confederates in Lombardy †.

The Colonnas, who talked of nothing leſs than of depoſing Clement, and of placing Pompeo, their kinſman, in the

† Jovii Vita Pomp. Colon. Guic. l. xvii. 407. Ruſcelli Lettere de Principi, i. p. 104.

vacant chair of St. Peter, exclaimed loudly againſt a treaty which left them at the mercy of a pontiff juſtly incenſed againſt them. But Moncada, attentive only to his maſter's intereſt, paid little regard to their complaints, and, by this fortunate meaſure, broke entirely the power of the confederates.

While the army of the confederates ſuffered ſuch a conſiderable diminution, the Imperialiſts received two great reinforcements; one from Spain, under the command of Lannoy and Alarçon, which amounted to ſix thouſand men; the other was raiſed in the empire by George Fronſperg, a German nobleman, who having ſerved in Italy with great reputation, had acquired ſuch influence and popularity, that multitudes of his countrymen, fond on every occaſion of engaging in military enterpriſes, and impatient at that juncture to eſcape from the oppreſſion which they felt in religious as well as civil matters, crowded to his ſtandard; ſo that, without any other gratuity than the payment of a crown to each man, fourteen thouſand enliſted in his ſervice. To theſe the archduke Ferdinand added two thouſand horſe, levied in the Auſtrian dominions. But although the emperor had raiſed troops, he could not remit the ſums neceſſary for their ſupport. His ordinary revenues were exhauſted, the credit of princes, during the infancy of commerce, was not extenſive; and the Cortes of Caſtile, though every art had been tried to gain them, and ſome innovations had been made in the conſtitution, in order to ſecure their concurrence, peremptorily refuſed to grant Charles any extraordinary ſupply*; ſo that the more his army increaſed in number, the more were his generals embarraſſed and diſtreſſed. Bourbon, in particular, was involved in ſuch difficulties, that he ſtood in need of all his addreſs and courage in order to extricate himſelf. Large ſums were due to the Spaniſh troops already in the Milaneſe, when Fronſperg arrived with ſixteen thouſand hungry Germans, deſtitute of every thing.

* Sandov. i. 814.

Both made their demands with equal fierceneſs; the former claiming their arrears, and the latter, the pay which had been promiſed them on their entering Lombardy. Bourbon was altogether incapable of giving ſatisfaction to either. In this ſituation, he was conſtrained to commit acts of violence extremely ſhocking to his own nature, which was generous and humane. He ſeized the principal citizens of Milan, and by threats, and even by torture, forced from them a conſiderable ſum; he rifled the churches of all their plate and ornaments; the inadequate ſupply which theſe afforded, he diſtributed among the ſoldiers, with ſo many ſoothing expreſſions of his ſympathy and affection, that, though it fell far ſhort of the ſums due to them, it appeaſed their preſent murmurs †.

Among other expedients for raiſing money, Bourbon granted his life and liberty to Moronè, who having been kept in priſon ſince his intrigue with Peſcara, had been condemned to die by the Spaniſh judges empowered to try him. For this remiſſion he paid twenty thouſand ducats; and ſuch were his ſingular talents, and the wonderful aſcendant which he always acquired over the minds of thoſe to whom he had acceſs, that in a few days, from being Bourbon's priſoner, he became his prime confident, with whom he conſulted in all affairs of importance. To his inſinuations muſt be imputed the ſuſpicions which Bourbon began to entertain, that the emperor had never intended to grant him the inveſtiture of Milan, but had appointed Leyva, and the other Spaniſh generals, rather to be ſpies on his conduct, than to co-operate heartily towards the execution of his ſchemes. To him likewiſe, as he ſtill retained, at the age of fourſcore, all the enterpriſing ſpirit of youth, may be attributed the bold and unexpected meaſure on which Bourbon ſoon after ventured ‡.

Such, indeed, were the exigencies of the Imperial troops

† Ripamond. Hiſt. Mediol. lib. ix. p. 717.
‡ Guic. l. xvii. 419.

in the Milaneſe, that it became indiſpenſably neceſſary to take ſome immediate ſtep for their relief. The arrears of the ſoldiers increaſed daily; the emperor made no remittances to his generals; and the utmoſt rigour of military extortion could draw nothing more from a country entirely drained and ruined. In this ſituation there was no choice left, but either to diſband the army, or to march for ſubſiſtence into the enemy's country. The territories of the Venetians lay neareſt at hand; but they, with their uſual foreſight and prudence, had taken ſuch precautions as ſecured them from any inſult. Nothing, therefore, remained but to invade the dominions of the church, or of the Florentines; and Clement had of late acted ſuch a part as merited the ſevereſt vengeance from the emperor. No ſooner did the papal troops return to Rome, after the inſurrection of the Colonnas, than, without, paying any regard to the treaty with Moncada, he degraded the cardinal Colonna, excommunicated the reſt of the family, ſeized their places of ſtrength, and waſted their lands with all the cruelty which the ſmart of a recent injury naturally excites. After this, he turned his arms againſt Naples, and, as his operations were ſeconded by the French fleet, he made ſome progreſs towards the conqueſt of that kingdom; the viceroy being no leſs deſtitute than the other Imperial generals of the money requiſite for a vigorous defence *.

1527.] Theſe proceedings of the pope juſtified, in appearance, the meaſures which Bourbon's ſituation rendered neceſſary; and he ſet about executing them under ſuch diſadvantages, as furniſhed the ſtrongeſt proof both of the deſpair to which he was reduced, and of the greatneſs of his abilities which were able to ſurmount ſo many obſtacles. Having committed the government of Milan to Leyva, whom he was not unwilling to leave behind, he began his march in the depth of winter [Jan. 30,] at the head of twenty-five thouſand men, compoſed of nations differing

* Jovii Vita Pomp. Colon. Guic. l. xviii. 424.

from each other in language and manners; without money, without magazines, without artillery, without carriages; in ſhort, without any of thoſe things which are neceſſary to the ſmalleſt party, and which ſeem eſſential to the exiſtence and motions of a great army. His route lay through a country cut by rivers and mountains, in which the roads were almoſt impracticable; as an addition to his difficulties, the enemy's army, ſuperior to his own in number, was at hand to watch all his motions, and to improve every advantage. But his troops, impatient of their preſent hardſhips, and allured by the hopes of immenſe booty, without conſidering how ill provided they were for a march, followed him with great cheerfulneſs. His firſt ſcheme was to have made himſelf maſter of Placentia, and to have gratified his ſoldiers with the plunder of that city; but the vigilance of the confederate generals rendered the deſign abortive; nor had he better ſucceſs in his project for the reduction of Bologna, which was ſeaſonably ſupplied with as many troops as ſecured it from the inſults of an army which had neither artillery nor ammunition. Having failed in both theſe attempts to become maſter of ſome great city, he was under a neceſſity of advancing. But he had now been two months in the field; his troops had ſuffered every calamity that a long march, together with the uncommon rigour of the ſeaſon, could bring upon men deſtitute of all neceſſary accommodations in an enemy's country; the magnificent promiſes to which they truſted, had hitherto proved altogether vain; they ſaw no proſpect of relief; their patience, tried to the utmoſt, failed at laſt, and they broke out into open mutiny. Some officers, who raſhly attempted to reſtrain them, fell victims to their fury; Bourbon himſelf, not daring to appear during the firſt tranſports of their rage, was obliged to fly ſecretly from his quarters*. But this ſudden ebullition of wrath began at laſt to ſubſide; when Bourbon, who poſſeſſed in a wonderful degree the art of governing the minds of

* Guic. l. xviii. 434. Jovii Vit. Colon. 163.

ſoldiers, renewed his promiſes with more confidence than formerly, and aſſured them that they would be ſoon accompliſhed. He endeavoured to render their hardſhips more tolerable, by partaking of them himſelf; he fared no better than the meaneſt centinel; he marched along with them on foot; he joined them in ſinging their camp ballads, in which, with high praiſes of his valour, they mingled many ſtrokes of military raillery on his poverty; and wherever they came, he allowed them, as a foretaſte of what he had promiſed, to plunder the adjacent villages at diſcretion. Encouraged by all theſe ſoothing arts, they entirely forgot their ſufferings and complaints, and followed him with the ſame implicit confidence as formerly †.

Bourbon, meanwhile, carefully concealed his intentions. Rome and Florence, not knowing on which the blow would fall, were held in the moſt diſquieting ſtate of ſuſpence. Clement, equally ſolicitous for the ſafety of both, fluctuated in more than his uſual uncertainty; and while the rapid approach of danger called for prompt and deciſive meaſures, he ſpent the time in deliberations which came to no iſſue, or in taking reſolutions, which, next day, his reſtleſs mind, more ſagacious in diſcerning than in obviating difficulties, overturned, without being able to fix on what ſhould be ſubſtituted in their place. At one time he determined to unite himſelf more cloſely than ever with his allies, and to puſh on the war with vigour; at another, he inclined to bring all differences to a final accommodation by a treaty with Lannoy, who, knowing his paſſion for negotiation, ſolicited him inceſſantly with propoſals for that purpoſe. His timidity at length prevailed, and led him to conclude an agreement with Lannoy [Mar. 15,] of which the following were the chief articles: That a ſuſpenſion of arms ſhould take place between the Pontifical and Imperial troops for eight months; That Clement ſhould advance ſixty thouſand crowns towards ſatisfying the demands of the Imperi-

† Oeuvres de Brant. vol. iv. p. 246, &c.

al army; That the Colonnas ſhould be abſolved from cenſure, and their former dignities and poſſeſſions be reſtored to them; That the viceroy ſhould come to Rome, and prevent Bourbon from approaching nearer to that city, or to Florence*. On this haſty treaty, which deprived him of all hopes of aſſiſtance from his allies, without affording him any ſolid foundation of ſecurity, Clement relied ſo firmly, that, like a man extricated at once out of all difficulties, he was at perfect eaſe, and in the fulneſs of his confidence diſbanded all his troops, except as many as were ſufficient to guard his own perſon. This amazing confidence of Clement's, who on every other occaſion was fearful and ſuſpicious to exceſs, appeared ſo unaccountable to Guicciardini, who, being at that time the pontifical commiſſary-general and reſident in the confederate army, had great opportunities, as well as great abilities, for obſerving how chimerical all his hopes were, that he imputes the pope's conduct, at this juncture, wholly to infatuation, which thoſe who are doomed to ruin cannot avoid†.

Lannoy, it would ſeem, intended to have executed the treaty with great ſincerity; and having detached Clement from the confederacy, wiſhed to turn Bourbon's arms againſt the Venetians, who, of all the powers at war with the emperor, had exerted the greateſt vigour. With this view he detached a courier to Bourbon, informing him of the ſuſpenſion of arms, which, in the name of their common maſter, he had concluded with the pope. Bourbon had other ſchemes, and he had proſecuted them now too far to think of retreating. To have mentioned a retreat to his ſoldiers would have been dangerous; his command was independent on Lannoy; he was fond of mortifying a man whom he had reaſons to hate; for theſe reaſons, without paying the leaſt regard to the meſſage, he continued to ravage the eccleſiaſtical territories, and to advance towards Florence. Upon this, all Clement's terror and anxiety returning with new

* Guic. l. xviii. 436. † Guic. l. xviii. 446.

force, he had recourſe to Lannoy, and intreated and conjured him to put a ſtop to Bourbon's progreſs. Lannoy accordingly ſet out for his camp, but durſt not approach it; Bourbon's ſoldiers having got notice of the truce, raged and threatened, demanding the accompliſhment of the promiſes to which they had truſted; their general himſelf could hardly reſtrain them; every perſon in Rome perceived that nothing remained but to prepare for reſiſting a ſtorm which it was now impoſſible to diſpel. Clement alone, relying on ſome ambiguous and deceitful profeſſions which Bourbon made of his inclination towards peace, ſunk back into his former ſecurity*.

Bourbon, on his part, was far from being free from ſolicitude. All his attempts on any place of importance had hitherto miſcarried; and Florence, towards which he had been approaching for ſome time, was, by the arrival of the duke d'Urbino's army, put in a condition to ſet his power at defiance. As it now became neceſſary to change his route, and to take inſtantly ſome new reſolution, he fixed without heſitation on one which was no leſs daring in itſelf, than it was impious, according to the opinion of that age. This was to aſſault and plunder Rome. Many reaſons, however, prompted him to it. He was fond of thwarting Lannoy, who had undertaken for the ſafety of that city; he imagined that the emperor would be highly pleaſed to ſee Clement, the chief author of the league againſt him, humbled; he flattered himſelf that, by gratifying the rapacity of his ſoldiers with ſuch immenſe booty, he would attach them for ever to his intereſt; or (which is ſtill more probable than any of theſe) he hoped that by means of the power and fame, which he would acquire from the conqueſt of the firſt city in Chriſtendom, that he might lay the foundation of an independent power; and that, after ſhaking off all connection with the emperor, he might take poſſeſſion

* Guic. l. xviii. 437, &c. Mem. de Bellay, p. 100.

of Naples, or of ſome of the Italian ſtates, in his own name†.

Whatever his motives were, he executed his reſolution with a rapidity equal to the boldneſs with which he had formed it. His ſoldiers, now that they had their prey full in view, complained neither of fatigue, nor famine, nor want of pay. No ſooner did they begin to move from Tuſcany towards Rome, than the pope, ſenſible at laſt how fallacious the hopes had been on which he repoſed, ſtarted from his ſecurity. But no time now remained, even for a bold and deciſive pontiff to have taken proper meaſures, or to have formed any effectual plan of defence. Under Clement's feeble conduct, all was conſternation, diſorder, and irreſolution. He collected, however, ſuch of his diſbanded ſoldiers as ſtill remained in the city; he armed the artificers of Rome, and the footmen and train-bearers of the cardinals; he repaired the breaches in the walls; he began to erect new works; he excommunicated Bourbon and all his troops, branding the Germans with the name of Lutherans, and the Spaniards with that of Moors‡. Truſting to theſe ineffectual military preparations, or to his ſpiritual arms, which were ſtill more deſpiſed by rapacious ſoldiers, he ſeems to have laid aſide his natural timidity, and, contrary to the advice of all his counſellors, determined to wait the approach of an enemy whom he might eaſily have avoided by a timely retreat.

Bourbon, who ſaw the neceſſity of diſpatch, now that his intentions were known, advanced with ſuch ſpeed, that he gained ſeveral marches on the duke d'Urbino's army, and encamped in the plains of Rome on the evening of the fifth of May. From thence he ſhewed his ſoldiers the palaces and churches of that city, into which, as the capital of the Chriſtian commonwealth, the riches of all Europe had flowed during many centuries, without having been once vio-

† Brant. iv. 271. vi. 189. Belcarii. Comment. 594.
‡ Seckend. lib. ii. p. 68.

lated by any hoſtile hand; and commanding them to refreſh themſelves at night, as a preparation for the aſſault next day, promiſed them, in reward of their toils and valour, the poſſeſſion of all the treaſures accumulated there.

Early in the morning, Bourbon, who had determined to diſtinguiſh that day either by his death or the ſucceſs of his enterpriſe, appeared at the head of his troops, clad in complete armour, above which he wore a veſt of white tiſſue, that he might be more conſpicuous both to his friends and to his enemies; and as all depended on one bold impreſſion, he led them inſtantly to ſcale the walls. Three diſtinct bodies, one of Germans, another of Spaniards, and the laſt of Italians, the three different nations of whom the army was compoſed, were appointed to this ſervice; a ſeparate attack was aſſigned to each; and the whole army advanced to ſupport them as occaſion ſhould require. A thick miſt concealed their approach until they reached almoſt the brink of the ditch, which ſurrounded the ſuburbs: having planted their ladders in a moment, each brigade ruſhed on to the aſſault with an impetuoſity heightened by national emulation. They were received at firſt with fortitude equal to their own; the Swiſs in the pope's guards, and the veteran ſoldiers who had been aſſembled, fought with a courage becoming men to whom the defence of the nobleſt city in the world was entruſted. Bourbon's troops, notwithſtanding all their valour, gained no ground, and even began to give way; when their leader, perceiving that on this critical moment the fate of the day depended, leaped from his horſe, preſſed to the front, ſnatched a ſcaling ladder from a ſoldier, planted it againſt the wall, and began to mount it, encouraging his men with his voice and hand to follow him. But at that very inſtant, a muſket bullet from the ramparts pierced his groin with a wound, which he immediately felt to be mortal; but he retained ſo much preſence of mind, as to deſire thoſe who were near him to cover his body with a cloak, that his death might not diſhearten his troops; and ſoon af-

ter he expired with a courage worthy of a better cauſe, and which would have entitled him to the higheſt praiſe, if he had thus fallen in defence of his country, not at the head of its enemies‡.

This fatal event could not be concealed from the army; the ſoldiers ſoon miſſed their general, whom they were accuſtomed to ſee in every time of danger; but, inſtead of being diſheartened by their loſs, it animated them with new valour; the name of Bourbon reſounded along the line, accompanied with the cry of *blood* and *revenge*. The veterans who defended the walls were ſoon overpowered by numbers; the untrained body of city recruits fled at the ſight of danger, and the enemy, with irreſiſtible violence ruſhed into th town.

During the combat, Clement was employed at the high altar of St. Peter's church in offering up to Heaven unavailing prayers for victory. No ſooner was he informed that his troops began to give way, than he fled with precipitation; and with an infatuation ſtill more amazing than any thing already mentioned, inſtead of making his eſcape by the oppoſite gate, where there was no enemy to oppoſe it, he ſhut himſelf up, together with thirteen cardinals, the foreign ambaſſadors, and many perſons of diſtinction, in the caſtle of St. Angelo, which, from his late misfortune, he might have known to be an inſecure retreat. In his way from the Vatican to that fortreſs, he ſaw his troops flying before an enemy who purſued without giving quarter; he heard the cries and lamentations of the Roman citizens, and beheld the beginning of thoſe calamities which his own credulity and ill conduct had brought upon his ſubjects†.

It is impoſſible to deſcribe, or even to imagine, the miſery and horror of that ſcene which followed. Whatever a city taken by ſtorm can dread from military rage, unreſtrained

‡ Mem. de Bellay, 101. Guic. lib. xviii. p. 445, &c. Oeuv. de Brant. iv. 257, &c.

† Jov. Vit. Colon. 165.

by diſcipline; whatever exceſſes the ferocity of the Germans, the avarice of the Spaniards, or the licentiouſneſs of the Italians could commit, theſe the wretched inhabitants were obliged to ſuffer. Churches, palaces, and the houſes of private perſons, were plundered without diſtinction. No age, or character, or ſex, was exempt from injury. Cardinals, nobles, prieſts, matrons, virgins, were all the prey of ſoldiers, and at the mercy of men deaf to the voice of humanity. Nor did theſe outrages ceaſe, as is uſual in towns which are carried by aſſault, when the firſt fury of the ſtorm was over; the Imperialiſts kept poſſeſſion of Rome ſeveral months; and, during all that time, the inſolence and brutality of the ſoldiers hardly abated. Their booty in ready money alone amounted to a million of ducats; what they raiſed by ranſoms and exactions far exceeded that ſum. Rome, though taken ſeveral different times by the northern nations who over-ran the empire in the fifth and ſixth centuries, was never treated with ſo much cruelty by the barbarous and heathen Huns, Vandals, or Goths, as now by the bigotted ſubjects of a Catholic monarch§.

After Bourbon's death, the command of the Imperial army devolved on Philibert de Chalons prince of Orange, who with difficulty prevailed on as many of his ſoldiers to deſiſt from the pillage as were neceſſary to inveſt the caſtle of St. Angelo. Clement was immediately ſenſible of his error in having retired into that ill-provided and untenable fort. But as the Imperialiſts, ſcorning diſcipline, and intent only on plunder, puſhed the ſiege with little vigour, he did not deſpair of holding out until the duke d'Urbino could come to his relief. That general advanced at the head of an army compoſed of Venetians, Florentines, and Swiſs, in the pay of France, of ſufficient ſtrength to have delivered Clement

§ Jov. Vit. Colon. 166. Guic. lib. xviii. 440, &c. Comment. de Capta Urbe Romæ, ap. Scardium, ii. 230. Ulloa Vita dell Carlo V. p. 110, &c. Giannone Hiſt. of Nap. B. xxxi. c. 3. p. 507.

from the preſent danger. But d'Urbino, preferring the indulgence of his hatred againſt the family of Medici to the glory of delivering the capital of Chriſtendom, and the head of the church, pronounced the enterpriſe to be too hazardous; and from an exquiſite refinement in revenge, having marched forward ſo far, that his army being ſeen from the ramparts of St. Angelo, flattered the pope with the proſpect of certain relief, he immediately wheeled about and retired†. Clement, deprived of every reſource, and reduced to ſuch extremity of famine as to feed on aſſes fleſh§, was obliged to capitulate [June 6] on ſuch conditions as the conquerors were pleaſed to preſcribe. He agreed to pay four hundred thouſand ducats to the army; to ſurrender to the emperor all the places of ſtrength belonging to the church; and, beſides giving hoſtages, to remain a priſoner himſelf until the chief articles were performed. He was committed to the care of Alarçon, who, by his ſevere vigilance in guarding Francis, had given full proof of his being qualified for that office; and thus, by a ſingular accident, the ſame man had the cuſtody of the two moſt illuſtrious perſonages who had been made priſoners in Europe during ſeveral ages.

The account of this extraordinary and unexpected event was no leſs ſurpriſing than agreeable to the emperor. But in order to conceal his joy from his ſubjects, who were filled with horror at the ſucceſs and crimes of their countrymen, and to leſſen the indignation of the reſt of Europe, he declared that Rome had been aſſaulted without any order from him. He wrote to all the princes with whom he was in alliance, diſclaiming his having had any knowledge of Bourbon's intention*. He put himſelf and court into mourning; commanded the rejoicings which had been ordered for the birth of his ſon Philip to be ſtopped; and employed an artifice no leſs hypocritical than groſs, he appointed prayers and proceſſions throughout all Spain for the recovery of the

† Guic. l. xviii. 450. § Jov. Vit. Colon. 167.
* Ruſcelli Lettere di Principi, ii. 234.

pope's liberty, which, by an order to his generals, he could have immediately granted him†.

The good fortune of the houſe of Auſtria was no leſs conſpicuous in another part of Europe. Solyman having invaded Hungary with an army of three hundred thouſand men, Lewis II. king of that country and of Bohemia, a weak and inexperienced prince, advanced raſhly to meet him with a body of men which did not amount to thirty thouſand. With an imprudence ſtill more unpardonable, he gave the command of theſe troops to Paul Tomorri, a Franciſcan monk, archbiſhop of Golocza. This awkward general, in the dreſs of his order, girt with its cord, marched at the head of the troops; and, hurried on by his own preſumption, as well as by the impetuoſity of nobles who deſpiſed danger, but were impatient of long ſervice, he fought the fatal battle of Mohacz [Auguſt 29, 1526], in which the king, the flower of the Hungarian nobility, and upwards of twenty thouſand men, fell the victims of his folly and ill conduct. Solyman, after his victory, ſeized and kept poſſeſſion of ſeveral towns of the greateſt ſtrength in the ſouthern provinces of Hungary, and, over-running the reſt of the country, carried near two hundred thouſand perſons into captivity. As Lewis was the laſt male of the royal family of Jagellon, the archduke Ferdinand claimed both his crowns. This claim was founded on a double title; the one derived from the ancient pretenſions of the houſe of Auſtria to both kingdoms; the other from the right of his wife, the only ſiſter of the deceaſed monarch. The feudal inſtitutions, however, ſubſiſted both in Hungary and Bohemia in ſuch vigour, and the nobles poſſeſſed ſuch extenſive power that the crowns were ſtill elective, and Ferdinand's rights, if they had not been powerfully ſupported, would have met with little regard. But his own perſonal merit; the reſpect due to the brother of the greateſt monarch in Chriſtendom;

† Sleid. 109. Sandov. i. 872. Mauroc. Hiſt. Veneta, lib. iii. 220.

the neceſſity of chuſing a prince able to afford his ſubjects ſome additional protection againſt the Turkiſh arms, which as they had recently felt their power, they greatly dreaded; together with the intrigues of his ſiſter, who had been married to the late king, overcame the prejudices which the Hungarians had conceived againſt the archduke as a foreigner; and though a conſiderable party voted for the Vaywode of Tranſilvania, at length ſecured Ferdinand the throne of that kingdom. The ſtates of Bohemia imitated the example of their neighbour kindom; but in order to aſcertain and ſecure their own privileges, they obliged Ferdinand, before his coronation, to ſubſcribe a deed which they termed a *Reverſe*, declaring that he held that crown not by any previous right, but by their gratuitous and voluntary election. By ſuch a vaſt acceſſion of territories, the hereditary poſſeſſion of which they ſecured in proceſs of time to their family, the princes of the houſe of Auſtria attained that preeminence in power which hath rendered them ſo formidable to the reſt of Germany §.

The diſſenſions between the pope and emperor proved extremely favourable to the progreſs of Lutheraniſm. Charles, exaſperated by Clement's conduct, and fully employed in oppoſing the league which he had formed againſt him, had little inclination, and leſs leiſure, to take any meaſures for ſuppreſſing the new opinions in Germany. In a diet of the empire held at Spires [June 25, 1526], the ſtate of religion came to be conſidered; and all that the emperor required of the princes was, that they would wait patiently, and without encouraging innovations, for the meeting of a general council which he had demanded of the pope. They, in return, acknowledged the convocation of a council to be the proper and regular ſtep towards reforming abuſes in the church; but contended that a national council held in Ger-

§ Steph. Broderick Procancelarii Hungar. Clades in Campo Mohacz, ap. Scardium, ii. 218. P. Barre Hiſt. d' Allemagne, tom. viii. part i. p. 198.

many would be more effectual for that purpoſe than what he had propoſed. To his advice, concerning the diſcouragement of innovations, they paid ſo little regard, that even during the meeting of the diet at Spires, the divines who attended the elector of Saxony and landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel thither, preached publicly and adminiſtered the ſacraments according to the rites of the reformed church *. The emperor's own example emboldened the Germans to treat the papal authority with little reverence. During the heat of his reſentment againſt Clement, he had publiſhed a long reply to an angry brief, which the pope had intended as an apology for his own conduct. In this manifeſto, the emperor, after having enumerated many inſtances of that pontiff's ingratitude, deceit and ambition, all which he painted in the ſtrongeſt and moſt aggravated colours, appealed from him to a general council. At the ſame time he wrote to the college of cardinals, complaining of Clement's partiality and injuſtice; and requiring them, if he refuſed or delayed to call a council, to ſhew their concern for the peace of the Chriſtian church, ſo ſhamefully neglected by its chief paſtor, by ſummoning that aſſembly in their own name ‡. This manifeſto, little inferior in virulence to the invectives of Luther himſelf, was diſperſed over Germany with great induſtry, and being eagerly read by perſons of every rank, did much more than counterbalance the effect of all Charles's declarations againſt the new opinions.

* Sleid. 103. ‡ Goldaſt. Polit. Imper. p. 984.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.